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i  
ABSTRACT 
 
This research attempted to answer two questions related to the resource 
governance in Indonesia. The first question is why and how the governance in 
hydrocarbon and mining industries change the way they do. The second one is why 
both governances change to different trajectory. Institutional change, developed by 
North (1990, 2005, and 2009); Lowndes and Robert (2013); and Campbell (2004), is 
the main theoretical framework use to answer those questions. The theorist proposed 
that a study of institutional change should consider; institutional elements, the agent 
of change, the sources of change, and the process as well as mechanism of 
institutional change. In addition, theories (1977) about bargaining relationship 
between state and business developed initially by Vernon () and developed further by 
Luo () by the name of political bargaining relations are used to explore the way in 
which interaction among actors could change initial institutional arrangements. 
Meanwhile, governing interdependence and actors’ capacity in economic activities 
developed by Weiss (1991) are used to analyse how actors act in their respective role 
in the structure as well as react to problems and challenges from their environment. 
Qualitative comparative research method became a guideline to make a research 
design and process tracing is the method of analysis. The development of the resource 
governance in Indonesia extractive industry is an important case study for research 
about institutional change that also provides an alternative framework for further 
studies on resource-rich countries other than using dominant perspectives like 
resource curse and rentier state. 
The study shows that a government could generate two different types of 
resource governances for its extractive industry. Indonesia has different institutional 
arrangement for both hydrocarbon and mining sectors. Both were also changing to a 
different mode of governance and influencing by different factors although locating in 
the same political, economic, and social environment. Dominant actors, institutional 
elements that change, as well as process and mechanism of institutional change are all 
different. Hence, it is possible that extractive industry could have different 
institutional arrangement despite historically, having similar point of departure. 
Those basic findings provided an alternative point of view than previous 
studies about resource-rich countries that is usually starting from a continuous 
struggling political and economic condition producing weak institution, rent-seeking 
behaviour of dominant elites, as well as social conflict emerge in the region against 
either the corrupt government or the company, or both. In this regard, institutionalism 
developing by North (1991, 2005, and 2009) gives an interesting point of departure. 
He pointed learning process as an important capacity and process for expanding 
actors’ ability to act and interact. Furthermore, he highlighted openness as an 
important factor and mechanism in an institutional change and understanding 
historical path of the case as crucial process to uncover the source of different 
outcome and trajectory of change. 
The result of my study is that institutional change in both mining and 
hydrocarbon industries happens in both element of rule and procedure. The process is 
influenced by similar factors; the political and economic environment and it happens 
both evolutionary and revolutionary. Incremental development happens as part of 
actors’ transition and adaptation to the bigger change. Both types of change are 
following a historical path, that means gradual shift is usually followed by the big 
change, usually happen in rule element, and so does the big change is followed further 
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by smaller one, usually in procedure element. The source is from both internal and 
external factors. The mechanism of change is following North, Wallis, and Weingast 
(2005) mechanism of transition from limited to open access order. The transition 
involved the continuous interaction with other actors, shifting from personal to 
impersonal exchange among actors, and the emergence of perpetual-life organization 
(in Indonesia case, such organization is both national companies and bureaucratic 
agencies). 
In conclusion, analyzing about institutional change in resource governance of 
a resource-rich country gave a valuable insight that was usually obscured by prejudice 
about the weak institution embedded in the governmental system and rent-seeking 
behavior done by elites. Such insight is important to produce an alternative analysis 
highlighting how actors, both the dominant and the usual ones, always move by 
themselves, expanding their capacity to act and interact with each other. In this 
regard, starting from the prejudice stated could not give a better and deeper analysis  
as the institutional arrangement and structure is not owned and directed only by the 
movement of dominant 
Keywords: institutional change, resource governance, learning process, openness 
iii  
This thesis is dedicated to my beloved country, REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA; my 
parents, Drs. Fuldiaratman, M.Pd and Dra. Roseli Theis M.S.; and my husband, 
Henderi, S.S.T., MBA. 
A special mention for my late father in law, Mr. Gunadi (1959-2014). Loosing you is 
the most painful thing that ever happened during this journey. Thank you for your 
love and support for the last 5 years. 
Lastly, this thesis is also dedicated to all muslims in the world. We have been through 
so much problems, hate, and discrimination due to negative prejudice and 
Islamophobia directed by the ones who know nothing about our religion. Let’s just 
focus our attention to gain Allah’s love and do not concern our time and effort to feed 
such negativity. (Deeply grieving for all victims in New Zealand attack, none of us, 
muslims, deserve such terrorist attack) 
iv  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The journey of being PhD student is not easy. I owe my husband, my parents, and my 
siblings and in laws, for their support during this journey and for connecting me with 
the sources in the government and companies. I am very grateful for LPDP for 
sponsoring my study. I am very thankful for my supervisor, Dr. Richard Connolly and 
Dr. Derek Averre for their understanding, support, and suggestion during the research 
and writing process. I could not keep going in conducting my research and complete 
writing this thesis without their guidance and support. I owe Tricia for her support 
during my study in the university. She is very responsive and helpful in dealing with 
my administrative affairs during my study. I am also thankful for valuable insights 
from the two examiners, Professor Fiona Nunan and Dr. Michael Buehler 
This thesis will not be completed without the cooperation from governmental  
agencies and hydrocarbon and mining companies in Indonesia. I would like to send 
my gratitude towards Member of House of Representative, SKK Migas, Directorate 
General of Oil and Gas; and Directorate General of Mineral and Coal in the Ministry 
of Mineral and Energy Resources, Directorate General of Tax in the Ministry of 
Finance, Pertamina, BUMD Bekasi, Pemerintah Daerah Sumatera Barat, and the oil 
and mining companies. In addition, I would like to thank Proofreading Service UK for 
helping me in editing my thesis. 
Being an international PhD student means that living in a foreign country, far away 
from home. Therefore, I would like to thank my Indonesian friend, especially Mas 
Hijrah, Mbak Mukti, Mbak Irni Rahmayani Johan, Mas Mohammad Roudo, and 
Mbak Vima; as well as Zhiting, my only friends in the program, for accompanying me 
to go through this process. 
Lastly, I never forget my status as lecturer in the International Relations Department, 
Faculty of Social and Political Science, State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah 
Jakarta. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Bahtiar Effendy and Dr. Hendro Prasetyo for 
their support in applying for LPDP scholarship. In addition, I would like to thank my 
former lecturer, Dr. Titi Mutiah Setyawati and Prof. Zainuddin Djafar, M.A., Ph.D for 
giving me academic recommendation for my LPDP application. 
v  
List of Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Indonesia Oil Reserves................................................................................................ 104 
Figure 3.2. Indonesia Gas Reserves .............................................................................................. 104 
vi  
List of Charts 
 
 
 
 
Chart 3.1. Oil and Gas Production in Indonesia ............................................................................ 103 
Chart 6.1. Comparison of Government Revenue from Hydrocarbon and Mining Industry .......... 188 
vii  
LIST OF ABBREVIATION 
 
 
ANTAM : Aneka Tambang, a State-owned Mining Company 
BPPKA :Badan Pembinaan dan Pengusahaan Kontraktor Asing (the Managerial 
Body of Foreign Contractor, former name of BP Migas 
BP Migas : Badan Pelaksana Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi (Implementing 
 
Body for Upstream Operation) 
BPH Migas : Badan Pelaksana Usaha Hilir Minyak dan Gas Bumi (Implementing 
 
Body for Downstream Operation) 
CoW : Contract of Work 
FMC : Foreign Mining Company 
FOC : Foreign Oil Company 
GOI : Government of Indonesia 
HoR : House of Representative 
LAO : Limited Access Order 
MEMR : Ministry of Mineral and Energy Resources 
MEM : Ministry of Energy and Mining, former name of MEMR 
MNC : Multi National Company 
MoF : Ministry of Finance 
NMC : National Mining Company 
NOC : National Oil Company 
OAO : Open Access Order 
PSC : Production Sharing Contract 
PTBA : name of a national coal mining company 
SKK Migas : Satuan Kerja Khusus Minyak dan Gas Bumi 
SoC : State-owned Company 
viii  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................... i 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iv 
LIST OF FIGURES ..........................................................................................................................v 
LIST OF CHARTS ........................................................................................................................ vi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................... vii 
TABLE OF CONTENT ............................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................1 
1.1. Background of the Research .....................................................................................................1 
1.2. Overview of the Republic of Indonesia ..................................................................................10 
1.3. Institutionalism and Institutional Change ...............................................................................15 
1.4. Focus of the Research and Research Questions ......................................................................18 
1.5. Research Design ......................................................................................................................19 
1.6. Hypothesis...............................................................................................................................20 
1.7. Structure of The Chapters .......................................................................................................22 
CHAPTER II THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................24 
2.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................24 
2.2. Institutionalism and Institutional Evolution and Change: Definition and Elements ..............30 
ix 
 
2.3. Institutional Change: The Path, Process, and Mechanism ......................................................41 
2.4. Limitations of Resource Curse Literature in the Studies of Resource Governance ................49 
2.5. Theoretical Frameworks of Government and Business Relations ..........................................57 
2.5.1. Actor’s Capacity ......................................................................................................64 
2.6. Comparative Historical Institutionalism and the Process Tracking Method ..........................65 
2.6.1. Data Collection ........................................................................................................70 
2.7. Operationalisation of the Frameworks and Method ................................................................71 
2.8. Conclusion: Basic Assumptions and Hypothesis ....................................................................73 
CHAPTER III INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN INDONESIA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
............................................................................................................................................76 
3.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................76 
3.2. Institutional change in Indonesia’s political and economic sectors ........................................80 
3.3. General View on Hydrocarbon and Mining Industries in Indonesia ......................................86 
3.3.1. Historical Path of the Hydrocarbon and Mining Industries .................................................90 
3.3.2. State Control and Foreign Investment ...............................................................................96 
3.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................106 
CHAPTER IV INDONESIA HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY ..............................................108 
4.1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................108 
4.2. The Rule Element .................................................................................................................109 
x 
 
4.3. The Procedure Element .........................................................................................................125 
4.4. Process and Mechanism of Change ......................................................................................138 
CHAPTER V INDONESIA MINING INDUSTRY ................................................................143 
5.1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................143 
5.2. The Rule Element .................................................................................................................144 
5.3. The Procedure Element .........................................................................................................148 
5.4. Process and Mechanism of Change ......................................................................................177 
5.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................182 
CHAPTER VI COMPARISON BETWEEN THE HYDROCARBON AND MINING 
INDUSTRIES IN INDONESIA ................................................................................................186 
6.1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................186 
6.2. The Rule Element .................................................................................................................189 
6.3. The Procedure Element .........................................................................................................198 
6.4. Process and Mechanism of Change ......................................................................................208 
6.5. Theoretical Reflection ...........................................................................................................227 
6.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................231 
CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................235 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................ 
1  
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background of the Research 
 
Oil producing countries consist of many newly independent states and have attracted 
many researchers as they challenged the supremacy of international oil enterprises, which 
dominated supply within the oil market until 1970. Some of the countries are not only oil-rich, 
but also resource-rich. This situation means that resource governance is complex and could be 
varied based on the different kinds of extractive industries in those countries. Unfortunately, 
such complexity is still rarely captured by previous studies as they mostly emphasise the 
interlinkage of resource-richness, governance, and general national economic performance. Such 
studies could result in an incomplete and too shallow conclusion regarding the nature of 
government and resource governance in developing countries. 
North (2005, p. viii) stated that he did not consider the nature of societal change and the 
way in which human understand and act accordingly to such change in his earlier work on New 
Institutional Economic (NIE). Furthermore, he highlighted the importance of understanding 
economic change as a unique societal process and that, however we try, our knowledge and 
understanding are always imperfect. In this regard, there is no clear-cut model or recipe for 
economic change that is able to ensure a positive economic growth (North, 2005). The author 
further posited that humans, as vital institutional actors, have a belief system in which they know 
the consequences of their actions. In this way, humans build upon preferences blended into 
perceptions about their environment and understand their environment through a learning  
process that is assumed to comprise of accumulation of both individual experiences and 
experiences from past generations. Hence, he emphasised that it is important to focus our 
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attention on human learning, i.e. what is learned and how it is shared among members of society. 
However humans act upon their understanding, there will always be gap between their intentions 
and the actual outcome, something that we often call uncertainty and unpredictability in the 
environment. This gap results from the changes which happen in our environment while we are 
learning and understanding it (North, 2005, p. ix). This reality implies that imperfect human 
understanding is a condition that always occurs and should be dealt with, meaning our capacity 
to adapt is important in the attempt to achieve our goals and realise our plans. 
Vernon (1972, 1977, and 1998) consistently considered multinational companies (MNCs) 
as in constant conflict with government. This conflictual relationship between state and business 
is a consequence of their asymmetrical goals, jurisdictions, and responsibilities. Eden (2000, p. 
336) explained their differences further; the state has broad goals covering all sectors, for 
instance the political, economic, and social arenas, jurisdiction is limited by national borders, and 
as it manages state affairs the government is responsible towards the citizen. On the other hand, 
profit maximisation is the primary goal of an MNC as its main responsibility is its shareholders 
and it operates globally (across national boundaries). 
The obsolescing bargaining framework is famous for analysing state and business 
relations. This framework makes an important contribution to political and economic sciences, 
especially regarding the dynamic nature of this relationship. Vernon (1977 and 1998) explained 
that at the beginning phase, many states compete to attract foreign investment made by MNCs 
into their economies. However, after being chosen as the host country for their operations, a 
government has stronger position in comparison to MNCs. This means that MNCs begin to lose 
their advantage over governments and therefore their bargaining power is also weakened. This 
situation exists as both parties enter a contractual relationship as the rule of the game for their 
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further interaction within the country’s jurisdiction. MNCs become vulnerable to changing 
policies and attitudes which will influence their operations within the state’s boundaries. This 
scenario is exacerbated by the increasing cost of leaving as MNCs have already invested in their 
operation’s expenditures, while the government has a stronger position as it has benefited from 
such investment. The ownership structure within the country determines this situation. The 
protection of property rights is usually determined by both the contract and national and local 
regulations; however, the gap between regulation and actual practice is crucial for a sustainable 
and long lasting interaction. A smaller gap means that MNCs could have more certainty to 
conduct their operations and benefit from their investment. It also means that the government 
could gain more trust from other MNCs which are considering investment, thus enabling them to 
secure their operations in the face of changing domestic political and economic environments. 
However, this does not mean that both actors have static advantage and disadvantage 
positions (zero-sum interactions). Long and sustained government and MNC relations are more 
beneficial for both actors under unchanging domestic and international circumstances. 
Nevertheless, both actors should always have an exit strategy for disadvantage situations; thus, 
both need not only certainty from the contract but also a flexible attitude in their mutual 
interactions. 
Governance of natural resources is suggested can lead to strong or poor economic 
performance based on several related factors. Some researchers suggested that a country’s 
political system (democracy or autocracy) (see Karl, 1997; Luong and Weinthal, 2013; Bianca 
and Sarbu, 2015, for example) and the ownership structure (public or private ownership) (see 
Luong and Weinthal 2013; Bianca and Sarbu, 2015) demonstrated a pattern of weak institutions 
and the inability of governments to produce wealth for their citizens despite their richness. Some 
4  
researchers posited that democratic countries tend to have private ownership to manage their 
natural resources and limit their intervention in such affairs. On the other hand, autocratic 
countries prefer a state monopoly over their resources and the resultant income serves elites 
rather than the public need (Karl, 1997). Some other researchers suggested that a dominant path 
to study resource-rich countries that are classified as rentier states facing the resource curse 
involves identifying the weaknesses and highlighting the factors that confirm the “weak 
institution” arguments about the country’s governance; the path ends by emphasising the 
importance of reforming such governance and their structures by copying the liberal and 
neoliberal path of Western, developed countries. The over-emphasising of the usefulness of 
developed countries’ lenses to look and assess resource governance in developing countries is 
particularly dominant, and therefore academia has tended to undermine the importance of 
investigating a country-specific path of development and change. This is my main objective in 
studying the dynamic of resource governance in Indonesia. 
There are some common situations in resource-rich countries. However, such 
commonality is not adequate to understand and explain country-specific environments that 
together establish a unique feature for each country. Generating conclusions from only the 
general commonality without recognising their uniqueness could potentially mislead the outcome 
of our analysis and create a gap between what we think we know and what actually happens in 
those countries. 
The majority of resource-rich countries are Third World countries which gained their 
independence during Cold War. Many of them had autocratic systems as newly independent 
countries, but not many retain these systems in 2018. Some of them have transitioned towards 
democracy and some have been successful in developing a democratic political system which as 
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improved over time. They did not have a similar form of democracy or political economic 
institutions but, together with developed countries, they have survived the various economic and 
political crises which have taken place since 1990s. Thus, researches about resource-rich 
countries’ failure offered only a one-sided story regarding the complex political, economic, and 
social development path and process taken by these nations. Over-emphasising and over- 
simplifying such complexity by having prejudice and premature conclusions about weak 
institutions and rentier states could present a false illustration and trigger rejection and negative 
opinions and assumptions with regards to the developed Western world. This misunderstanding 
from the First and Third World Countries need to stop. Thus, there is a need for academia to 
attempt to look deeply into developing countries with a non-prejudiced, unbiased lens and build 
an analytical framework that does not undermine the struggle and complexity of these nations. 
The search for a framework that is built on their point of view is urgent in order to generate a 
more update and complete understanding about what actually happens in developing countries. 
Although previous studies on the subject constitute an important starting point, letting the 
information and data tell the actual story about the mechanisms and processes in their political 
and economic systems is also an important step in building a new framework for studying 
resource-rich developing countries. 
There are several explicit and implicit lessons that I have collected from studying both 
literatures. First and foremost is that the developing countries are neither uniform nor have a 
static position, capacity, and action in governing their natural resources. Each of them has 
different political, economic, and social circumstances and therefore generalisation could barely 
develop our understanding about the way in which the real world is actually run. Resource curse 
and rentier state literatures tend to generalise resource-rich and developing countries as having 
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certain characteristics causing them to fail to govern their richness. The literatures were once 
important starting points guiding investors from developed countries to understand the challenge 
they would face when interacting and establishing relationships with elites and governments 
from such countries. However, both literature types have a static point of view, avoiding or 
worse ignoring the development in those countries. The nation-states were once newly 
independent countries which were in their initial step to build all their nations’ sectors. As the 
business entities nowadays have changed, the resource-rich countries have also transformed, 
developed, and changed. 
Secondly, by looking into government and business relationships, it is important to 
acknowledge that actors grow over time and their position with regards to other parties in a 
certain period could shift. The problem is how to overcome this dynamic condition as it is an 
inevitable fact social science scholars need to consider in their studies. Nothing is static in social 
relations and we can neither isolate nor control social actors and keep them in the imaginary 
moulds we call models, theories and concepts. Looking into such conditions without  having 
strict prejudice is vital in developing our knowledge and understanding about developing 
countries. 
It is important to rewrite and reconsider our initial assumptions drawing from knowledge 
about developed Western countries when studying developing countries. They do not merely 
consist of East Asian countries and the rest and each one is worth the effort of extensive study. 
They are not walking the same path as developed countries and hence studying them from that 
perspective fails to do justice to their own histories and paths. Existing frameworks are important 
and valuable starting points, but continuing the analysis in the same path and drawing the result 
in the same way by using developed countries’ lenses could be misleading. Studies about 
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developing countries are not supposed to use a mirroring method of analysis where they are fit 
into the existing frameworks and the aspects that do not fit are concluded (or judged) to be 
wrong, poor, or not efficient. These studies then unwisely suggest certain paths and formulas that 
the researchers believe will work as well as in the developed countries. 
Drawing from the importance of looking closely into how governments govern their 
natural resources, I intend to present an alternative approach which is useful in understanding 
two kinds of mining governance in Indonesia: the hydrocarbon and mineral mining industries. 
Indonesia has been chosen as this country has a complex political and economic realm 
surrounding its resource governance since its independence in August 1945. The complexity 
arose from the political and economic development, which went through institutional change. It 
also came from the development of actors’ capacity to interact and establish as well as prolong 
their relationship with each other, especially the one categorised as transformational and adaptive 
capacity. Institutional change, actors’ capacity, and the relationship among actors are conceptual 
frameworks that are combined to provide an analysis capturing the complexity of resource 
governance in Indonesia. 
On the other hand, researches about institutional change provide a variety of viewpoints. 
Some of them discussed the source of these changes, whether endogenous or exogenous, as well 
as the agent of change, whether individual, collective, or organisation (Lowndes and Robert, 
2013 and Campbell, 2004). The others explained the processes of change, whether spontaneous, 
by design, random, or gradual, and the scope of changes, and whether they were isolated or 
involved sets of related institutions (North, 1991; North, 2005; and North, Wallis, and Weingast, 
2009). Those researches imply a complex nature of studies about institutional change. Such 
studies are important as institutional stability and a static view regarding social order has 
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dominated institutionalists’ attention and pursuing both stability and order has been considered 
the main goal of society and thus change has been considered as a form of disorder. 
This thesis presents an analysis of institutional change in Indonesia’s resource 
governance. It focuses on the dynamic of resource governance in Indonesia in which institutional 
arrangement is changing and the position and role of political organisations in the governance is 
also shifting. This shift is affected by change in the rules governing the extractive industries. 
Although the dynamic of the organisational level is not the focus of my analysis, I explain the 
general learning steps which occurred within governmental bodies related to mining. On the 
other hand, I posit that changes in the rule happen as part of changes that occurred in the national 
political and economic realm. Hence, the dynamic in governing the industries is not the result of 
individual and collective actors’ attempt to change the rules. 
The search for wealth and power by various international economic actors, especially 
states, has been a primary concern in International Political Economy studies. States are 
considered as influential organisational actors in both political and economic systems. However, 
since the globalisation has intensified transnational economic activities, there are other actors 
that challenge states’ domination in those activities, namely multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
Thus, both actors are involved in competitive and conflictual as well as cooperative relationships 
in their effort to pursue power and wealth as they conduct their activities within states’ territories 
and across territorial boundaries. 
States and MNEs have different characteristics in their political economic activities 
(Stiglitz, 2007). A state has ownership rights over and is bounded by its territory and all 
resources within its internationally-recognised boundaries. State could also collect rent from 
private actors and foreigners operating within its territory by claiming ownership over resources 
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extracted and produce from the area. The amount of collected rent is usually agreed through a 
contract signed between government that represents the state and its citizens and representative 
from the company (or companies as in the case of a joint company). The contract legally binds 
both actors over a certain period of time and usually consists of permission to enter and exit, 
rights and obligations, as well as procedures and consequences for compliance and disobeying 
the agreement. Thus, each contract always has financial consequences through the national fiscal 
system as well as involving other political, economic and social structures as MNEs operate 
within territorial boundaries of one or more states. 
A state has the autonomy to choose what, when, and how policy will be conducted with 
regards to every issue and sector. Thus, a state is sensitive to any threats towards its sovereignty, 
particularly about its ownership rights and autonomy. On the other hand, MNEs do not have such 
rights and also have the freedom to act. Even though they are independent actors in the 
international arena, they still have to deal with different regulations, laws, and societal 
environments in the different states in which they operate. As a profit-oriented actor, the 
company will make decisions by calculating potential profit and loss as well as the economic 
benefits of their government and societal relations. 
Stopford, Strange, and Henley (1991) argued that this reality changes the nature of 
international economic systems and challenges the primary position of the state as dominant 
actor. The contemporary international system has been shaped not only by interstate bargains, 
but also cooperation and competition between states and firms and also between firms. These 
authors claimed that in the globalised economic system, state authority and legacy is weakened. 
Thus, analysis of the decision-making process and strategy to gain wealth from interstate 
relationships is no longer adequate to explain the dynamics of the international economy. 
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The world economic system consists of both international and domestic actors and 
interactions. On the one hand, the interaction at the international level is shaped by interstate 
relationships, bargaining between states and multinational enterprises, and inter- and intra-firm 
coordination and competition. On the other hand, interaction in the domestic economic 
environment is shaped by the relationship between the government and foreign business entities. 
Although the interactions happen within a state jurisdiction, the transnational nature of the oil 
industry means that the relationship has to face both opportunities and constraints due to the 
ever-changing domestic and international political and economic environment. 
Resource governance, which is the main focus of this study, is the dynamic of actors’ 
relationships and the institutional arrangement of extractive industries in Indonesia. This 
dynamic is understood as institutional change that consists of changes in rules as well as changes 
within related organisations as the agents of change. Thus, institutional change is influenced by 
organisational actors (in this thesis the actors are governmental bodies and mining enterprises). 
Moreover, the changes also affect the way in which organisations act and interact with each 
other. 
1.2. Overview of the Republic of Indonesia 
 
Indonesia is a country located in the intersection of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This 
country consists of many islands located on the equator. Its location makes the country rich in 
various natural resources, especially minerals. This richness is combined with difficult 
topography, which means the extractive industry faces challenges in many locations. The areas 
with resources that are easy to extract, exploit, and produce are predominantly located on the two 
big islands, Java and Sumatra, while activities on other islands, which also have big deposits of 
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various minerals, were not developed until the 1997 political reform. Inequality of political and 
economic development in many islands is a direct consequence of these conditions. 
Following independence, Indonesia’s economy struggled to find the most suitable 
strategy in order to fund development projects, produce more money and distribute it to the 
suffering society. This difficult situation was also influenced by the power struggle among elites, 
especially the search for a suitable political system that could maintain Indonesia’s independence 
and gain support and legitimation from other political and social movements that spread all over 
the country. The disagreement among elites in governing the industry was heavily instigated by 
different opinions regarding the way in which the government should deal with foreign 
companies and foreign investment. The pro-liberalisation movement claimed that the 
government should invite foreign investors to enter the Indonesian economy as the available 
government capital was not adequate to fund the development projects. However, the painful 
experiences of colonialism were still felt strongly in various regions. The citizens sounded their 
rejection of the government’s liberalisation plan and strongly insisted that the government should 
rely on national power to run the industrialisation projects. However, the reality soon hit the pro- 
nationalist elites as this policy led to economic stagnation and resulted in poor economic growth. 
The elites needed to seek a new approach to save the hard-won independence and solve the 
economic problems. 
These difficulties were also shaped by the fact that the Republic of Indonesia consists of 
many islands with different languages, culture, and political and economic potency and 
structures. Nation and state building were not an easy task for whoever took the leading position 
of this newly independent country. The challenging domestic political economic condition has 
not been properly studied in previous researches. Economic historians such as Anne Booth 
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(1998) attempted to capture the history of Indonesia’s economic development process over a 
long period of time from the country’s precolonial period until the 20th century. Other 
economists have attempted to understand the paradox of Indonesia’s poor economic performance 
after the independence until the mid-1960s and the miraculous economic growth from 1969 to 
1990. Booth (1998, Chapter IV) attempted to explain the connection between economic 
performance and national economic policy from the colonial period to the post-colonial era 
(lasting for 150 years); however, she did not take into account the different nature, ideology, and 
style of the colonial and independent governments as the government of Indonesia only began to 
exist since the declaration of Independence in 1945. Her analysis did shed some light regarding 
the factors behind those performances, and the diverse economic strategy both in the East Indies 
and Indonesia. However, it failed to provide significant insights into the development of 
industrial governance with regards to government and business entities as the leading actors. 
The negligence regarding the linkage between political and economic institutional 
development means it is not possible to find an alternative answer to why the institutional 
structure of Indonesia’s political economy has developed to its current state, particularly 
regarding the governance of extractive industries. Furthermore, the national economic 
development trajectory and the reasons behind the poor economic growth are seen differently by 
researchers and academics. Some of them blame protectionist tendencies and nationalist 
sentiments resulting in unfavourable policies towards market economy and business. On the 
other hand, some of them, usually the insider/Indonesian academics, argue that due to the 
inability and lack of political will from the government to empower domestic economic players 
as opposed to foreign and international economic players the society has no control over the 
financial and profit flow from the resources found in the country’s soil or farmed from its rivers 
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and seas. Both groups of academics proposed an extreme viewpoint, an argument framed as pro- 
neoliberalist vs pro-nationalist. This inflexible and timid approach is not helping the students and 
readers to understand the actual condition in the country and has also failed to establish a basis 
for policy evaluation and consideration for policy makers. It is about time that a more diffuse 
approach considering both sides is considered by using a different lens. 
In addition, the tendency to neglect the social, political and economic conditions in which 
the institution was established and developed has resulted in immature or premature judgment 
about the development trajectories that actually take place driven by the actors vs the unintended 
results driven by the uncertain and unpredictable nature of the country’s local, national and 
regional political and economic realm. Those layers of social environment heavily shape or 
influence the way in which political and economic actors perceive and interact with each other. 
Thus, previous studies neglected the way in which actors behave and react regarding other 
actors’ actions and attitudes as well as their environment. Most importantly, severe negligence 
has been found regarding the diversity of governmental actors and business entities. In this study, 
it is proposed that without this diverse understanding about the diversity of governmental and 
business actors no new result can be found in this topic of study. Furthermore, it will not be 
possible to identify the root cause of the puzzling question about why the economic development 
trajectories in Indonesia have taken unprecedented directions and failed to produce a satisfying 
result from both extreme perspectives. This is because the direction of the study is no longer 
adequate to add value from the existing literature about Indonesia’s resource governance and it 
also highlights the need to change the analytical lens through which this topic will be studied. 
The analytical focus on the way in which the government of Indonesia governs the 
country’s interdependence with business entities proposes a valuable point of view to understand 
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the institutional development trajectory of the political and economic realm of the nation. 
Unfortunately, this viewpoint is rare in the previous and recent researches from Indonesianists 
inside and outside the country. The tendency to study the Indonesian political and economic 
realm during a specific period of time without considering the historical path experienced by 
both the government and businesses as well as society to some extent has resulted in exhausted 
and unoriginal analysis and descriptions about the country’s actual condition and direction. In 
addition, the tendency to study the topic in pieces also influenced an incomprehensive picture 
and created a tendency to quickly generalise the way in which the governance has developed in 
the same way for the same type of industries. A generalisation has often been made that the 
extractive industry consists of the same institutional arrangement even though it has several  
types of governance based on the differentiation between hydrocarbons with coal and mineral 
industries. 
Previous studies about resource governance in Indonesia could be located in at least two 
opposite polar; namely the pro-nationalist or the pro-liberalist. The first group of researchers 
advocated the importance of government involvement and protection towards the country’s 
natural resources (see for example Bakhri, 2013; Utomo, 2010; Tim ReforMiner Institute, 2011; 
Syeirazi, 2009; Yuwono, 2014; Pradnyana, 2014; Syeirazi, 2017; Salamudin, 2011; Sudrajat, 
2013; Rizky and Majidi, 2008). On the other hand, the second group emphasised the acute 
problems of plummeting foreign investment in both the hydrocarbon and mining industries as the 
country needs the investment to conduct more exploration activities and boost national 
production, especially oil and gas products (See for example Machmud, 2000; Hadi et al., 2012; 
OECD, 2016). The other study see government intervention as the source of economic problems 
and crisis (Hill, 1999). This study places emphasis on the institutional development (and change) 
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of the country’s resource governance and is the first attempt to analyse what the country has 
actually experienced in terms of governing its natural resources, especially in the hydrocarbon 
and general mining sectors. It is also an attempt to show how a developing country’s resource 
governance should be presented by exploring what path it took, complete with the transformation 
and changes which have taken place over time; following this, the study analyses why the 
shifting happened by using the dynamic of actors and the relationship between government and 
business as the unit of explanation. 
1.3. Institutionalism and Institutional Change 
 
Although change is an important subject, it is believed to contradict the notion of stability 
and order. Stability is assumed to be a primary goal of institutionalisation and the importance of 
an institution, the notion sometimes considered as the same as a rule. This is why a clearer 
concept of institutional change did not develop until after the 2000s. North (1991) mentioned 
institutional change in his books on institutionalism. However, he had not yet provided more 
applicable and operable explanations about the concept. Several later institutionalists began to 
develop the concept further in order to both answer critics about institutionalists’ static point of 
view (see Peters, 2008 for example) about the subject and to progress the framework further to 
address important development in the real world. The static point of view is no longer adequate 
to analyse recent development in the Third World countries. Development in all sectors is an 
actual condition that both governmental and business actors have to face during interactions. 
Hence, in order to stay relevant in studying the political economics of developing countries, 
institutionalists have to develop their framework to address such dynamic circumstances in 
political and economic environments as well as the simultaneous dynamics of actors and their 
interactions. There is still much room for development for institutionalism as an important 
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framework to analyse resource governance in developing countries. Such dynamic governance in 
resource-rich countries needs to be analysed further rather than starting from assumption that the 
countries having a rentier state tendency and are most likely to experience the resource curse due 
to their weak institutions. We could learn and analyse so much more by avoiding such 
assumptions. This is my primary reason for choosing institutional change as my main framework 
in this research. Because of the chosen framework, my research begins by seeing a complex 
institutional arrangement in Indonesia’s political and economic environments and attempting to 
understand one small piece of the oldest and complex industry in this country: the extractive 
industry. 
North (1991, p. 18, 49, and 68) posited that an institutional framework consists of 
political structure, property structure, and social structure. Furthermore, he argued that a process 
of institutional change is not easy as it influences the pay-off structure that actors expect to gain 
from their commitment to the institutional arrangement. Meanwhile, he argued that credible 
commitment is particularly important in ensuring that the development of the institution is 
moving towards a positive direction, such as more open access with strong enforcement and 
adjustment mechanisms to protect the leverage of being inside an institution as opposed to being 
outside of the institution. 
Studies about institutional change have built upon the institutionalist perspective of the 
dynamic nature of actors, actors’ interactions and their institutional arrangement (see  for 
example Soderbaum, 2008; Bell, 2011; Brousseau, Garrouste, and Reynaud, 2011; Caballero  
and Soto-Onate, 2015; Koontz, et al.,2015 as he called it adaptive institution; Bakir and Jarvis, 
2017; Bakir and Gunduz, 2017; and Arbatli, 2018). Unlike dominant political economic 
frameworks which consider actors and their relationships from a static viewpoint, 
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institutionalism places both actors and institutions as part of a more complex web of interactions 
consisting of many actors and many institutions that, most of the time, engage in relationships 
involving various forms of institutional arrangement. These complex views are strengths and  
also weaknesses of institutionalism. As a theory, it has various difficulties to satisfy other 
theoretical traditions wherein sophisticated methodology and making predictions and 
generalisations are paramount for a good study. Nevertheless, as an analytical framework, it 
provides researchers with complex and more complete analytical tools to look into social and 
qualitative data gathered by a unique case (and cases) by avoiding and over-simplistic view of 
social relationships, which could lead to a significant discrepancy between the theoretical ideal 
and the actual condition in the field. Institutionalism also has a tendency to offer more 
descriptive analysis. Thus, researchers need to be fully aware of these difficulties and endeavour 
to overcome such problems. 
The study of resource governance from the perspective of the relationship between 
government and corporations was introduced by Raymond Vernon (1971, 1977, and 1998) in his 
books. His studies proposed an alternative perspective among domination of resource curse and 
rentier state in studying the subject. Vernon recognised the importance of the negotiation process 
for first-entry terms of contract for a foreign corporation in developing countries. He also 
highlighted the shifting favourable terms from government towards a company over time. 
Initially, the government can take advantage of the corporation’s eagerness to enter the national 
industry by accommodating and adjusting their business and economic plans in favour of the 
government agenda. Nevertheless, after some time, the bargaining position of the government is 
weakened as the corporation becomes an important source of national revenue and has settled 
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down its operation and become an influential part of national economy. These conditions 
illustrate an obsolescing bargaining power in government and business relations. 
1.4. Focus of the Research and Research Questions 
 
This research focuses on the institutional change in the governance of the extractive 
industry in Indonesia. The change is argued to be influenced by the changing political economic 
environment at both the national and subnational levels. Furthermore, the change influences the 
interaction between the government and companies. 
Resource governance in resource-rich countries is often presumed to result in stagnant 
and negative economic growth and is also thought to increase rent-seeking behaviour, which 
could also hinder political development. The richness is blamed as the curse for such countries 
due to their inability to pursue a “Western” model of political and economic development, 
namely democracy and liberalism. Despite this strong assumption, I attempt to present an 
analysis of the change in resource governance in one developing country – Indonesia – which 
has been directly influenced by political economic development since the country’s 
independence in 1945. 
This development also affects the capacity development of various governmental bodies 
(especially the bureaucracy system and the bureaucrats) in Indonesia to do their jobs either more 
efficiently, more transparently, or more in a more accessible manner for other parties which are 
not among the decision makers or elites. This condition also implies the improvement in the way 
in which they interact, establish, and manage relationships with business entities (especially 
companies) in conducting their role and authority as the governing entities. The complexity of 
the diversity of organisations shaping government behaviour towards the industry, and in 
particular towards the corporations related to the industry, is a crucial aspect. The outcome of 
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their relationship is assumed to be seen in the changing nature and development of extractive 
industry institutions in Indonesia. 
From the above, this study attempts to present answers regarding several research 
questions. The main question is: Why does the resource governance of extractive industry in 
Indonesia develop and change the way it does? It is important to note that the main object of 
this study is the hydrocarbon and mineral industries in Indonesia. In addition, as the findings 
show that there is similarity and differences in the institutional development of the hydrocarbon 
and general mining industries in Indonesia, the following question emerged: Why do such 
differences exist even though political, economic, and social landscapes are the same and 
both industries are classified as extractive industries? 
1.5. Research Design 
 
The research uses the process tracing method and historical institutionalism as the 
method of analysis by combining literature-based study and interviews. The first step is 
determining the initial condition of the establishment of national resource governance in 
Indonesia from 1945 to 2018. The second step is determining the actors involved in both 
elements of institutional arrangement: the rule and the procedure elements. Subsequently, the 
research is expanded into gathering and analysing data relating to interactions among 
government and companies as the two dominant actors. In addition, data about the changing 
domestic political and economic environment in relation to the extractive industries is also 
important to provide a context in which institutional change happens. 
The research uses historical data of the hydrocarbon and mining industries in the form of 
reports, news, regulations, speeches, and analysis in books, articles, and journals from 1945 (the 
Independence of Indonesia) to 2017 (last interview). The large amount of data is selected and 
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categorised based on the analytical frameworks designed from combining several theoretical 
frameworks and a literature review related to the study. The data is classified based on elements 
of institutions, changes that happen in each element, the mechanism of change, etc. 
This is a qualitative research using a single case study; resource governance in Indonesia. 
The governance is found to have different institutional arrangements between two primary 
sectors in the industry: hydrocarbon and mining. Process tracing is used as the method of 
analysis to provide a causal process and mechanism by which institutional change in both sectors 
takes place. Hence, this study could also be classified as an explaining-outcome process tracing 
(Trampusch and Palier, 2016, p. 443; Lange, 2013). 
1.6. Hypothesis 
 
The research question and frameworks used in this study have been clearly stated in the 
previous sections. Based on the above discussion, I have posited several assumptions and 
hypothesis that will be analysed and presented further in this thesis. 
Firstly, an institutional change has taken place in both the hydrocarbon and mining 
sectors in Indonesia. This change is influenced by actors’ preferences, perceptions, and actions 
(North, 2005). North further explained that the learning process is not only experienced by 
individual actors but also by organisation as it consists of various people with their own timing 
and learning processes. Hence, the development of organisational actors could be understood as  
a result of the development of their members. However, my analysis focuses on organisational 
actors: the government and business entities. Furthermore, as actors interact with both other 
actors and the environment, an understanding of both context and openness is beneficial to 
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generate analysis about the causal processes and mechanisms regarding why change happens in 
national resource governance. 
As suggested by Lowndes and Roberts (2013), this change happens in all elements: rules 
and procedures. Secondly, there is a different trajectory as the hydrocarbon sector has established 
a different form of contractual relationship compared to the general mining sector as the national 
government has invited subnational governments to become involved in governing the mining 
sector. The differentiation is further sharpened by different governmental actors that bridge or 
are active in the relationship between the government and companies. Thirdly, institutional 
change in both sectors results from the learning process, enforcement, adaptation, and 
transformative mechanisms as a result of interaction among actors and between actors and the 
domestic political economic environment. These processes and mechanisms imply that, while 
change happens in institutional resource governance arrangements, the actors also develop 
through the process of learning. Additionally, their interaction with other actors and environment 
also changes through the same process that is adjoined by the three mechanisms happening 
simultaneously. 
Changes happen both incrementally and abruptly. They appear to happen abruptly 
because they happen via rules. Meanwhile, prior and after such changes, it is evident that 
incremental changes happen in the way in which actors complete their tasks or interact with  
other actors. They are also affected by openness and the intense relationship between global and 
international affairs and actors. Rather than a mirroring or copying the path taken by developed 
countries, the process is more about adjusting to new conditions, addressing current problems, 
accommodating other actors, and having better strategies for achieving their goals through 
various means and opportunities. 
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1.7. Structure of the Chapters 
 
This thesis is intended to provide an alternative framework for further studies about 
resource governance in developing countries. I choose Institutional change as my main analytical 
framework. The framework has been developed by various institutionalists, especially North 
(1990), North (1991), Campbell (2004), North and Weingast (2009), and Lowndes and Robert 
(2013). This framework also generates the writing structure for presenting the findings of this 
study (Chapters 4, 5, and 6). 
The first chapter presents the research questions, introducing the literatures used to 
analyse the governance of Indonesia’s extractive industries. It also provides an overview of the 
Republic of Indonesia. The second chapter presents a more detailed explanation of the theoretical 
frameworks used in analysis, while the third chapter presents general analysis on institutional 
change in political and economic systems in Indonesia. In the second chapter, I highlight the 
importance of seeing political economic events as a process which is dynamic and developing 
throughout time. In addition, bargaining relations between government and business are used as  
a framework to assess the way in which such relationships affect and are influenced by changes 
in institutional arrangements. These two frameworks have some common grounds as they view 
political economic events as a process that starts in the past and continues to the future. They 
also consider actors’ interaction as a valuable perspective. However, both also have common 
disagreements as they see the process as either static (as posited by resource governance as well 
as business and state relations) or as dynamic (as emphasised by Historical Institutionalists). The 
second chapter also explains the way in which comparative history and the process tracing 
method have shaped the research design, as well as the strategies used to collect information and 
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analyse the data in order to answer the research questions provided in the first chapter. The 
research process provides valuable insights for further researches involving the related topic. 
The findings of the research are presented in four chapters: Chapter III to Chapter VI. 
The third chapter provides a general view on the changes which have happened in political and 
economic environments in Indonesia as well as giving a short historical background about 
resource governance in the extractive industries in Indonesia. The fourth and fifth chapter intends 
to answer the first question about why extractive industries’ institutions in Indonesia have 
developed in the way they have. It generates the second question answered in Chapter VI about 
why both industries governance develop in different path. The findings demonstrate the need to 
go beyond the resource curse and rentier state frameworks in order to discover the different 
institutional trajectories for different sectors in the extractive industry, produced by the same 
government in the same domestic political economic system. This finding also highlights the 
importance of looking at the historical institutionalism path to understand why a different path 
emerged and sustained. 
Finally, Chapter VII provides a conclusion about the research and highlights important 
points explained in the previous chapters. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHOD 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Studying institutional change as a growth process of a society and nation in 
developing countries is valuable in order to understand the complex nature of political 
economic settings that influence the way in which governments and businesses have 
established their relationship. This complexity is often neglected either because of 
prejudice towards developing countries as simply having rent-seeking behaviour and 
weak institutions, or because of the researcher’s inability to understand political, 
economic, and social settings behind a government’s preferences, decisions, and choices 
of action. The latter could happen because researchers in this area often have a rigid belief 
system about liberalism as the finest paradigm for economic growth and democracy as the 
supreme political ideology. This single-minded attitude could influence our judgment 
while exploring and analysing institutional change in a specific nation. This potentially 
leads to a negative perception of the resource nationalism conducted by developing 
countries and the argument that a government’s behaviour should change to fit into 
liberalism and democracy. Developing countries deserve to be seen and heard as they 
have their own political, economic, and social structure and settings, their own growth 
and their own developmental processes and mechanisms. This thesis is one of many 
attempts to do so. 
Hence, my primary research question explores why the institutional arrangement 
of Indonesia’s resource governance has developed in the way it has. I intend to 
understand the growth process of the governance and analyse the mechanism behind such 
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development. To achieve this, I use the theory of institutional change developed by 
institutionalists like Lowndes and Robert (2013), Campbell (2004), and North (1990). 
Historical institutionalists posited that analysing institutional elements provides an insight 
into consistent changes and the vital elements which are constantly found in every setting 
and order within society. Interaction is one of the most crucial elements in social settings. 
An abundance of literature has examined this element within different settings. Political 
economists are have also focused on interactions as the main element in their studies and 
theories, namely state and business relationships, political and economic relations among 
nations, etc. 
It is important to note that elements other than interaction constantly change, 
including actors, situations, environments, agendas, and structures. Hence, although 
various kinds of interaction always exist in social settings, the kind, scope, and 
configuration change as changes happen in actors and environments related to its 
existence. It is also important to recognise the interlinkage of various interactions in the 
social setting and how they influence and constraint each other’s behaviour and choices  
of action. Such information could improve our empirical and theoretical understanding of 
how an institution works and interacts with actors within similar and different 
arrangements or settings (Ostrom, 1990, p. xiv). 
The constant changes in political, economic, and social environments are 
undermined by many resource curse researchers in their analyses of resource governance 
in developing countries. This leads to a stringent analytical outcome focusing on certain 
institutional factors that are assumed to be closely related to the industry, primarily 
categorised as weak and inefficient institutions. I thus study, the interaction between 
government and business entities in resource governance is the main focus to provide an 
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alternative analysis to study the development of resource governance in Indonesia, 
especially comparing different institutional arrangements in the country’s hydrocarbon 
and mining industries in the country. I argue that, although they are often categorised as 
identical extractive industries, there are different kinds of governance between both 
sectors. This is because different kinds of interaction between government and companies 
that happen and institutionalised in both industries. 
The importance of state involvement in governing economic activities is a classic 
debate in both political and economic discourse. The dominant view considers the state as 
a problem for and enemy of economic growth and suggests that the market (as the 
opposite of the state) is the best government for the economy. Resource nationalism is an 
important reason behind government intervention in managing economic sectors (Wiens, 
2015). Rosales (2016) stated that there are various motivations behind such behaviour. 
Elites from a state could use jargon to cover up their rent-seeking intentions by using their 
political authority to collect money from companies, while others could use a similar 
policy for the purpose of funding national development projects or other social purposes. 
Hence, it is difficult to differentiate and separate both intentions from a single event. We 
need further investigation of the political and economic situation surrounding the policy, 
public and elite opinion regarding this matter, as well as the institutional arrangement in 
the sector under study. 
This perception implies that such problems emerge from acknowledging that the 
state is in fact an organisation of organisations; it is not unitary and therefore it is possible 
to find competing and conflicting actors within the state realm that prevent the state from 
pursuing the most productive and efficient way to govern both political and economic 
activities. It is also implied that there are varieties of state capacity and strategies to 
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address the problem. In other words, domestic structure, architecture, and institutional 
arrangement are important in understanding a state’s actions. 
The irony is that many theories force unitary characteristics on states, which can 
be misleading and lead to an incomplete understanding of the complexity behind states’ 
capacities, actions, and strategies. Such views result in a simplification (and 
generalisation) about states without looking into the dynamic learning process and 
openness of institutional actors (see Luong and Weinthal, 2010 and Karl, 1997 for 
example). This tendency for generalisation and the lack of adequate analytical 
frameworks to study developed countries is another problem that becomes my main 
concern in conducting this research. Developing countries deserve more attention from 
the academic community and, as a citizen from one of these nations, I intend to provide 
an appropriate framework by using and combining several related frameworks to present 
the diversity of extractive industry governance in Indonesia. 
The results of this study could provide an important insight for further studies 
about institutional change in developing country’s resource governance. The history of 
institutional change in developing countries is not merely about the weakness of domestic 
institutions and social conflicts. It is a history of continuity, transformation, learning 
experience, and growth in interconnected realms of politics, economics, and society in a 
certain period of time. It is also a history of organisational development within 
governmental bodies and their relationships with each other and with non-state actors, 
especially business entities. There is no place for a static view in this study as the 
dynamic happens between the institutional actors (government and enterprises), in the 
actors’ relationships, and in the institutional arrangements of extractive industries. Thus, 
adaptive and transformative capacities are important frameworks to look into change and 
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transformation of institutional actors. At the same time, theory about institutional change 
in combination with concepts about government and business relations are used to 
explore the dynamic in the resource governance in Indonesia’s extractive industries. 
The understanding about variation of states’ capacities, actions and strategies is 
also important when observing and analysing the mechanisms of institutional 
transformation (Weiss and Hobson, 1995; Weiss, 1998; Weiss, 2004; Bakir, 2014). 
However, it is also important to place such capacity within the context of the relationship 
between government and companies. The study of government and business relations was 
primarily developed by international business scholars. The continuing imbalanced 
perception about the nature and the development of this relationship, particularly the lack 
of understanding from governments as well as the political, economic and social sides, 
needs to be addressed from the perspective of international political economy. In addition, 
the consideration of this relationship in terms of its institutional development could 
capture a more “helicopter view” by taking the historical timeline and the development in 
the political, economic and social sectors of the host country into account. The actors are 
treated as having both dynamic perceptions and situations that could lead to certain 
changing dimensions in their interaction patterns. 
In this chapter, I highlight that Indonesia has a peculiar governance style in its 
extractive industry. The country’s experience demonstrates that the extractive industry 
could have different governance styles depending on how both governmental and 
business actors perceive challenges and opportunities specifically related to the 
hydrocarbon and general mining industries. Different approaches and strategies have been 
used by both government and business entities in these industries, which have 
experienced similar political, economic, and social domestic situations. They have 
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different international economic challenges and have gone in different institutional 
development directions. Is the different governance from both industries caused by the 
difference in the international economic challenge or does it result from different 
perceptions and situations perceived by both parties? 
As shown in the previous chapter, it is important to consider alternative points of 
view to study the institutional development in Indonesia’s hydrocarbon and mining 
industries. The simple approach of the rentier state and resource curse perspective is no 
longer adequate to address such differences in a developing country with bright, positive 
economic growth following the political and economic crises in 1997 and 1998. The 
country, of course, could not be compared with the liberal developed countries in terms of 
efficient bureaucracy, government bodies, and political process within the country. 
However, the developing countries are worth studying as the process they produce is 
certainly distinctive to their specific national and local political, economic, and social 
condition. The explorative nature of this research is what gives the research a fresh, 
alternative perspective for further study on this theme by attempting to have less  
prejudice about the nature of both actors and about which direction and strategy should be 
taken by the GoI in managing its mineral resources. Prejudices should be minimalised in 
order to trace the process of institutional development through the actual chain of 
conditions in Indonesia and its hydrocarbon and mining industries. Furthermore, although 
this may be true for some basic principles, there is no intention to make careless 
generalisations that this alternative view could be replicated for studying other countries. 
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2.2. Institutionalism and Institutional Evolution and Change: Definition and 
Elements 
North (1990 and 1991) separated institutions from organisations. An institution is 
defined as a set of regulations and rules of the game which constrain and enable 
organisations (the player) to operate, cooperate, and solve their differences within the 
institutional arrangement. North (1990) explained that there are different kinds, levels, 
and scopes of influence an institution can have. An institution is part of a bigger and 
larger institution and exists together with other institutions. Thus, an organisation could 
have several memberships in those many institutions. This means an organisation and its 
interaction with other actors becomes more complex and possibly causes clashes. Unlike 
Vernon (1977) North considered government and business relations as a positive sum as 
both cooperate to achieve their goals and collecting benefits from their operations. 
Changes are inherent within such relationships as not only the configuration of members 
within the institution change over time, but also the members, which usually consist of 
many organisations, also deal with changes in both their internal structure and external 
situation. North considered this situation as affecting the incentive structure among 
members to change their initial institutional structure in order to fit their current 
circumstances. 
An institution consists of external as well as internal constraints on actors’ actions 
(North, 1990 and 1991). External factors mean that the social, political, and economic 
environment limits actors’ choices, decisions, actions, and patterns of interaction. Internal 
constraints mean that actors’ resources and capabilities determine their ability to 
implement the decisions they make and the bargaining position they have, as well as the 
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benefits they can gain from their interaction. In general, an institution is able to constrain 
action, determine actors’ opportunities, and facilitate interaction among actors. 
An institution is assumed to be stable until it is disrupted external forces. External 
factors, such as war and crisis, are assumed as primary sources of institutional change. 
However, other scholars found that change can also come from internal factors. The shift 
in bargaining power between actors affects their preferences and capabilities of action. 
This shift can lead to unpredictable strategies and actions in their interactions with others. 
Finally, a changing bargaining relation is able to transform and reproduce new  rules of 
the game. In conclusion, institutions are not static and rigid; there is always space for 
different and unpredictable action from the actors. However, North (2005) underlined two 
stumbling blocks in the institutional changing process: the cost of changing institutional 
arrangements, and actors’ preferences for maintaining their status quo. This means that 
once an institution is established, it cannot easily be modified or shifted merely by actions 
or interactions among actors. 
Institutionalism goes beyond discourse about actors vs structure. Institutionalists 
emphasise more on role of both rules and actors in determining performance and outcome 
from an institutional arrangement, especially the orderly condition that ensures actors 
within certain arrangements will receive the maximum benefit from their involvement. 
Despite the importance of stability in an institution, many institutionalists recognise the 
importance of understanding change, transformation, and evolution as part of an 
institution’s developmental process. 
Lowndes and Robert (2013) further described the  differences between institutions 
and organisations. An organisation is both an institution and an actor and could be both 
institution and player. This means that it has not only rules, procedures, and narratives 
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constraining individuals which operate within its structure, but also acts as a unitary actor 
in a larger institutional arrangement. Rules, procedures, and narratives are considered by 
Lowndes and Robert (2013) as elements of institutions. 
There are discourses about the concept of institutional change. Some consider that 
institutionalism had a static and linear assumption that focuses on stability as one of 
actors’ goals in establishing and maintaining institutional arrangements (Weyland, 2008, 
p. 281). Historical institutionalists expected a stable and long lasting institutional 
arrangement once it is established. Meanwhile, rational choice institutionalists considered 
that to change existing institutions, a change in the equilibria of actors’ preferences is 
necessary. It is not easy for institutional actors to change their preferences and are rarely 
incentivised to change the way they act and interact with each other, especially when 
there is less benefit to change than to stay within the existing arrangement. Both types of 
institutionalist are assumed to tell a little about institutional change. However, as political 
change happens simultaneously in the same region, some institutionalists have attempted 
to explain the dynamic of institutional arrangement domestically and regionally as well as 
adjusting their previous propositions regarding the path and process of change (Weyland, 
2008, p. 283). Weyland (2008) noticed the importance of considering actors’ capacities in 
determining the trajectory and path to change in an institution by also considering the 
external influences on actors’ preferences and designs, as well as the trajectory of change 
available in the region. He proposed a point of view that considered both demand and 
supply side of institutional change in his article about a New Theory of Institutional 
Change. 
Institutions have three dimensions: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
(Palthe, 2014). The regulative dimension consists of formal laws and constitutions that 
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justify certain actions and patterns of interactions, while at the same time set borders 
between what and how an action can be done or cannot be done, what goals can be and 
cannot be pursued, what expectations can be and cannot be had, and what role should be 
fulfilled. The normative dimension is the values, norms, and traditions that suggest 
appropriate goals to pursue, roles, and strategy of actions. Lastly, the cultural-cognitive 
dimension means that the institution involves a belief system and learning process for 
individual actors as well as organisational actors. It also involves the framing of reality 
and how to perceive, understand, and process information from themselves and the 
environment. 
The actors establish rules of the game in their interactions in order to constrain the 
behaviour of themselves and others and therefore protect social order. The development 
of the rules of the game within society is determined by the openness of the established 
institution towards new actors and their flexibility to overcome new challenges. North 
(2005) stated there are at least three phases on the development of social order: the 
limited order, the transition towards a more open order, and the open social order. The 
dominant and more powerful actors can limit the other actors’ range of actions in a 
limited social order. This condition results in an imposed order; there is order in society 
but rather than benefitting all actors, the goal is primarily to maintain the power and 
position of the dominant actors as well as to protect and increase the benefit they can gain 
from existing institutions. In a transition phase, there is a tendency to make the rules more 
flexible and adapt with new challenges and new actors. However, there is a limitation to 
the openness process since there are resisting parties that will attempt to maintain their 
position and status quo within the institution. Finally, there are loose rules of the game in 
an open social order. Each actor has a huge range of alternative choices of decision and 
can interact with others through various strategies and actions. 
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The main critical view of historical institutionalism (HI) is its narrow point of 
view about actors’ actions and their dynamic interactions with others. There is no static 
pattern of action and interaction because actors can face similar situations and deal with 
similar challenges, but they can choose different preferences and strategies of actions. 
Another critical point is that it fails to explain why an institution can be maintained over 
time even though it involves different generations. This means that an institution itself is 
dynamic and can have adjustment mechanisms to adapt to change. HI also does not 
explicitly recognise that institutions which constrain actors consist of multiple levels and 
sectors. Consequently, HI has the potential to offer broader framework of analysis and 
explanation about social interaction in various levels and sectors. 
Every actor and relation always has a starting point that will be the path taken in 
the present and future. Pierson (2000, p. 252) defined path dependence as ‘social process 
grounded in a dynamic increasing return’. Path dependence acknowledges that 
institutionalisation, institutional development and change involve a process of interaction 
among actors. The more frequent the interaction, the more positive feedback each actor 
can get. This feedback is the source of information to act further, to obey or disobey their 
previous agreement. An institution can survive and develop as long as actors perceive it 
as more beneficial to be maintained than to be broken. 
Institutional continuity is also influenced by its flexibility to the changing nature 
of political, social, and economic environment, as well as to the changing preferences, 
expectations, and behaviours of actors. This flexibility can facilitate the initiative to 
modify the institution. This modification can be considered as the continuity of the path 
as long as the basic characteristics of the previous arrangement are retained. The 
modification only happens in the supporting elements. However, there is still a lack of 
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study to differentiate between basic and supporting elements of an institution. This 
understanding is required because continuity can mean both the survival of the same 
arrangement throughout time and the modification of its supporting elements. Basic 
elements of an institution consist of values, norms, and principles that are respected and 
protected by all actors; they are the core of institution and determine the existence and 
specialty of the institution. On the other hand, the supporting elements support the core to 
function effectively and efficiently. They can be tangible or intangible such as actors’ 
resources, compatibility of actors’ goals, trust between actors, strong and effective 
bureaucracy, the existence of dispute settlement mechanisms, dominant actors, etc. 
Historical institutionalists also acknowledge that the path can change. This is 
likely to happen at a critical juncture which later determines the different path to be taken. 
It happens when the basic elements of an institution are changing, which can happen 
naturally or forcefully. This means that the source of change can be internal, for instance 
from the dynamic within institution, or external, such as a global crisis or war. The 
change can occur in all sectors simultaneously or in just one sector. It can also be a 
gradual process or a revolutionary one. Connolly (2013) explained that there are four 
frameworks of institutional change: incidental, social conflict, endogenous, and 
exogenous. The incidental view argues that any decision can lead to unintended outcomes 
that change the institutional arrangement; this means that an ‘accidental decision’ can 
become a critical juncture that changes the path. The social conflict framework considers 
the change to be the result of conflict among actors, especially the dominant actors. The 
endogenous approach views that different internal conditions can change the rules, while 
the exogenous approach see external forces as the source of institutional change. 
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North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) proposed a view on the process of institutional 
development by investigating the interaction among actors that have access to the 
institution within social interactions, which they called social order. There are three types 
of social order: foraging order, limited access order (LAO), and open access  order 
(OAO). The first type exists in a small community in which individuals gather and act 
together to protect and to fulfil their needs. LAO is the second step in which the society is 
bigger with more complex interaction. The main characteristic of LAO is the personal 
exchange with centralised authority and close institution, meaning that the advantages of 
being within an institution are determined and controlled by a small group of dominant 
elites. This situation is not easy to change as the elites have an interest in maintaining the 
status quo as the authoritative group. Thus, it might take longer to move from LAO 
towards OAO. The loss of elite control in OAO is a consequence of advanced 
institutionalisation in actors’ relations. This means that personal change is replaced by 
interpersonal change in which there is protocol that binds and manages relationships 
among actors in their attempt to achieve their goals and protect their interests. There is 
more freedom to join the institution in OAO, which is why it is known as open access. 
The movement from LAO to OAO uses the mechanism of change rather than mechanism 
of progress. This means that there is always the possibility to go back to LAO after 
enjoying OAO for a period of time (North, Cecil, and Weingast, 2009, p. 12). Therefore, 
actors’ commitment to maintain an OAO should be credible in order to stay in OAO. In 
the transition from LAO to OAO, there is a doorstep condition which implies that both 
actors and institutional ability and commitment will have more impersonal exchange in 
their interactions. This transition involves a more complex regulation to manage such 
exchanges in society (North, Cecil, and Weingast, 2009, p. 26). 
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Nevertheless, a basic agreement should be underlined first before we talk further 
about how an institution will change and how actors can attempt to change or adapt to 
such changes despite the benefits they have collected from the initial arrangement. We 
need to understand what institutionalism means with regards to institutional change and 
the elements, steps, and outcomes of such process. Different institutionalists have 
proposed different analytical frameworks to study the process of institutional 
transformation and evolution. Despite different trajectories of their studies about change, 
a common basic agreement about change can be established. From this point, I attempt to 
draw a simple analytical model of institutional change derived from the commonalities 
and differences proposed by previous studies. The initial model is adjusted to suit the 
empirical conditions during my research as well as to suit the specific conditions of 
Indonesia’s resource governance. 
Scholars like Peters (2008, Chapter I) considered that institutionalism and 
institutionalists find it difficult to explain institutional change. This is because branches of 
institutionalism have different opinions regarding the nature and dimensions of an 
institution and the source of change within its nature. Rational choice institutionalists 
consider the incentive structure as the main dimension of an institution, suggesting that 
individual actors – as the players in institutional games – act rationally based on 
calculating the potential benefits they could gain from playing or exiting. Changes to the 
incentive structure that directly affect the benefits they receive would lead to an attempt 
to reject or support the change. 
Campbell (2004, p. 32) posited that analysing institutional change necessitates 
careful consideration. Some institutionalists have attempted to analyse continuity and 
discontinuity within institutional arrangements. A continuous change pattern means 
38  
evolutionary and transformative paths, while a discontinuous one means a punctuated 
equilibrium. However, there are two factors that need further consideration: the 
dimensions of institutions that could be changed and the time frame for this change. 
Considering both factors is important to understand the nature of institutional change 
(Campbell, 2004, p. 32-33). 
The change has several basic patterns: incremental and evolutionary patterns. 
Incremental patterns mean that change happens in a gradual process wherein it is 
impossible to track who started it and when. It follows along a single path of change and 
run in a single direction. On the other hand, an evolutionary change means that an initial 
or old institutional arrangement is transformed, gaining some characteristics that are 
distinctly different compared to its predecessor. An equilibrium condition could also be 
understood as a stability condition. It occurs in between the old and new arrangements. 
Such stability could be disrupted by actors’ social learning. This learning process is 
intended to adjust with current internal and external challenges and problems (Campbell, 
2004, p. 34). 
Why does institutional change happen? The answer is dependent on the 
perspective of researchers or theorists. Based on the explanation above, there are various 
reasons for changes to happen in institutional elements. Thus, focusing on smaller parts of 
an institution is crucial in order to see the pattern and mechanism of institutional change. I 
use Campbell’s category of institutional elements: the rules, the norms, and the practices. 
Rules consist of written agreement and codes of conduct about how things are done, 
acceptable and punishable behaviours and actions, as well as structured and required 
actors’ interactions within institutional arrangements. Meanwhile, norms consist of 
publicly known and socially agreed codes of conduct in more general human interactions 
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in the form of culture and tradition. In this regard, norms often precede and exist long 
before institutional arrangements are established. Practice is influenced by both rules and 
norms, while procedure, as part of practice, is generated from the rules agreed by actors. 
This explanation also implies that changing rules most often involves actors’ 
actions, behaviours, and interactions with other actors and the relevant circumstances. 
Rule change could be influenced by both endogenous and exogenous factors. The driving 
force of change could be attempts from actors to change it or it could also be influenced 
by actors’ attempt to adapt to a changing situation either inside and outside the 
institutional arrangements. Both the transformative and adaptive capacity of actors 
involved determines the process and mechanism of change. Both capacities could 
potentially lead to a gradual and incremental change or a critical juncture, such as crises 
or shocking events that force a dramatic directional shift for the institution. Thus, 
although stability is an important achievement for an institutional arrangement, change is 
also a situation that inherently exists in various forms of social interaction. 
This study’s main focus is to observe institutional change in resource governance 
in Indonesia. Researches about institutional change mostly originate from political wings 
of institutionalism and involve a more historical approach. The importance of identifying 
the agents of change and mechanism of change has been highlighted in such studies, 
although they have different analytical framework and methods. Adequate time frame, 
selection of case (or cases), not focusing on generalisation but looking into variation, 
perceiving the dynamics of both actors, the agenda, the actors’ relationships, and 
institutional arrangement are among the main principals of studying institutional change. 
There   are   various   propositions   about   institutional   change   from   different 
 
institutional branches. Critical juncture is considered by historical institutionalists as the 
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starting point for an institutional change to happen. Meanwhile, rational choice 
institutionalists have a different view about change; they consider the incentive structure 
as the reason behind institutional change. In addition, there are other viewpoints about 
institutional change that have explored different aspects that the writers considered to 
have been overlooked by other studies. For example, Davis (2010) proposed a study that 
attempted to bridging gap between empirical and historical focuses on the flexibility of an 
institution and its growth. He proposed that it is important to distinguish between an 
economic institution and meta-institutions which affect the rules differently. Economic 
institutions that consist of policies and laws are considered to determine the quality of an 
institution, while meta-institutions operate on a broader dimension. Meta-institutions 
operate on bigger political, economic, and social arenas and determine the flexibility of  
an institution as they have various related institutions operating and linking to form more 
complex and bigger arrangements. Constitution and common law are among such 
institutions. Meanwhile, an economic institution specifically regulates economic 
interactions among economic actors. It determines the quality of these institutions to 
establish and maintain order. Industrial-specific governance is an example of such 
institution. 
North (1991) proposed a more economic approach to the analysis of institutional 
change. Due to the tendency to see economic activities from a static viewpoint and 
considering state and firm relationship as a zero sum game, the theory of change has not 
developed within economics. He proposed an early political economic theory of 
institutional change which emphasises the dynamic interaction and relationship between 
state and firm. It is not only about a contractual relationship which marks the beginning 
and the end of such a relationship. 
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Technology is one factor that is considered to trigger institutional change in the 
relationship between governments and enterprises (North and Lewis, 1971). Through 
technology, a company has both advantages and disadvantages compared to the others in 
front of government and thus attracts different kind of leverage. 
As a basic principal for institutional study, the state is not a unitary actor as it is an 
organisation of many organisations. As the institutional and organisational characteristics 
of a state are unique, generalisation could be misleading. It is important to not easily jump 
to conclusions or have prejudice while observing and analysing a state. Such attitudes 
could cause us as researchers to omit important elements intentionally or unintentionally. 
It is important to obey the guidance from the institutional framework while having an 
open mind to see the empirical situation. 
2.3. Institutional Change: The Path, Process, and Mechanism 
 
Study about institutional change has mostly been conducted by historical 
institutionalists who analysed the evolution of systems, structures, and societies within a 
certain awareness of space and time frame. There are three main theories that have been 
used in this thesis to explain institutional evolution in the governance of extractive 
resources in Indonesia. North and Weingast (1991), Campbell (2004), and Lowndes and 
Robert (2013) provided valuable insights about institutional change using frameworks of 
resources, actors, goals, and mechanisms. Their frameworks are combined to guide my 
analyses regarding various lenses and elements that should and could be considered to 
investigate resource governance. Even though they have different focuses, they do have 
agreement about some underlying assumptions needed before studying institutional 
change. They also critically address some of the tendencies and approaches used by 
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institutionalists. Thus, combining their insights is an important step to capture the 
complexities of the studies of institutional change in different periods of time. 
Based on the previous explanation, I posit that institutional change results from at 
least two elements. Actors and their actions to change the institutional arrangement are 
seen as the dominant factor which leads to institutional change (see North, 1991 for 
example). Another factor is the existence of other institutions (at the same level or at an 
upper level) which endorse and enforce change within a certain arrangement. The last 
factor is the relationship between actors as agents of change, which could be included in 
the first factor but with the need to emphasise the cooperative capacity which endorses 
and enforces current institutions to change their elements. 
The second factor affects current institutional arrangement through both the scope 
of rules and procedures affected by the change, as well as by the changing capacities and 
roles of actors in the new institutional arrangements. I posit that there are certain elements 
that could change as a result of institutional arrangement. The dynamic elements that 
institutional actors have are role and authority. These elements are primarily based on 
their access to and position within the decision-making process and statements from 
contractual arrangements among actors. Another element of an institutional actor is their 
capacity, especially transformative and adaptive capacities (Weiss, 1998). 
Furthermore, considering the survivability of an institution, it is also worth 
explaining the temporality and sustainability of an institutional element in the face of 
change. These elements influence the scope, speed, and time needed for a transition and 
the process of change from previous to new institutional arrangements. This is because 
change could happen spontaneously, incrementally or revolutionary (Campbell, 2004). 
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All of these elements constitute the causal mechanism of an institutional change, which is 
the primary analytical method in this thesis. 
In his books, North (1990 and 1994) implied that the learning process is 
experienced by an organisation (both the government and companies are organisations) as 
institutional actors make their preferences, perceptions, and capacities to act. These 
factors change constantly, although not at the same time, space, and speed. Therefore, the 
outcomes are also varied, as is the actors’ adaptive and transformative capacity to accept 
the change and absorb it into the existing institutional and organisational structure and 
arrangement. 
North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) showed how actors deal with problems and 
challenges1. Such problems are assumed to contain an incentive structure which makes 
actors adjust the way in which they act and interact with other actors and the environment 
surrounding the problem. Indeed, actors’ capacity to gather, filter, and analyse 
information about the problem leads to different choices, plans, and decisions. The 
organisation discussed in the books mentioned above is a state actor, the government. 
Social order is a vital goal in order to minimise violence and to ensure people can conduct 
their business and other economic activities securely and free from oppression from other 
parties, especially dominant and powerful ones. There is no actor that could solve 
problem of violence immediately and each actor learns from previous decisions as well as 
from other societies. Learning capacity is the most important aspect underlined in this 
book and others by North, highlighting actors’ capacity to create better institutions (see 
North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009; North, 1990 and 2005). Hence, they proposed stages 
1 In their book, violence is a social problem that needs to be controlled by 
authoritative bodies in order to create and maintain social order. 
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in which society transforms its accumulated knowledge into a better institutional structure 
and arrangement. The phases are natural state, limited access order, and open access 
order. In each step, state actors rise through an increasingly expanding network of 
interactions, indicating a more open attitude towards other actors’ entrance into the 
business and better knowledge. This ultimately leads to trust and expansion of 
cooperative and collaborative action among actors. The three stages of society in dealing 
with problem of violence will be discussed briefly later. 
Natural state is the first form of institutional arrangement, wherein members of 
society agrees to manage their political and economic affairs. The process is simply 
agreed by individuals in the society and the scope of legitimation is still small, consisting 
of limited tasks, sources of action, and authority. As the society grows, communal 
problems also become more commonplace. This situation requires a more complex 
institutional structure. This is LAO in which elite groups have more members from 
various occupations with differing expertise and economic levels. There is also 
differentiation of tasks and sharing of authority among different groups doing different, 
but often overlapping, tasks managing a number of society affairs. 
During this second phase, there is already a form of power and task sharing in 
which different tasks and authority are given to different groups of elites. However, the 
accessibility, transparency, responsibility for public goals and existence of public control 
is very limited or non-existent. This means that public affairs are translated into policy 
and political or economic decisions by elites through their own perceptions and 
understanding as well as their scope of knowledge and interest. Most nation states, 
especially developing countries, are still in this phase of social order in 2019. 
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The last stage is OAO. Most developed rich states are already in this phase. The 
institutional structure has a clearer differentiation of tasks and authority with the 
institutionalisation of public control with public interest as the ultimate goal pursued by 
the authoritative body. Individual elites have lost their privilege in this kind of state as 
most political and economic exchanges are impersonal; personal linkages and networks 
no longer dominate state affairs. These circumstances also mean that the 
institutionalisation process has succeeded in creating a perpetuated bureaucratic 
organisation in which public affairs are dealt with and transformed into policies, bills, 
strategic plans and actions. Nevertheless, it does not mean that there is no problem in this 
phase as destructive self-centred elites who manipulate state organisations for their own 
interest still exist with different strategies. However, such negative behaviour is neither 
acceptable nor able to be shown openly in public. They have to be very secretive and thus 
have limited access and scope of control across sectors as such behaviour is punishable by 
law and social norms. 
North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) stated that the stages of society development 
do not happen in the progressive path. This means that there is no guarantee that once a 
nation-state is located in one phase it will automatically move on to the next stages; 
indeed, it could deteriorate to lower phases due to internal crises and conflict. Thus, the 
society and elites should constantly seek improvement to maintain and expand their 
capacity despite their current position in the stage so that regime and generation change 
will not negatively influence the country’s position and performance. 
Path dependence and punctuated equilibrium are the two most common 
mechanisms of institutional change evident in the various literatures about 
institutionalism (see example North, 1990; Lowndes and Robert, 2013; Campbell, 2004). 
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The concept is closely related and used by historical institutionalists as they consider 
context and time as important factors in analysing the mechanism of institutional change. 
Therefore, studying change relies of the availability of historical data and an 
understanding of its context. Path dependence uses both factors to build up its context- 
specific analysis of the sequence of stability and change events within the institutional 
structure and arrangement. Meanwhile, punctuated equilibrium focuses on influential and 
important events or sequences of events that affect the way in which actors function and 
complete their tasks (practice element) and how they are perceived and accepted by 
society and public norms (normative or narrative element). 
Furthermore, the change could happen incrementally or abruptly. This means that 
the change could take place gradually in smaller areas until the changes are recognised by 
the public or realised by other actors. This process could also recognised as a bottom-up 
mechanism of changes in which actors (organisations) attempt to develop themselves and 
such actions influence other actors to do the same, resulting in a more extensive change 
which happens in bigger or higher structures or arrangements. On the other hand, there 
are also top-down mechanisms. This means that the initiator of change is a higher 
authority – the government – where rule elements are changed (formal regulation). 
Nevertheless, such mechanisms are initially and mostly proposed by members (or a group 
of members) of an institution. 
A challenge in studying institutional change is to identify the source of change. 
Lowndes and Robert (2013), North (1990), and Campbell (2004) proposed exploring 
exogenous and endogenous factors, or a combination of both, as the source of change. 
Exogenous factors mean that the source of change comes from outside the institutional 
structure, whereas endogenous factors come from inside the structure. Hence, it is 
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important to clarify what is meant by institutional structure and the boundary between 
endogenous and exogenous factors of institutional change within the structure and or 
arrangement. 
I understand institutional structure as represented by specific sectors in which 
actors act and interact. The hydrocarbon and mining industries are the two structures I 
intend to analyse in this thesis. Therefore, actors directly and closely related to 
institutional arrangement of both sectors, as well as their regulative, practical, and 
normative elements, are part of the structure that has become my focus of study in 
explaining institutional change within Indonesia’s extractive resource governance. It also 
means that other aspects are included in the exogenous factors of the structure, especially 
the wider political, economic, and social environment in which resource governance 
exists and is legalised and practiced. 
An important process in which institutional change could happen is exchange 
between actors. By conducting exchanges with each other, an actor not only gains 
information about other actors, but also understands more about themselves. While 
competing and collaborating with others, they challenge their limited resources and 
capacities in order to achieve their goals. They develop their knowledge, use their 
potency, and expand their capacity through exchanging and interacting with others. This 
is the essence of the learning process which is the most essential element of being human 
and establishing organisation. In this thesis, I focus on organisations as institutional actors 
and agents of change. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate the benefit that an 
organisation can provide for its human members, leaders, workers, and managers. The 
organisation grows as the human grows. Hence, research on institutional change is 
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essentially a study of both human and organisational development. It provides process(s) 
to be discovered and mechanism(s) to be analysed. 
Weiss and Hobson (2003, p. 175) stated that Governing Interdependence (GI) is 
related to coordination and collaboration by converting political autonomy into economic 
capacity. It is a system of central coordination based on the cooperation of government 
and industry. Policy is seen as the result of regular and extensive consultation and 
coordination with the private sector. State capacity is also determined by institutional 
depth and breadth. Institutional depth is related to the degree to which boundaries of the 
state and the orientation of state actors define a public sphere distinguishable from larger 
society; meanwhile, the institutional breadth refers to the density of the link between state 
activities and those of the social entities. The incentive structure is a pay-off structure, 
and is apparent in political and economic processes that incorporate the specific 
institutions involved and the consequent structure of political and economic exchange. 
The technical capacity refers to the ability of bureaucrats to acquire insider knowledge 
regarding the industry as well as the technological sophistication which is vital to 
understand the industry. Political capacity means facilitating intra-elite agreement over 
how the strategy is to be implemented. 
An important task of using Weiss’ GI is expanding the scope of the state capacity 
concept and challenging the prerequisite of this concept. GI and the notion of embedded 
autonomy are usually used to examine economic development or performance as a result 
of government and business relations. Could GI be used to look at the institutional 
development of resource governance in Indonesia in terms of state and business 
relationship and capacities to interact with each other? Along this line of thinking, I also 
use the framework of governing interdependence developed by Weiss and Hobson 
49  
(1995). They gave a different proposal emphasising a different relationship between the 
government and companies which goes beyond the simple concept of a bargaining 
relationship. She proposed looking into the essence of having (and acting as) a leader that 
governs the interdependence relationship between the government and companies. 
Furthermore, she also highlighted the importance of assessing a state’s capacity to 
perform this role. Unfortunately, Weiss’ concept is not popular among researchers and 
hence it is difficult to find further studies that have used and complete her proposal. 
A basic assumption taken from the state capacity concept is that state actors are 
not a unitary or monolithic structure (Weiss, 1998). A state could also have a 
transformative capability with general attitudes often seen as state intervention in 
economic activity. GI requires reciprocal consent which results from negotiation and 
compact as the core aspect in business and state relations. Collaborative and institutional 
linkage is also crucial in governing the relationship and is often known as political 
nurturing of collaboration. 
2.4. Limitations of Resource Curse Literature in the Studies of Resource 
Governance 
Resource governance is the main topic in this study, and institutional elements and 
interactions are the main focus of the analysis. Indonesia has experienced a changing 
institution in its extractive industry. I argue that the changes have predominantly been 
caused by a dynamic interaction among institutional actors both within the industry and in 
other related institutional settings, which means that the actors involved in the industry 
are also members of other domestic and international institutional settings. This multi- 
membership means that the exposure of external factors could influence the way in which 
the actors operate, manage, and interact with each other. 
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Resource governance considers ownership and management over hydrocarbon and 
mineral resources as policy tools. This means that there are various policies taken by the 
government in conducting this strategy. On one side, the government tightly controls its 
resources through various policy instruments that severely limit business operations in the 
field. On the other side, the government uses a looser strategy to gain control, mainly 
through taxation in order to collect rent from mining production while giving managerial 
and operational freedom to the companies. However, most states are located in between 
these two extremes as they use various limitations as well as allowing various freedoms 
and incentives to encourage companies into doing what they want them to do as well as 
letting them do their job the way they want. 
Luong and Weinthal (2010) considered ownership structure as something 
dynamic, while in Indonesia’s case ownership rights are fixed and have not changed. The 
way in which the government uses and protects the rights are developing, but the owners 
of national natural resources are always Indonesian people and the ownership is managed 
by the government as the people’s representative in dealing with business entities.  
Despite my criticisms of their ownership structure thesis, both authors make an important 
assumption that the resource curse supporters assume and believe that institutions in such 
states are stagnant or unchanging (Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p. 3). This perspective 
inspired the consideration of the institutional development in the governance of extractive 
industry with government and business entities’ relationship as the explaining factors 
shaping this development. By doing so, I try to combine Susan Strange’s (1994) 
assumption that a government has to deal with companies in an era of globalised 
production. Even though she chose to consider state and market relations instead of state 
and companies’ relations as the main focus in her book, these statements have encouraged 
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me to consider the foreign companies as another dominant player in an industry 
institution within a state. 
Unfortunately, such strategic action is often generalised and mistakenly classified 
into “government intervention” as the opposite of the laissez faire concept of “liberalism” 
or “neoliberalism” in Western countries. Such prejudice leads to early judgment (which is 
mostly negative) of the government strategies in developing countries as hindering their 
own national economic growth, slowing their economic development, or making their 
country unattractive for foreign investment. The explicit similarity of all such judgment is 
the tendency to relate resource governance in developing countries with outcomes such as 
overall national economic performance, and then stretching it to national poverty level. 
This omits an important aspect of resource governance: serving the national and public 
interest as well as achieving national political, economic, and social goals as part of 
national grand policy strategies. Governments and societies in developing countries are 
not entirely filled with foolish, stupid, or rent-seeking people and actors. Their situation is 
identical to developed countries, where there is combination of smart and kind people 
alongside stupid and self-interested individuals within the political and economic power 
base. Thus, the complexity in the decision-making process is also present in resource-rich 
developing countries. 
Government intervention in the economy, conducted by developing countries, is 
often classified as taking either predatory or developmental forms, while developed 
countries are usually have a more laissez faire principals in governing their extractive 
industries. It is often assumed that the latter form is ultimately the most beneficial form of 
resource governance. Thus, development strategies directed by the  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) reflect the importance of mirroring 
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developed countries’ path to ensure the success of national development while neglecting 
the unique characteristics of each country. It is important for academia to understand 
governments in developing countries and their governance strategies in an objective 
manner. This does not mean presenting all positive things from the governance structure 
in developing countries while omitting or avoiding negative situations and problems 
which have emerged in the past; instead, it means looking deeper into the matter by using 
developing countries’ point of view and seeing things through their lenses. The study of 
developing countries is not only about developmental states in East Asia and Singapore, 
while considering the rest as mainly having the characteristics of predatory states and  
then being surprised by their growth but criticising their choices of action by using the 
perspectives of developing countries. It is not about conflicting interest of government 
and business actors in extractive industries. Rather, it is about understanding the 
complexity of a continuous and long relationship between state and business and studying 
such complexity properly. 
Because of the reasons stated above, studying resource governance is important 
for researchers in various fields, especially political economic scholars. Understanding 
the complexity of these countries’ resource governance could make a significant 
contribution to the development of studies in the political and economic fields. Analysing 
the way in which the actors process and conduct their actions and strategies towards other 
actors as well as towards the national and local political and economic environment is 
part of the attempt to expand the study of resource governance in developing countries. It 
is also important to acknowledge the way in which institutional change happens in such 
governance structures and to study the process of change, analysing the areas of an 
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institution in which change takes place and the implications for actors’ actions and their 
relationships with other actors, as well as the governance. 
Studies about resource governance provide intense analyses of the relationship 
between government and business entities. In several studies, resource governance has 
been explored in terms of its ability to generate economic rent and become a source for 
government income and development funds (see Singh and Bourgouin (2013) edited book 
for example). Some others have seen it in terms of governments’ inability to manage their 
natural resources due to weak institutions, which leads to the resource curse phenomenon 
(see Karl, 1997; Luong and Weinthal, 2010 for example). Such phenomena could also 
produce resource nationalism, which hinders national growth due to isolationist policies 
and over-suspicious behaviours and attitudes regarding foreign investment and foreign 
companies. 
Both negative conditions are the result of a combination of domestic and 
international factors. Domestic factors refer to the interrelation between domestic 
political, economic, and societal spheres. On the other hand, most external factors come 
from the multidimensional effects of globalisation and the intense relationships among 
nations. 
The resource curse is dominant as an analytical framework to examine resource 
governance in developing countries such as Indonesia. This is due to the tendency of 
previous studies to focus on economic performance (i.e. economic growth) and a static 
view of governance itself. The results of such studies are mostly dominated by presenting 
institutional weakness in resource-rich countries as the dominant factor affecting their 
negative performance, such as significant inequality of income distribution, stagnant and 
negative  economic  growth,  inflation,  etc.  (see  for  example  Karl,  1997;  Luong  and 
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Weinthal, 2010). The tendency of these studies is to have a static view about how 
governance is run, to focus on elites’ behaviour, to assume there is one-way interaction 
from government towards other actors, and to consider the government as a unitary actor. 
Consequently, this research attempts to provide an alternative analytical process by using 
those neglected assumptions. This means that Indonesia’s resource governance is 
analysed from the basic assumption that it is about the history of institutional change in 
such governance. The government and business relationships are presented as explanatory 
elements of the transformation process while the government is intentionally considered 
as an organisation of organisations, which together with other actors acts and interacts 
within multiple institutions. 
On the other hand, the actual concern for governments and societies in developing 
countries is to maximise income from the abundance of resources while maintaining their 
ownership of such resources and overcoming various environmental and social problems 
caused by extractive activities in their neighbourhoods. Thus, resource nationalism is an 
embedded value in society (including employees in various ministries and other 
governmental bodies, see for example transcriptions of my interviews with high profile 
persons and employees in such agencies) rather than merely a discourse or mental 
construction for elites’ agenda. 
Arbatli (2018) stated that there are ups and downs, ebbs and flows in the 
implementation of resource nationalism as oil is now seen more as a tool for foreign 
policy, while resource nationalism and the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
resources (UN resolutions 1966) is used more frequently as a domestic policy tool. This 
means that, since the 1990s, the government has used resource nationalism in a more 
pragmatic manner. 
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It is not a matter of strong or weak bureaucracy within a state (state potency); 
instead, the focus is on the government’s capacity to decide what it wants with its 
authority and potency, as well as how this can be achieved (Weiss and Hobson, 2003). 
While state potency might be given and static, government capacity is dynamic and 
something to be strived for. Therefore, autonomy is an element of a state’s potency, but 
policy and regulation indicate the capacity to achieve the state’s goals and protect its 
interests. The government needs to know its potency in order to be able to generate the 
capacity to achieve its goals. 
On the other hand, supporters of the resource curse concept assumed that the 
ownership of natural resources (state potency) has an embedded weak institution which 
leads to poor economic performance (Karl, 1997). Meanwhile, Luong and Weinthal 
(2010) proposed a slightly different viewpoint about negative government performance in 
resource-rich countries. They assumed that weak institutions rather than the oil curse 
leads to poor and negative outcomes in these nations, especially in their political and 
economic performance (Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p. 2). Another argument made by 
these authors is that a weak institution containing a wrong set of institutions needed to 
encourage better performance. They also repeatedly underlined that the resource curse 
considers weak institution as inherently attached to the states, meaning there is no way for 
the government to escape the “curse”. According to this perception, Norway is often 
considered as the outlier among resource-rich states as it has successfully escaped from 
the “curse”. 
Property rights determine actors’ role and authority to act towards their property 
and other actors. Ownership is another term for property rights claimed by state, while 
property rights are commonly used by companies and individuals. In order to maintain 
their  rights,  actors  used  their  capacity to  control  access  to  their  property (Weiss and 
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Hobson, 2003). An act to control is to expand and gain a more significant advantage from 
their property and ownership by bargaining with other actors, negotiating, and releasing 
some constraints and giving incentives. The existing structure of rights and the 
characteristics of their enforcement define the existing wealth-maximising opportunities 
of the actors that could be realised by political and economic exchange. 
Hence, this study emphasises the importance of shifting the way academics 
perceive and conduct research from a static viewpoint towards a more dynamic 
perspective by using a less judgmental and less prejudice analytical framework for 
developing countries. This thesis is one of many attempts to do so. Such dynamism is 
considered by taking into account the complex situations and varieties of opportunities 
and constraints that institutional actors have to deal with during a certain period of time. 
Campbell acknowledged that both actors and their institutional arrangements are 
constantly changing in different scopes and speeds (2004). 
Resource nationalism is not an ideology to govern an industry. It is a policy  
choice or policy instrument. Thus, it originates from the political and economic decision- 
making process rather than a national belief system. The fact that pro-resource 
nationalism always exists in developing countries means that ownership over their 
resources is important. Their concerns are about the rent generated from these resources 
as well as control over the use and management of both the resources and the income for 
the public. 
This understanding also means that rent-seeking behaviour could come from a 
strategic approach regarding the ownership and control over resources. Such behaviour 
cannot be isolated as the attitudes and interests of elites only. It is a matter of perception 
regarding their situation and capacity both to use and manage their resources and to 
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generate rent. Thus, this behaviour could come from a strategic political economy 
consideration and not merely from elites’ pragmatism, especially if we locate such 
behaviour in an open access society in which elites’ decisions are not the only important 
aspect. A lack of consideration regarding the complexity of state organisations (and the 
government) could be misleading and will not improve our understanding of resource 
governance in developing countries in doorstep conditions and in the early phases of 
becoming an open access society. 
Gustaffson and Scurrah (2018) proposed looking into resource governance by 
considering the complexity of organisations within the resource-rich states. This is 
important for analysis of the strategic actions taken by weaker governmental 
organisations in governing resources. Local governments are considered to be examples 
of such organisations. 
2.5. Theoretical Frameworks of Government and Business Relations 
 
The extensive government and business relationship literature was mainly 
contributed to by international business scholars. As such, their main viewpoint 
highlighted the challenges and difficulties faced by multinational enterprises in their 
operations around the world, especially regarding the inevitable relations with the 
governments of both their home and host countries. 
The concept of obsolescing bargaining is an important starting point to understand 
how the initial condition during negotiations could determine who gained the upper hand 
in the beginning of the relationship (Vernon, 1977 and 2000). However, the condition 
changes over time and the contractual terms could potentially shift in favour of other 
parties. Multinational Companies (MNCs) often got the upper hand in the beginning of 
the contractual relationship, but since the amount of investment and assets grow bigger 
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over time, the risk of losing them also increases; thus, the government could gain a 
stronger position. This shifting is very likely to happen in mining as the industry typically 
has longer contracts and high investment. The risk increases because the government’s 
capacity to act in any mining affairs could also grow over time as globalisation in 
information and technology make information and education sharing across borders more 
intense, creating a younger generation of both political and economic elites. 
Various studies in host government and MNC relations assume that MNCs have 
stronger position than governments, especially regarding natural resource industries such 
as hydrocarbons. This asymmetric bargaining power results in a bargaining outcome that 
is more favourable towards MNCs’ interests and goals. This condition results in a 
dynamic relationship between governments and oil companies. In the early stages of the 
oil industry, MNCs dominated both access to factor production, technology, and the 
market. Several scholars have argued that one of main concerns of MNCs is the ‘outsider’ 
status in the host country (Eden and Molot, 2002). This means that there is liability of 
foreignness that they have to overcome in the early stages of their activities after deciding 
to enter. MNCs attempt to develop their organisational legitimacy by building sustainable 
and trustful relationships with the state. This legitimacy can be enhanced by developing 
partnerships with local partners. 
Bargaining advantage refers to the bargaining resources and capabilities that 
determine actors’ available choices to achieve their goals. Grosse (1996) argued that the 
outcome of government and MNC relations is dependent on the bargaining advantage 
each actor has. Each actor brings their own resources and strategies to the negotiation 
process. Both factors are assumed to determine the alternative choices available and the 
ability to pursue their goals. In his schema about the bargaining context between the host 
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government and MNCs, Grosse (2005) concluded that the government is the one which 
sets the rules of the game in their relations. This is different from our view that the rules 
of the game are determined by all actors in the oil industry. 
Obsolescing bargaining relations provided early theory on state and firm 
relationships. This framework assumes such relations as a zero sum game, which means 
the advantage of one actor is a disadvantage for the others. The bargaining model 
considered governments and companies not as rivals, but as partners to gain wealth 
(Vivoda, 2011). Companies possess resources protected by property rights as well as tacit 
and relational resources. The first variant is related to a firm’s specific advantage, 
especially its financial and technological abilities, while tacit resources result from its 
strategic operation and learning process. The relational resources place companies in their 
networks and relationships with other actors, thus determining their access to information 
and knowledge about market conditions, rivalries, and the political, social, and economic 
environment at the national and global levels. 
The bargaining model focuses on the first-time or initial bargaining process 
between governments and foreign companies (Vivoda, 2009 and Vivoda, 2011). The 
outcome that is taken into account is an MNC’s decision to enter the host country. 
Foreign companies can choose to invest or not, while the government can choose to 
receive the investment or not. However, it is generally assumed that investment will 
benefit both parties. In the initial process, the MNC has a stronger bargaining position as 
it is assumed that the MNC always has the option not to invest and to move the funding to 
other countries, while the same option might be not available to the government. There 
are many countries that have similar comparative advantages that offer different incentive 
structures to attract foreign investment, whereas governments do not always have other 
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sources of investment. Thus, in this initial phase, MNCs can gain more benefits than the 
government. However, over time, the advantage becomes obsolete and shifts towards the 
government as it has more mature industrial capacities and sufficient funding, managerial 
capabilities, and technological ability to sustain the production process. Furthermore, 
through their cooperation with MNCs, the government obtains access to the international 
market. Thus, both production capability and the ability to sell products shift towards the 
government. 
Eden, Lenway, and Schuler (2004, p. 2) define the political bargaining model 
(PBM) as “iterated political bargaining negotiated between government and companies 
over a wide array of government policies at the industrial level”. It uses transaction cost 
principles and a resource-based view to sharpen the obsolescing bargaining model 
(OBM). The OBM assumes that bargaining relations are the function of compatibility and 
conflicting goals, resources, and capabilities of actors. The more resourceful and capable 
the actors, the more they are able to gain benefits from this bargaining. However, the 
PBM assumes that perceptions about each other and abstract objectives, for instance the 
need for learning and knowledge, also influence such bargaining. MNCs enter host 
countries not only to gain access to the domestic market and factors production, but also 
to learn and gather more knowledge and skills about various strategies to handle different 
situations. MNCs’ global competencies are derived from their abilities to survive in 
various environments. They learn from their subsidiaries in many countries. The PBM 
emphasises the attachments and relations MNCs establish with their domestic affiliates. It 
takes time and commitment to build and develop positive relations since, within the host 
country, MNCs are often viewed as enemies and rivals for wealth and power. In 
conclusion,  governments  and MNCs  are  involved  in  a political bargaining relationship 
where their interaction agenda is not only about ownership and profit sharing, but also 
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wider industrial and economic issues (Eden and Molot, 2002, p. 4). Moreover, MNCs 
seek more favourable public policies through their interactions and negotiations with 
governments and other economic actors. 
Furthermore, Brewer (1992, p. 301-302) classified four typologies of issue that are 
important in analysing bargaining relations between government and MNCs: distribution, 
regulation, protection-interaction, and redistribution. These typologies are based on the 
tangibility and consistency of the impact of a policy on MNCs’ actions. MNCs are 
assumed to actively attempt to change their political environment; they do not passively 
react and the political environment is not given. Distribution issues appear when the 
policy impact is tangible and symmetrical. MNCs enjoy many benefits and incentives 
from their relations with government and therefore it is not directly conflictual. The 
protection-interaction issues emerge when the impact is symbolic and symmetrical. All 
companies have to deal with the same conditions when this issue appears as the 
government has the same policies towards them. They are classified as regulation issues 
when the impact is tangible and asymmetrical, the government and MNCs’ relationship is 
conflictual, and it happens in an open political process. MNCs act collectively in order to 
have a more significant impact on the political process. Lastly, redistribution issues are 
indicated by symbolic and asymmetrical impact. MNCs’ elites interact directly with 
governmental elites and reach a consensus. Furthermore, the determinant of MNCs’ 
power differs across issues. The sources of MNCs’ power in these issues originates from 
their access to governmental elites, an exceptional negotiation ability, and the 
cohesiveness of companies’ coalition to pursue their interests in the political process. 
Thus, this issue approach emphasises MNC’s organisational ability as partners of the 
government to develop the economy. 
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The cooperative bargaining model refers to adjustment of one’s behaviour to the 
actual and anticipated preferences of other actors (Luo, 2004). This model acknowledges 
cooperation and competition as the nature of bargaining relations between governments 
and companies. Both happen simultaneously through partnership interaction. Cooperation 
is indicated by accommodation of the needs of others, interdependence of goal 
achievement, and collaboration of capabilities between actors. On the other hand, 
competition indicates both opportunities to bargain and the probability of conflict. Luo 
created this newer version of the bargaining model as a criticism of the previous theory 
which emphasised more on the competition and conflict between governments and MNCs 
to gain access to resources, exploit them, and control revenue generated from them (2004, 
p. 432). 
Luo created four types of competition and cooperation relations in government 
and MNC interaction: estranger, contender, partner, and integrator (2004, p. 437-440). 
The estranger type reflects a distance relation between actors. They are not  
interdependent and their interactions consist of compliance and circumvention. 
Compliance means that actors follow the rules of the game, while circumvention means 
one actor challenges the supremacy of the others. This actor attempts to break the 
constraining rules that the other actors follow during their relations. In the contender type, 
there is limited interdependence between both actors but their bargaining power is 
asymmetrical. In this condition, the outcome from their interactions depends on both 
actors’ range alternatives. The one with the greater bargaining power is likely to gain a 
more favourable concession from this process. In a conflictual situation, one actor can 
apply the threat to exit or the threat to expropriate. 
The partnership type means that MNCs attempt to accommodate social needs in 
 
the host country and comply with domestic values, norms, and traditions. This means that 
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MNCs seek to achieve an ‘insider’ position in the national industry as they need 
legitimacy to survive and overcome the liability of foreignness. Lastly, in the integrator 
type, governments and MNCs create a coalition to reach their objectives as their resources 
are complementary and their goals are interdependent. There is a close interaction that is 
reflected in personal relations from both elites. The common pattern of behaviour from 
the actors is accommodation; they tend to have compromising preferences and strategic 
actions to respond to the demands of others and changing conditions. MNCs tend to 
influence the host government’s policies through lobbying and take advantage of political 
and economic support from their home government. 
The ability of each actor to access, gain and process information from their 
interactions is different. This difference can lead to asymmetric information power and 
capabilities to respond among actors. Thus, actors always face uncertainty during their 
interactions with others. An institution can overcome this problem by providing access to 
information that is available to all related actors; however, this is also problematic since 
each actor can be considered as a rival to the others. Access to information is one kind of 
power that can be a source of comparative advantage within one actor. This issue  
involves the distributional dimension of an institution and means that an institution has to 
gain information from each actor to distribute it to the others. On the other hand, from the 
actors’ perspective, it means that each actor has to give up their comparative advantage in 
order to gain more from the institution. This distributional dimension is also a 
consequence of being within an institutional framework. This is why institutions can 
constrain actors’ behaviours and limit their choices of action. The initiators of the 
institution usually design an institution that is long lasting, can be inherited by a 
successor, and can be used to anticipate the movements of others. 
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2.5.1. Actors’ Capacity: 
 
Good resource governance is related to government capacity in four sectors: 
policy-making, strategy-making, operational decision-making, and monitoring and 
evaluation (Lahn et al., 2007, p. 8). Alternatively, Lubiantara (2017) explained that the 
governance structure in the hydrocarbon sector is often related to how the government 
and political elites perceive oil and gas; for example whether it is perceived as merely a 
commodity or as an engine for economic growth. There is a huge difference between both 
perceptions in generating national resource governance in Indonesia. The first perception 
leads to strict regulation with little flexibility and consideration for economic and 
business challenges that companies are dealing with locally, nationally, and globally. This 
condition makes regulative and practical elements of institutional arrangement in resource 
governance insensitive to the dynamics of the international and domestic oil market and 
competition. On the other hand, the second perception is assumed to give the authoritative 
body in the governance a broader view, more flexibility, and greater sensitivity with 
regards to the company and market situation. Hence, the four capacities mentioned earlier 
could be analysed as closely related to government perceptions regarding the extractive 
sectors. 
Meanwhile, Weiss (1995) posited that state capacity determines whether it is able 
to govern an interdependence situation with business entities. She believed that there are 
differences between commanding, leading, and governing, where the latter would give the 
best result as the government and companies are able to cooperate and collaborate in 
achieving their goals although they actually have different goals. Such capacity is known 
as transformative capacity and, with their institutional structure, developing countries are 
considered as the ones that have the privilege to do the governing. 
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Actors’ capacity is often closely related to their strengths and weaknesses, which 
are determined by their institutional and administrative capacity. In other words, state 
capacity is determined by how much can be achieved by forcing other actors to act in 
accordance with the state’s own path to success. 
2.6. Comparative Historical Institutionalism and the Process Tracking Method 
 
As a scientific journey, I use a comparative historical method in an attempt to 
answer my research questions. This method provides tools for both exploratory research 
and an analytical framework in my attempt to understand resource governance in 
Indonesia. This means I can find the process of change in the governance as well as in the 
larger context, the national political and economic realm. After finding such process(s), it 
is possible to analyse the mechanism of change in the resource governance of both the 
hydrocarbon and mining industries. Lange (2013) named this tool the process tracing 
method. 
I use both narrative comparisons as the methods for comparing the process and 
mechanism of change in two extractive industries in Indonesia: the hydrocarbon and 
mining industries. I have chosen this method as, in the preliminary research, I found that 
both sectors started with the same regulation but at a certain point the institutional 
arrangements for both changed and developed in different directions. 
This study is a qualitative research that uses interviews, documents, journals, and 
books as the primary and secondary resources. The interviews are conducted in Indonesia 
with governmental agency representatives and company representatives. In addition, I 
was allowed to observe a meeting between SKK Migas and the oil and gas contractors in 
2015 discussing the  recent  policy issued by the  Bank of  Indonesia  which obligates  the 
business entities to use the Rupiah as the main currency in their domestic transactions, 
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including in the domestic oil trade between companies and between companies and the 
government. I have also been able to obtain additional information from various 
hydrocarbon companies by attending an annual exhibition for the hydrocarbon industry 
held by IPA (Indonesia Petroleum Association) in 2016. The collected data and 
information is analysed using the process tracing method. 
Understanding the social world has stimulated philosophers and social scientists to 
develop social science as a separate discipline from natural science. However, there are 
competing perspectives about social reality, especially from naturalists and constructivists 
(Moses and Knutsen, 2012, p. 7). Naturalists believe that in the social world there is the 
‘Real World’ that is separate from our perception about it, while constructivists believe 
that the truth in the social world is socially constructed and determined by people’s 
perceptions about it. Naturalists emphasise the importance of reasoning that is backed up 
by the observable reality and the single truth and pattern in social reality. The followers of 
this view believe in the existence of general patterns of human action. On the other hand, 
Constructivists believe that people’s actions are derived by their perceptions and beliefs 
regarding the world and therefore the meaning behind this action can help us to 
understand social facts. There is no single method to understand and discover the social 
world because each social event is unique and has different meaning for actors. Although 
constructivists argue that there are many ways to capture the meaning behind human 
behaviour and actions, they value case study as an important method to analyse and 
understand it (Moses and Knutsen, 2012, p. 7-12). 
However, nowadays, social scientist cannot be fully divided into both categories 
as there is also a moderate perspective known as scientific realism, which acknowledges 
the complexities of truth and understanding within the social world that are influenced by 
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human perceptions and actions. However, along with naturalists, scientific realists believe 
that besides people’s construction of social reality, there is the ‘Real World’ out there. 
They believe in different paths and ways to understand and discover the ‘Real World’ and 
thus avoided the generalisation of social facts. This is because most social facts consist of 
multiple layers of human interpretation and consequently the falsification principle cannot 
be applied. Scientific realists also contend that different contexts can lead to different 
behaviours and actions. Thus, the social world is an open system and not a closed and 
rigid one. It is unpredictable and uncertain (Moses and Knutsen, 2012, p. 12-14). 
All three perspectives recognise the same method in conducting social research 
such as case studies, statistics, and comparative methods. However, Moses and Knutsen 
(2012, p. 15-16, 49) argued that naturalists have a hierarchy of methods with experiments 
as the first and primary method to discover the ‘Real World’, whereas non-experimental 
methods such as statistics, comparison, and case studies are secondary. On the other hand, 
they posited that constructivists analyse the processes and sequences of events throughout 
time in order to find the meaning of events (Moses and Knutsen, 2012, p. 225). Process 
tracing is an important tool to ascertain the interlinkage of historical events. By doing so, 
constructivists can understand more about an event based on its context, the actors’ 
motivation, roles, and interpretations, and the interactions between actors and the context 
of space and time. Regarding this tendency, naturalists value the narrative method when 
studying social events and extract social facts (Moses and Knutsen, p. 231). Moreover, 
Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003, p. 11-15) argued that causal narration in the sequence 
of events and historical process throughout time is the central focus in conducting this 
method. Lange (2013) posited that there are three kind of analysis in this method: the 
causal narrative, process tracing, and pattern matching. The causal narrative is a useful 
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tool to answer why questions, while process tracing is most suitable for how questions. 
Pattern matching is applied to test the ability of a theory or concept to explain a case. 
Comparative analysis is significant in order to extract conclusions regarding how 
different political systems affect the decision-making structure and relationship among oil 
actors, especially in developing countries which are known to have a unique and specific 
political structure, ideology, culture, and process. I contend that the collaboration of those 
systems shapes the way in which the domestic political and economic elites establish their 
relationships and achieve their commitments, while at the same time gaining profit and 
leverage. 
A process tracing and process-oriented narrative comparison research has been 
designed to explore the similarities and differences in the selected cases (Lange, 2013, p. 
48). Process tracing is a term usually used in the case study method. It focuses on the 
sequence of events throughout the research time frame in order to illustrate the 
institutionalisation process and the development of institutions. Such research conducts 
analysis on data collected during research by paying attention to the process, the 
sequences of events as a whole within a case (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 7). Bennett 
and Checkel explained further that the method could be used for many purposes such as 
testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms explained by or generated from a theoretical 
framework, developing (complementing) existing theories, or developing new theories 
(2015, p. 7-8. See also Trampusch and Palier, 2016, p. 439). 
There are several steps to conduct process tracing research. According to table 2, 
which shows types of process tracing (Trampusch and Palier, 2016, p. 443), my research 
could be categorised as explaining outcome process tracing that is part of a more 
inductive type of process tracing. This method has been chosen as I want to understand 
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how and why institutional change happens and results in different trajectories for different 
kinds of extractive industry in Indonesia. Trampusch and Palier (2016, p. 448) explained 
that “the main merit of process tracing is to unpack causality and how it develops in 
time”, and “if one states that context and time matter, one needs to use process tracing, 
because things do not happen ‘ceteris paribus’ and mechanisms have to be understood 
within their specific institutional and historical environment”. This explanation also 
implies that the types of hypotheses derived from theories would reflect a probabilistic 
model rather than a deterministic one as suggested by supporters of Bayesian logic. I 
decided not to use Bayesian logic in my process tracing method as I do not intend to 
prepare and generated deterministic hypotheses to be tested in my research. I prefer, for 
the sake of the intention to provide alternative analysis to that produced by resource curse 
researchers, I went back and forth between the theories used and the findings during my 
research. By doing so, I purposely had an imaginer discussion between my understanding 
about theories and my findings in order to generate a more thorough analysis about the 
way in which such development has taken place in Indonesia’s resource governance. 
I learned where to look in the case being studied by theoretical framework used in 
this study and I generated the causal mechanism used in my hypotheses from the theories. 
The change in institutional arrangement of resource governance in two extractive 
industries in Indonesia is the outcome that I seek to analyse, while actors, environment, 
interactions among actors (and their initial to current capacities) as well as interactions 
between actors and the environment are the causal factors. By using process tracing, the 
analysis searches for a causal process and mechanism behind institutional change in the 
resource governance generated by the causal factors as informed by theories. One general 
process and three general mechanisms generated from the theories discussed earlier form 
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the basis for my hypotheses: the learning process (including the process of openness), and 
enforcing, adaptive, and transformative mechanisms. 
The way in which the process tracing method is actually used in my research is as 
follows. The first step is to identify the actors and interconnectivity among actors so that 
the initial condition of the institutionalisation process can be inferred. The next step is to 
derive the institutional development and determine the feedback, adjustment, and 
enforcement mechanisms. The exploration and explanation of the institutionalisation 
process and the institutional development of each case is the first goal of the design. 
Subsequently, by using process-oriented narrative, the similarities and differences 
in the institution is generated and the findings can be placed in their own context in order 
to find the limitations and any issues which may affect the findings when they are applied 
in other contexts. By doing so, the researcher can achieve a deeper and broader 
understanding of the cases. 
2.6.1. Data Collection 
 
A study about governance over a long time frame requires the collection of 
historical data from literature and relevant official documents. Additionally, interviews 
are conducted to observe and analyse the preferences of actors, their perceptions towards 
each other, their current situations including their perceptions about opportunities and 
problems, and challenges within the current institutional arrangement. Selected 
interviewees are mainly high profile persons in their respected organisations, especially 
the ones from government agencies and national and local companies. Some of them are 
former or current chief secretaries for their respective offices. Meanwhile, interviewees 
from foreign companies have different backgrounds; they are mainly employees without a 
structural position within their companies and only one of them has a higher position. 
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It is also part of the ethical considerations to ask for permission to mention their 
names in this thesis. Thus, for the purpose of not implicating their individual positions 
and their organisations, persons from the companies are mentioned as representatives 
from national or foreign companies without their names or their companies’ names. 
2.7. Operationalisation of the Frameworks and Method 
 
Process tracing has been chosen as the most suitable method to analyse the data as 
it investigates a changing situation from an initial point towards a point of destination. 
The user of this method often uses a causal mechanism in their analysis. There are two 
important principals in doing this method. The first principal is recognising the 
connection between the initial and destination point in a specific context (or case), and the 
second is recognising actors as individual actors and looking at them from the perspective 
of actors’ relations. I generate several steps in conducting this research from those two 
principals. 
First of all is determining the point of departure and the point of destination. One 
thing I have focused on during the research is recognition of the initial point and the 
development points of the extractive industries institutions. By doing so, the difference in 
the development paths in the hydrocarbon and mining industries have been accurately 
captured and it has been possible to avoid judging and treating the governance in both 
sectors as uniform. Treating both institutions and the actors’ relations using the same 
viewpoint is the main problem in analysing their development process. 
In this stage, I identify governmental agencies that closely interact with companies 
as targeted sources for interviews. SKK Migas, Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR), House of Representative, and one Governor in 
Indonesia are the one who agree to be interviewed. The Governor of West Sumatra is 
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chosen as the one region that have been through all phase of interaction with mining 
companies since independence. The mines in the area were already closed but the local 
government succeeded to transform it into tourist destination. In addition, I also pinpoint 
big foreign oil and mining companies that have long period of interaction with 
government, especially the ones that have experienced regime changes in the country. I 
choose one random NMC, among 3 other NMC, that have headquarter office in Jakarta 
and 1 regional-owned company, to get general views about government and companies 
relations from state-owned companies’ side. Furthermore, I come to IPA exhibition in 
Jakarta in order to make short interview to many MNCs at the same time and place. 
Unfortunately, only 1 FOC welcome to have a discussion about the topic and the rest are 
rejecting my intention. 
The second step is by identifying the dominant and participant actors. In this step, 
I look into each actor’s actions and learning experience through the actors’ relations 
perspective. Therefore, the focus is on the relationships among actors while analysing 
individual actions. By doing so, I connect the learning experience of an agency 
individually with its interaction with other actors. It is important to note that the 
government consists of various agencies vertically and horizontally, meaning that each 
agency simultaneously deals with agencies at the same level as well as those above and 
below. Meanwhile, the companies also consist of various types based on the ownership 
and nature of their jobs. 
Lastly, the third step is positioning the actors’ relations into the institutional 
development process. This is an important process as the connectivity between actors’ 
relations and the development in extractive industries governance is the main hypothesis 
in this research. By using this logic, I have conducted two case studies by looking into the 
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hydrocarbon and mining industries separately, with the findings then compared for a 
wider analysis. This process demonstrates the value of looking into natural resource 
governance in the resource-rich countries sector by sector rather than treating the 
extracting industry as one entity. 
 
The challenge involved in analysing the results of the interviews is to validate the 
data mentioned during interviews and also to triangulate it with documents, articles, and 
papers released by the government, as well as news and reports from official websites and 
respected national newspapers. It should be possible to look beyond those sources to 
extract a rigorous and valid understanding about both the sectors being studied and the 
context surrounding them. Next, discussion between frameworks and my understanding 
will lead to an analytical outcome that was expected to be constructed and reconstructed 
or refocused and expanded throughout my period of research depending on new insights 
and understanding gained during the research process. This is one of many advantages of 
conducting a qualitative within-case research method in which I could closely engage 
with and imagine dialogues between theories, data, and context. Of course, such research 
also becomes a disadvantage for more positivistic researchers and methodologist as the 
analytical outcome is often highly objective and not generalisable. In this regard, I follow 
Lange (2013) methodological framework to ensure my design and method are stated 
clearly in order to give a sense of transparency and an accountable research process while 
also making me more responsible with regards to how my research is conducted. 
2.8. Conclusion: Basic Assumptions and Hypothesis 
 
This is not an evaluation research as there is neither proposed ideal resource 
governance nor a government and business relationship that functions as a model to 
evaluate government performance in governing extractive industries. In addition, unlike 
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the resource curse it does not focus on government performance. Rather, this study 
focuses on institutional change itself, something which is rare in existing studies of 
resource-rich countries. This is not a behavioural study like rentier state studies and 
neither is it a story of progress; instead, it is a story of evolution and change. 
What kind of problems, shortcomings, or critics for researches on institutionalism 
does this thesis answer? First and foremost is the scarcity of research on institutional 
change that considers both the dynamic of institutional arrangement as well as the 
dynamic of actors and their interactions with each other. Secondly, this research provides 
an alternative framework to look into resource governance in a developing country 
without starting its assumption from resource curse prejudice or presenting a negative 
portrayal of resource nationalism. It is valuable to look into the institutional elements and 
processes as well as the mechanisms provided by such countries in governing their 
extractive industry by giving full acknowledgement and consideration to their complex 
political, economic, and social environments. 
In earlier studies, institutional change has been understood and analysed as a 
change in equilibria. Emphasising equilibria as the paramount desire for order created by 
an institutional arrangement is one way to simplify the complex nature of a social 
environment. However, this simplification is not helpful for academia or the public to 
understand more about resource governance in developing countries. The goals and 
desirable outcomes of institutional arrangement could differ depending on actors’ 
preferences and situations. The goals could also change over time. The government, as 
one of the dominant and important institutional actors, for example had survival as the 
primary goal during their early period of independence. Over time, the goal shifted from 
gaining more sovereignty and independence to: economic development; protecting the 
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domestic market; smoothing the country’s industrialisation; gaining more revenue from 
its ownership over land and resources; gaining more independence from foreign imported 
products; or distributing wealth more equally to the country’s citizens and securing 
domestic demand within certain markets. This complex goal structure has not been 
captured well by previous studies on institutional change. Thus, I contend that actors’ 
learning process and their capacity structure influence the way in which institutional 
change happens. 
On the other hand, institutionalists have acknowledged the multidimensional 
characteristics of institutions (see North, 1991). However, empirical studies which 
illustrate this complexity are still limited. The interconnectivity between institutional 
actors at different levels has not received sufficient attention. This interconnectivity is 
vital to understand the complexity which could make the gap narrower between what 
institutionalism sees and what, how, and why an institution exists in reality. The study 
also contributes to existing literature on the study of government and business relations  
by presenting the complexity nature of this relationship due to the different perceptions 
and situations experienced, seen, and perceived by related actors. There are also 
differences in actors’ capacities to access information, analyse, and understand it to do 
their respective role in the institutional arrangement. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
INDONESIA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Indonesia is one of the developing countries that survived the economic and 
political crises in Asia which started in 1997. This country has experienced a vast 
changing political, economic, and social environment since the 1998 reformation, which 
marked an end to President Soeharto’s 32-year authoritarian regime (Acharya, 2015). 
Despite various criticisms of how the government dealt with problems emerging from the 
inexperience of political and economic actors in a dynamic Indonesia, it is important to 
recognise the survivability of this nation having undergone various problems both 
nationally and locally. It has faced challenges in a more globalised and interdependent 
world and has been able to survive and build the country. Unfortunately, analysis about 
the problems faced by governments in developing countries is more dominant than 
analysis about the dynamics of their political and economic institutions. 
Indonesia’s Oil Industry was developed in the early era right after the country’s 
independence as the government needed to collect development funds to start 
industrialisation (Chalmers and Hadiz, 1997, p.5). There are three rights in the 
hydrocarbon industry. Mineral rights mean the rights over the resources beneath and 
above the land, while mining rights mean the rights to explore and produce oil from 
oilfields. The final aspect is economic rights, which mean the rights to get profit from oil 
trading (Sanusi, 2004). Based on the Dutch Colonial Mining Law before independence, 
the concessionary contract was the only oil contract model (Carlson, 1977, p. 8; and 
Darmono, 2009, p. 18). Based on this model, the government did not have any control 
over a company’s activities. Furthermore, the government’s only task was collecting 
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royalties and tax from the company. In other words, the company had ownership rights 
over the land and the resources beneath and above it during the contract period. This 
system was greatly opposed by the government of Indonesia because, according to article 
33 in the 1945 Constitution, the government has sole ownership of the land and all 
resources beneath and above it and is obliged to use it to provide welfare and wealth for 
the citizens (Darmono, 2009, p. 18). 
Meanwhile, it is important to explicitly note that elites and citizens in the early 
period perceived the hydrocarbon industry as a source of instant development funds and 
also as an important sector supporting their industrialisation projects and the economic 
development of the newly independent Indonesia. However, they also had a different 
perspective and suggested strategies about how to manage this extractive industry 
(Darmono, 2009, Chapter VI and Machmud, 2000, p. 48-54). One group, known as 
nationalists, perceived the domestic ability to control and manage the operation of oil and 
mining fields as showing a strong and sovereign Indonesia while foreign investment, 
especially from the former colonial power, the Dutch and its companies, as a threat to the 
national politics and economy. Nevertheless, another group perceived foreign investment 
and having good relationships with foreign companies and their home states as important 
in boosting national economic projects. These contrasting opinions are always present 
among elites and citizens, thus affecting the dynamic behaviour and attitudes in national 
and local environments. 
Luong and Weinthal (2010) proposed to look at four types of ownership structure 
that they believe to be determining factors in a government’s performance to maximise 
national revenue from oil companies’ operations. They posited that the government’s 
control over the industry is the result of the ownership structure of natural resources. 
Moreover, the way in which the government conducts its authority over the industry 
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determines how much profit can be collected from oil mining operations. According to 
their classification, Indonesia is moving from S1 to S2 types of structure. It means that 
Indonesia had a state ownership with control and afterwards has a private ownership with 
control over its extractive industry. In this regard, these authors decided to determine 
ownership structure only from the oil regulation (Luong and Weinthal, 2010, p. 7). This is 
misleading because the country actually has two separate resource governance for its 
hydrocarbon and mining sectors. Considering ownership structure is institutional 
arrangement in the resource governance, generalization about the type of ownership 
structure based only on the rule element of both sectors is not a good starting point for my 
research. I found that there is no change in the country’s ownership structure as it is 
always a state ownership with control. The change actually happens mostly in procedure 
element of institutional arrangement. Chapter IV, V, and VI present the further analysis to 
prove such hypothesis. Nevertheless, their books gave me insight on how to highlight 
institutional change in this thesis. 
This study found that resource governance could have different forms in different 
resource sectors despite all being governed by the government of Indonesia (GoI). The 
hydrocarbon and general mining sectors, as part of the natural resource industry in 
Indonesia, have different institutional arrangements. Questions about why and how such 
differences have resulted from similar political and economic systems have triggered my 
interest in conducting this research. Such differences in governing the natural resource 
industry have rarely been noted and analysed in previous researches about resource-rich 
countries, creating an over-simplification regarding the complexity of resource 
governance in developing countries. 
The complexity is a consequence of the dynamic and changing political and 
economic conditions faced by the government both at the national and local levels 
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(Davidson, 2015, Chapter II; and OECD, 2016, p. 21). This situation also means that, 
despite external dynamism that should be dealt with, the country also has an internal 
dynamic situation as national and subnational political and economic actors grow and 
develop. Although institutionalism is often criticised as lacking in its ability to study 
dynamic and changing situations, this framework, especially its historical and 
sociological branches, recognises the development of actors in dealing with the changing 
social settings and environments. 
Indonesia has been chosen as the case study because of the fast and dynamic 
development of the political and economic governance during the country’s 67 years of 
independence. The country has already experienced authoritative, transition towards 
democratic, and limited liberal democratic governmental systems while maintaining 
Pancasila (The Five Principles) as the national ideology (Davidson, 2015). This dynamic 
situation has had a two-sided influence for Indonesia’s development as a whole. It has 
helped the government and society to become more mature in managing their internal 
affairs as well as their interactions with international actors, particularly foreign 
companies. On the other hand, the situation has made it difficult and less-attractive for 
foreign investors to enter and sustain their operations. Regime change usually also policy, 
attitude, and strategy alterations. Therefore, business entities should always be ready to 
have a different strategy to deal with new elites with new policies at both the national and 
subnational levels. 
This political dynamic not only happens at the national level but also at the 
regional level, and it results in greater uncertainty in predicting future challenges the 
company may face during its operations in the country. There is no insurance that it will 
be able to continue to operate in a changing political and social situation once there has 
been significant investment of capital in the exploration phase. Changing authoritative 
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elites, especially at the regional level, could lead to changing regional regulations or 
opposition to the company’s operations from elites or local citizens, which could hinder 
or become a disadvantage for their operations in the region. On the other hand, companies 
also have to deal with the dynamic of international business as well as the high risk, high 
cost, and time consuming nature of the industry. The decreasing value of coal in the 
international market since 2014 is a recent example of difficulties faced by coal mining 
companies as they had to adjust their economic calculations about their operations and 
strategy to survive and make profit. 
As a trade commodity, minerals have been widespread since the Industrial 
Revolution. However, many societies had already used minerals and done simple mining 
activities in order to obtain minerals from the earth. Coal was mainly used as an energy 
source to operate industrial machines and electricity, while other minerals were used as 
raw material for producing goods. After hydrocarbon was found and its usage became 
widely known in the 1800s, coal mining was significantly neglected as the former was 
cheaper and easier to use. However, after the Oil Boom in the 1980s many countries and 
companies sought alternative energy sources to reduce their dependency on oil, which 
was mainly produced by members of OPEC. Therefore, coal mining has emerged in many 
countries and this has marked a new beginning in coal mining industries in developing 
countries, including Indonesia. 
 
3.2. Institutional change in Indonesia’s political and economic sectors: 
 
The country has undergone a particularly dynamic political and economic 
situation since its independence. Literatures on the history of Indonesia such as Booth 
(1991) considered looking into the country’s development, starting from the pre- 
independence era; however, the very distinct nature of the pre- and post-independence 
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governmental structure – caused by the difference between colonial and native 
governmental elites – is not actually helpful in understanding the process and phases of 
institutional change which took place in resource governance. The government in both 
periods are completely changing. However, the problems become legacy made by 
colonial for the independent government. Among the problem is the existing oil contract 
made by colonial with Shell, Stanvac, and Caltex. 
The independent Indonesia also experienced a changing political structure as the 
president changed. This change and dynamism did not mean that all sectors transformed 
into a new structure, instead it had elements of continuation, transformation, and also 
change in which old forms and ideas influenced, were infused into, or were replaced by 
new ones. The elements of certainty and flexibility are mixed together to form a unique 
structure in each country. Thus, we could see certain form of enforcement as well as 
adaptability in forming and executing government policies and dealing with problems and 
challenges. Weiss (1995) called this ability the transformative and adaptive capacity of 
the system. Both capacities are vital for a country’s survivability. However, Weiss limited 
her proposition to the main elements differentiating between developed and developing 
countries, in which the former are considered to govern their countries’ interdependence 
with private sectors. Hence, we could conclude that the survivability of a nation is closely 
related to its experience with institutional change. Institutional change in resource 
governance involves political economic elements in the country. 
This study attempts to examine why and how the GoI has produced different 
institutions for the hydrocarbon and mining industries even though both are considered as 
extractive industries. This approach is valuable for further studies aiming to discover the 
complexity of institutional arrangements for governing extractive industries in developing 
countries. In addition, this study could serve as an alternative to and be complementary 
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for the resource curse as the dominant analytical framework for exploring resource-rich 
countries. 
The structure of resource governance is closely related to elites and citizens’ 
perception regarding foreign involvement in the national economy (Booth, 1991). 
Experiences of the nation determine such perceptions. Indonesian elites did not gain  
much opportunity both in political and economic structure during the colonial era, while 
native Indonesians generally suffered from colonial violence and a repressive approach to 
ensure their compliance. Both actors gained bitter experience regarding foreigners 
governing their country and claiming ownership of their natural resources. Rejection and 
negative views towards foreigners, especially those from the Netherlands, the origin of 
Indonesia’s colonists, was not unexpected, neither was President Soekarno’s decision to 
choose the Soviet Union and other communist countries as his closest allies to lead the 
newly independent Indonesia. 
However, the gap between ideology and practice was determined by national 
capacity to develop the political and economic sectors as a newly independent country. At 
that moment, there were too many unsolved problems and too little resources and ability 
to actually find and executing proper solutions. Inexperienced elites as well as  
bureaucrats and a lack of native businessmen were among the major problems. Looking 
back into that period, it was a particularly complex situation that a newly independent 
country had to face in order to survive. 
Historical institutionalists posited that previous choices could constrain elites’ 
range of choices and capacity to execute them. North (1991) also argued that the  
incentive structure among elites and elites’ groups determined the direction of institutions 
and institutional change as well as development. For the early period of the Republic of 
Indonesia, this perception might hold true. The first and second Presidents of Indonesia – 
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President Soekarno and Soeharto – were the main figures in the Indonesian political 
structure. During their regime, all trajectories of national political and economic 
development were determined by them and their groups. Both periods contributed to the 
growth and development of national bureaucratic structure and capacity, as well as 
domestic businessmen. This contribution, nonetheless, was not perfect or entirely 
beneficial for the country. The main negative outcome from both periods was the 
neglected local political capacity improvement. This problem was a consequence of a 
highly strict central authority in managing subnational affairs, and it was unsurprising that 
the decentralisation policy in 1999 produced many problems which persist today. 
Industrialisation in Indonesia is closely related to rent collected by Pertamina and 
later on by the GoI from hydrocarbon companies. President Soeharto determined 
industrialisation as an important element for positive economic growth that could prolong 
his regime. Authoritarianism was chosen as a viable and best strategy not only for his 
position, but also for a stable political situation after the challenging political and 
economic environment following the end of the Soekarno regime. Both presidents had a 
very different approach and strategy to govern political, economic, and social life 
nationally and locally. Soekarno chose socialism as the best political ideology for 
Indonesia, while Soeharto chose a mixture between nationalism and liberalism in his 
government. Moreover, Soeharto emphasised the importance of strong national economic 
structure with industrialisation as a key component in his development projects to solve 
national problems. Such decisions determined the future of the nation’s resource 
governance while also ending the struggle of both elites and citizens during the 
isolationism conducted by Soekarno. In the Soeharto era, Indonesia was a country able to 
take advantage of its openness and cooperation with foreigners through foreign 
investment, loans, and aid, as well as foreign companies’ operations in the region. This 
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situation was not evident during the Soekarno era as he was fundamentally  against 
foreign involvement in the country. 
Such extreme differences in governance style and approach from both regimes 
contributed to the way in which the nation developed its resource governance. The most 
basic thing the country could learn from both regimes was that isolationism generated 
only problems without viable solutions to national problems; openness and cooperation 
with other countries and foreign companies would be better and more advantageous than 
closing all doors. The only thing both elites and citizens need to learn is to handle and 
manage such relationships better for the interests of both the nation and the companies. 
There is no advantage to being so self-centred in a relationship with global actors. 
Managing and balancing both interests will be an important but challenging task for the 
government. It is even more challenging as the actors involved in the relationship are not 
simply the government and companies; the government consists of various bodies with 
often overlapping authority and roles, each possessing their own perceptions, goals, 
strategies, and capacities as well as pride. Meanwhile, the companies involved also have 
different scope of action, role, and organisational model. Such complexity is something 
that has often been over-simplified by previous studies involving resource governance 
and is therefore the primary contribution this study makes to the literature on resource- 
rich countries. The analysis about institutional change in Indonesia’s resource governance 
considers the positioning of those actors within both the process and mechanism of 
change. 
The following analysis relates to the phases of industrialisation in Indonesia. At 
first, national economic structure was mostly determined by the agricultural sector with 
farmers and farming made the biggest contribution in the national financial structure and 
revenue. This situation persisted during the Soekarno regime because no other economic 
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activity was conducted during this period. Soekarno halted new mining contracts for 
foreign companies until a new regulation made by the newly independent Indonesia that 
was different from previous contractual system, which was considered as harmful and 
threatening to the national interest. However, although they could not continue their 
operation due to security reasons due to the Lasykar Minyak occupation in their oilfields, 
the previous holders of mining contracts – the big three companies of Shell, Stanvac, and 
Caltex – were respected and recognised by the national government (Darmono, 2009; 
Machmud, 2000). 
In the Indonesian context, the bureaucratic organisations of government are 
clearly developing themselves. This developmental capacity is evident from their 
commitment to engage in various international negotiations, to adopt new international 
agreements, and to cooperate with preferred developed and developing countries 
compatible with the national interest. Such openness indicates that the nation does indeed 
have the adaptive capacity to learn, interact, cooperate, and make commitments with 
others. It also means that Indonesia does not have weak institutions that only consist of 
dominant elites pursuing their own personal interests while neglecting the public interest. 
Soeharto built the country to have a transformative capacity to deal with crises, take 
advantage of its international networking to conduct development projects, and produce 
national leaders and statesmen for the future. 
Nevertheless, his way of doing things was not without flaw as there was a trade- 
off and negative as well as unintended outcome from his policies and the decision to run 
the country in an authoritarian manner. He sacrificed local political elites and dynamics 
for the sake of national stability, chose businessmen of Chinese descent as his economic 
allies, used liberal and socialist political practices pragmatically and strategically, limited 
access to politics, and let his family and cronies have their own way in pursuing their 
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personal economic interests (Bowie and Unger, 1997, p. 45-48). His supporters and 
opponents exist until today as he indeed contributed greatly to the current existence and 
survivability of the Republic of Indonesia. He succeeded in leading the country through 
various political, economic, and social crises, while at the same time creating huge 
problems and challenges that the country and its citizens still have to deal with today 
(Robison, 2009). Weak, pragmatic and self-centred local elites, with weak transformative 
and governing capacities, are among the problem caused by Soeharto’s 32 years of 
oversight and disregard towards subnational authority and power, as well as the unequal 
attention paid towards the regional development. Hence, variation in the regional elites’ 
capacity in governing their political and economic affairs made a company should be 
aware and adjust with variety of local elites’ attitudes and approaches in managing the 
region. Operating in different regions means that the company might need to have 
different strategies to handle administrative and public affairs with local governmental 
agencies and elites. 
3.3. General View on Hydrocarbon and Mining Industries in Indonesia 
 
There are at least two dominant opinions within Indonesian political economic 
elites on governing extractive industries. On the one hand, the liberalist and neoliberalist 
supporters attempted to liberalise the old nationalistic, centralistic, and close bureaucracy 
in the governance of the economic sector. They argued that liberalisation is a key 
proposition to achieve rapid economic growth with a balance opportunity to all citizens in 
their pursuit of wealth and better productivity and efficiency in the bureaucratic system 
governing the economic sector (Chalmers and Hadiz, 1997, Chapter IV).  The 
involvement of political elites could hinder such growth by making governance less 
productive and efficient in supporting economic activities. On the other hand, the pro- 
nationalistic approach advocated a more conservative approach in developing and 
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reforming the political and economic sectors. Their main point is the imbalanced 
capacities of local political and economic actors to compete at the same level with their 
national and international or multinational counterparts. 
Immediately following Indonesia’ independence on 17 August 1945, the most 
important political affairs were the unity of many islands and the people under the same 
nation state and government. Alternatively, in terms of economic matters, the government 
needed huge amounts of capital to establish a proper economic system in accordance with 
Indonesia’s experience with other countries and foreign companies (Oon, 1986). In order 
to handle both critical problems, the government initially used nationalist as well as 
socialist jargon. During President Soekarno’s legacy, there was tendency to apply 
communist and socialist systems; however, the nationalist movement challenged this 
view. 
From the historical path above, we can draw a pattern of institutional development 
in the hydrocarbon industry. At first, when the government needed hydrocarbon revenue 
to drive development in other economic sectors, all management and authority was given 
to Pertamina, the only national hydrocarbon company. Pertamina’s action and movement 
were under direct supervision from the President. Thus, despite the company’s obligation 
to give an annual report to the Ministry of Mining and Energy, it had to report to and ask 
permission from the nation leader. This condition meant that the Ministry had an indirect 
line of command and little ability to influence Pertamina (Sidemen, 2015). 
However, during the 1998 economic crisis, the IMF asked the government to 
reorganise its national resource governance based on liberal and neoliberal ideas 
(Nasution, 2015, p. 2). In the oil industry, the government decided to override  
Pertamina’s authority over exploration, production, and distribution of oil and gas by 
releasing UU No. 21 Tahun 2001. Ibnu Sutowo, former President Director of Pertamina, 
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was concerned about the company’s decreasing capital to develop oil and gas industries. 
This is because, before 2001, the oil and gas revenue was collected and managed by 
Pertamina. On the other hand, since 2001, this revenue has been collected and distributed 
by the government through the Ministry of Finance. 
On the other hand, the discussion above also shows that the oil industry’s players 
were also dynamic. Initially, private companies dominated this industry; however, over 
time governments in some countries tried to gain some control to fulfil domestic needs by 
various strategies (Victor, Hults, and Thurber, 2012). The most common way was by 
forming a national hydrocarbon company that has tasks and authorities are varied, 
including negotiating and signing contracts. Both governments and business entities 
should also be ready to adapt to those changes. The challenges involved in entering the 
industry and maintaining operations within an area not only originate from the host 
government’s policy but also the political and economic situation and changes in the 
home country, as well as global changes. These factors influence the ability of players to 
enter and to stay in a country, as well as the rules of the game. For example, in the 
beginning a major Multinational Oil Company can dictate the contract and usually work 
with their own company branches and subsidiaries. However, the more challenging the 
area (in deep sea or remote areas), the more risk the company is exposed to. This 
encourages joint operations among foreign companies or between foreign companies and 
national companies, which can have positive and negative effects for both parties. 
However, looking at the growing number of joint operation agreements in Indonesia, this 
approach was a favourite strategy of both foreign companies and Pertamina. 
The path taken by the GoI to manage the hydrocarbon industry has varied over 
time as is evident from different regulations, governmental bodies involved in the 
industry, and Pertamina’s position in the industry. All agreed that hydrocarbons were an 
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important resource for the industry and a source of income for the government. However, 
the way in which governments have regulated, managed, and involved themselves in the 
industry varies, especially in developing countries due to their political, economic, and 
social institutional development. There are always new and different positions of actors, 
levels of openness to outsiders, and external challenges. Those factors influence a 
government’s strategic view and actions in handling the industry. 
Institutionalism, especially historical institutionalism, sees this matter from the 
learning process perspective (North, 2005). All events, negotiations, and arrangements 
result from a learning process for both the government and the company as they have to 
deal with each other to achieve their goals. As long as there is a mutual need, they had to 
adjust to each other. The situation could be more complicated when there is external 
pressure that tries to change the rules of the game. This was the case surrounding the pros 
and cons of law number 22 of 2001. The liberalisation of the hydrocarbon industry was 
not something initiated and discussed by the main actors, the government, Pertamina, and 
the FOCs. Instead, it began with the government’s need to obtain a loan from the IMF. 
The letter of intent signed between GoI and IMF clearly stated that the loan would be 
given with several requirements, one of which was to liberalise Indonesia’s oil industry 
(Nasution, 2015, p. 2). 
During the first stage, right after independence, the government acted in groups of 
Ministries and Governors, as well as Armed Forces and Parliament to make important 
decisions and establish the blueprint for Indonesia’s hydrocarbon industry. As Pertamina 
dominated the scene, it handled most activities including negotiation, signing the 
contracts, and controlling as well as evaluating FOC operations. This initiated the second 
stage, starting from 1971, where Pertamina and the contractors were the main players in 
the industry. Pertamina managed all activities from listing and offering working areas, 
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negotiating terms of contract with foreign companies, handling the negotiation with 
various governmental bodies and local government, issuing permission to conduct 
operations, approving working plans, and evaluating as well as watching the works and 
achievements. The Ministry of Energy only received annual reports from those activities 
(Sidemen, 2015). Above all domination, Pertamina was closely managed and took orders 
from President Soeharto. The company was seen as money machine to develop Soeharto 
and his family’s legacy in Indonesia’s political and economic scene (Robison, 2009). The 
third stage of change happen GoI established an agency under MEMR to handle day to 
day affairs regarding hydrocarbon business operations with the companies. Pertamina’s 
task is shifting toward purely operating hydrocarbon business, without having 
responsibility as administrator for oil contractors anymore. 
3.3.1. Historical Path of the Hydrocarbon and Mining Industries 
 
The Dutch colonial government started mining activities in the East Indies 
(Indonesia) during the 19th century (Darmono, 2009; Poeradisastra and Haryanto, 2016). 
Previously, it had focused more on producing crops and various spices as valuable trade 
commodities in Europe. The first mining concession was obtained by a private tin 
company named “Biliton” in the Belitung working area in 1850. This management policy 
was followed by the establishment of Jawatan Geologi in 1852, which was responsible for 
managing the mining concessions and mining companies in the region. At this time, 
mining activities were managed based on 1810 Netherlands Mining Law. Another 
concession was given for coal mining in Ombilin, West Sumatra in 1891. 
The mining management and policy from 1900 until 1960 was based on the 
Indische Mijnwet 1899 and the 1906 Mijn Ordonantie as further instruction in 
implementing the Mijnwet (Zulkifli, 2014, Chapter I; and Darmono, 2009, Chapter IV). 
The Mijnwet also explicitly stated that the mining concession would be exclusively given 
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to Dutch or Dutch-based companies. The colonial government had the authority to issue 
mining concessions for valuable minerals, while concessions for mining activities of other 
less-significant minerals were given to local government. This statement was criticised by 
other countries, especially American-based mining companies and the US government. 
Thus, the Mijnwet was amended in 1910 with an additional article known as article 5A, 
which stated that foreign investment was allowed in the mining industry in the East Indies 
via a contractual system, not a concessionary system. This article was further amended in 
1918 to allow the colonial government to take part in exploration and mining activities in 
other areas than those already specified in the contracts and concessions with mining 
companies. This centralistic approach succeeded in boosting exploration projects and 
mineral (especially tin and coal) production. Until 1938, 471 mining permits were issued 
by the colonial government; these permits allowed the companies to independently 
manage their organisation and operation and also own their production while paying tax 
and sharing with the government. 
During the Japanese occupation from 1942-1945, the Japanese Army established a 
Chisitsu Chosajo or a Central Office of Mining Governmental Agency. However, as they 
focused more on producing oil as the main energy source for their industry at home and 
for the war with the allied forces, there was no general mining activity during their 
occupation period. After Indonesia’s independence, the mining industry was intended to 
be conducted by the government and Indonesian citizens or companies. However, at that 
time Indonesia did not have any means to take over the industry in terms of capital, 
technology and skilled workers. Thus, there were no mining operations until the first 
Mining Law issued in 1967 (Hayati, 2015). 
The Dutch colonial government managed mining licensing as well as mining 
activities within the East Indies (Darmono, 2009). Previously, they attempted to 
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monopolise the industry only to government-related companies. The colonial government 
established a Special Committee for Mining in 1852, which later became the Colonial 
Mining Office (Dienst van het Mijnwezen). The office was responsible for conducting 
geological exploration to find exact mining reserves as an important step to expand 
mining activities in the region. The first coal mine was operated in Ombilin, Sawahlunto, 
West Sumatra in 1891 (Darmono, 2009; Arif, 2014). The private sector collaborated with 
the colonial government in operating the mines. However, the increasing international 
demand for coal products as well as the increasing interest from the Dutch private sector 
in Indonesian mines helped to end the monopoly. 
The most important event for mining rules in the region during this period was the 
independence of the East Indies. This huge shift in the region meant that the colonial 
government policy and decision-making was no longer the determinant factor in the 
industry. The political and economic transition period was the most important and 
anticipated time by international as well as domestic elites as the first step would 
determine the direction of mining governance within this newly independent and 
resource-rich country. At this time, nationalistic sentiment was widespread domestically 
due to severe discrimination and painful experiences during the colonial period. Thus, the 
government could not take citizens’ voice lightly, especially during the critical moment 
when the Dutch government actively rejected the independence declaration and attempted 
to reacquire governance by using diplomatic and military means. 
After independence, a group of former Indonesian workers in the oilfields during 
Dutch occupation gathered to establish a movement. They were known as Lasykar 
Minyak (Oil Troops) (Darmono, 2009, p. 118). This group established small oil 
companies in order to manage existing oilfields left by foreign companies during World 
War II. One local company was named Permiri (Perusahaan Minyak Republik Indonesia/ 
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Republic of Indonesia’s Oil Company) in 1946. The company managed oilfields in South 
Sumatra but it was disbanded in 1948; although it succeeded in repairing refinery 
facilities in Plaju, these facilities could not be operated because there was still no oil 
production during this time. 
Other major oilfields were in North Sumatra and Aceh (Darmono, 2009, Chapter 
VI). Lasykar Minyak had established Tambang Minyak Sumatra Utara (North Sumatra 
Oil Mining/ TMSU) and Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Negara (State Oil Mining 
Company/ PTMN) in Aceh. However, Shell owned the fields and according to the Round 
Table Agreement, the government had to recognise and protect their contract. The status 
of those oilfields triggered an internal conflict between pro-liberalism, pro-communism, 
and nationalism during the 1950s. Meanwhile, pro-liberalism elites sought as much help 
and investment as possible from foreign countries and nationalist and communist 
spokespeople demanded that government should not recognise its contracts with FOCs, 
especially Shell. They believed that Indonesian would be able to revive and operate those 
oilfields by themselves. In the middle of this chaos, Serikat Buruh Minyak (SBM), one of 
many people’s movements which was pro-communism, formed Perusahaan Tambang 
Minyak Republik Indonesia (PTMRI) in North Sumatra and Central Java. 
Regarding Shell’s decision to sell oilfields in North Sumatra, security reasons 
were the primary factor. The company was seen as a threat due to its Dutch origin. 
Furthermore, Lasykar Minyak (Oil Troops) took over the area and it has been a source of 
internal conflict ever since (Darmono, 2009, p. 118). The government tried to control the 
group’s movements by establishing a Sumatra Utara Oil Company and appointing pro- 
government elites from the Troops as the director. The company was supervised by both 
the Governor of Aceh and the Governor of North Sumatra with the help of the Indonesian 
Army. In June 1957, the government held a meeting in North Sumatra regarding the 
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oilfield’s status. The Mining Work Commission, established after the Hasan Petition, 
suggested that the government should return the site to Shell. The suggestion was 
approved in the Cabinet meeting, but the economic commission in parliament did not 
agree. Thus, the conflict also affected the government’s ability to produce a timely 
solution. Nevertheless, Government Regulation number 24 in 1965 declared that the 
government took over the North Sumatra oilfield. This regulation marked government 
control in the oil industry (Darmono, 2009, p. 18-19). 
 
The GoI committed to building a strong national economy by establishing several 
national mining companies after issuing a policy to end all mining contracts made by 
colonial government and take over all assets of Dutch-based companies. PT Antam, 
PTBA, and PT Timah were established to take over management and operation of mining 
operations in Bangka, Belitung, and Singkep. As the GoI held a majority share in these 
companies, it could enjoy subsidised fuel and electricity (Antam, 2016). However, this 
leverage only persisted until early 2000 when the government finally decided to cut 
subsidised fuel to businesses because, unlike in hydrocarbon businesses, national mining 
companies do not have a public service obligation. The NMCs are business oriented and 
owned by the government, yet they do not represent direct government management of 
the industry. The government emphasises the importance of developing vertically- 
integrated mining operations wherein the raw minerals are processed domestically before 
exports and international sales. This policy is designed to increase the economic value of 
Indonesia’s mining products. The national companies often had an image as merely land 
diggers, while the importer countries and foreign companies could buy Indonesia’s raw 
minerals at a cheaper price and sell their already-processed mining products on the 
international market at a higher price. 
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The local people are also actors in the mining industry. Some of them take part in 
small scale mining operations individually or collectively. The activity is often unknown 
by local authorities so it is difficult to manage. Moreover, if it is conducted in a mining 
working area, it could lead to conflict between the company as the contract or license 
holder and the local people (Prayitno, 2017). On the other hand, the citizens are also the 
landowners. The contract or licensing only means that the company has a license or 
permission to mine in the working area without any guarantee that mining operations will 
actually take place. Thus, it should pay rent to use the land to the landowners and local 
government, fulfil all requirements, get permission, and submit documents before starting 
the project. The process might take a long time and involve negotiation with various 
authoritative bodies and elites. Moreover, such companies should consider a community 
development programme or company social responsibility (CSR) project suitable for their 
operating areas and also take part (usually financially) in local events. There are some 
companies who handle political and social activities by themselves, while others use 
independent organisations for such activities. 
From 1945 until the late 1960s, the GoI’s focus on developing its economic 
condition could be seen from the structure of its first ministerial cabinet. They established 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which was the leading actor in managing Indonesia 
economic sector (Darmono, 2009). However, the newly independent country had to face 
economic stagnation in the late 1960s due to the lack of capital to pursue its 
industrialisation and economic plan (Booth, 1998, p. 168-172; and van-Zaden and Marks, 
2012, Chapter VII). During this time, the nationalist sentiment became more apparent 
among citizens and political elites. They considered foreign investment as another form  
of foreign colonialism and imperialism which could endanger national sovereignty. 
Soekarno, the President at the time, considered socialism as the most suitable ideology to 
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govern Indonesia. He had absolute authority in governing all sectors and his regime had 
unlimited time. There was almost no foreign investment or operations during this time 
period. There was not only inadequate domestic capital, but also only a limited number of 
skilled workers who could handle industrial machines and managing business activities. 
In the political sphere, there was an important change of regime from Soekarno to 
Soeharto after 1965. The Soeharto era marked the beginning of openness towards foreign 
investment in the Indonesian economy. His cabinet invited foreign banks and companies 
to fund national development projects, including the mining industry. The government 
determined that a contractual system should function as the basis for their relationship 
with foreign mining companies. While collecting funding for national development 
projects through international investment, the GoI also committed to developing domestic 
business capabilities to provide domestic needs of mining products and also to take over 
Dutch-based mining companies which had already nationalised in the early 1960s. 
3.3.2. State Control and Foreign Investment 
 
The hydrocarbon industry in Indonesia was established long before the country’s 
independence in 1945. The colonial government established the oil mining industry, 
explored oil and collected rent from the oil mining operations in the East Indies (the 
former name of Indonesia). After the independence of Indonesia in 1945, a group of 
citizens took over the oilfields and demanded that the GoI nationalise the company. 
The GoI managed the hydrocarbon industry after the independence, largely 
because of pressure from society. The oilfields in Java and Sumatra were abandoned by 
Caltex, Shell, and Stanvac (the only three oil contractors Indonesia inherited from the 
colonial government) during World War II, which was followed by Japanese occupation 
(Purwoto and Kuncoro in Kuncoro et al., 2009, Chapter II, p. 13). The former workers in 
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those oilfields mobilise themselves and local people to confiscate the areas and demand 
that the government take over the facilities. They attempted to operate the facilities by 
themselves and asked for government support and mandate to do so. 
The workers called themselves Lasykar Minyak (Oil Troops) and established three 
national oil companies in Sumatra and Java without the government’s consent (Darmono, 
2009). The companies were PTMNRI (Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Negara Republik 
Indonesia/ Republic of Indonesia Oil Mining Company) in North Sumatra, PTMN 
(Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Nasional/ National Oil Mining Company) in Cepu, Central 
Java, and PERMIRI (Perusahaan Minyak Republik Indonesia/ Republic of Indonesia Oil 
Company) in South Sumatra. 
The resultant situation created chaos as the GoI was newly established and had too 
many problems to properly focus on the industry. Therefore, it chose the most plausible 
method to prevent the situation from deteriorating by giving authority to the Indonesian 
Army to manage the situation in the oilfields and surrounding areas. The Army worked 
together with local government to control the situation. During this time, the government 
decided to stop any oil industry activities from the three major oil companies: Royal 
Dutch Shell in Pangkalan Brandan, Stanvac in Prabumulih, South Sumatra, and Caltex in 
Kalimantan. 
The companies had to wait for a further decision from the GoI regarding whether 
they could continue working with the previous contracts or negotiate new contracts. The 
GoI considered the fact that there was no money to support the national development 
projects and revive economic activities after the extensive period of Dutch and Japanese 
occupation. Moreover, the government did not have capital or capabilities to take over the 
oil industry itself. On the other hand, the oil industry had provided a significant funding 
for the colonial government for 50 years. Therefore, the GoI allowed the entrance of 
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foreign oil companies in Indonesia, starting with renegotiation of contracts with the three 
existing MNCs. The negotiation process took months, meaning there were no oil mining 
operations during this time. One of the important issues discussed in the contract was the 
requirement to sign and establish a joint venture between the MNCs and the three NOCs. 
The Three NOCs were formed from rearrangement of three companies established by the 
Oil Troops: Pertamin, Permina, and Permigan. Each MNC signed a contract of work 
(CoW) with an NOC. A CoW was a new form of contract to replace the concessionary 
contracts the companies had signed with the colonial government. 
The national political system was unstable in 1950s. A Prime Minister could not 
hold his position for more than two years during this period. Thus, until 1950 there was 
no agreement among elites about how management in existing oilfields would be 
conducted and who would be responsible for managing them (particularly choosing 
between management by foreign or local companies). 
In 1956, the government established a panitia negara (state committee) to analyse 
the importance of annulling the Roundtable Agreement and to determine the blueprint of 
national resource governance (Darmono, ed., 2009, p. 146). At the end of 1959, the 
commission completed their tasks and produced a draft law to replace the Indische 
Mijnwet 1899. The draft was meant to give back the ownership and control of the oil 
industry to the GoI and provide a mandate to the government to use it for public needs. 
Unfortunately, this draft did not become law until 1960 because of the pros and contras in 
the parliament about foreign oil companies’ status in the national oil industry. However, 
from 1959 to 1960, no new oil concessions were given to foreign oil companies. During 
this process, the government attempted to regulate existing concessions according to 
national and public needs by conducting a series of negotiations with big companies, such 
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as Shell, Stanvac, and Caltex, to adjust the contract. This was a a significant first step 
towards national oil and mining regulation. 
During the commission’s working period, the government issued PP No.  34 
Tahun 1956 (Government Regulation Number 34 Year 1956,) known as the Banteng 
programme, in response to public demand to end the Dutch monopoly in vital industries 
such as the oil industry. This programme unilaterally discarded the Roundtable 
Agreement and meant that the government took over the oilfields owned by Shell. The 
regulation also specified government control over TMSU. This decision was supported by 
the North Sumatra population through a general people’s meeting in 1957. To neutralise 
the intense situation in North Sumatra, the Ministry of Industry asked the Chief of the 
Indonesian Army to take over management of the oilfields in July 1957. 
After lengthy discussions following independence, the government issued the first 
oil and gas law in 1960. According to Law Number 44/ 1960, Indonesia’s oil industry had 
to be controlled through national companies (Purwoto and Kuncoro in Kuncoro et al., 
2009, Chapter II, p. 16). This law legalised the establishment of three national oil 
companies: Permina, Permigan, and Pertamin. The CoW became a new contract system 
wherein the government hoped to gain more rent and at the same time fulfil their 
obligation to secure the national interest. Under this new system, the GoI attempted to 
negotiate more favourable – for the government – terms of contract with both Stanvac and 
Caltex. After three years of negotiation, the first oil contract between Pertamin and 
Stanvac was signed, followed by Permigan and Caltex and finally Permina and Shell in 
1966. However, before any activities took places, Shell decided to pull out of Indonesia 
because the growing nationalist sentiment resulting from their Dutch origin. 
This decision was also considered as an opportunity for the Indonesian Army to 
take a greater role in the Indonesian economy and industrialisation process. Some of their 
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officials became general directors and directors in the companies. For security reasons, 
Major General Abdul Haris Nasution took over the oilfields and renamed TMSU as 
ETMSU (Perusahaan Eksplorasi Tambang Minyak Sumatra Utara/ North Sumatra Oil 
Mine Exploration) (Darmono, ed., 2009, p. 18). The Board of Directors was composed of 
the Minister of Industry, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Trade, the Regional 
Military Commander in Aceh and the Governor of Aceh, the North Sumatra Military 
Commander, and the Governor of North Sumatra. Later on, the company was renamed 
Permina (Perusahaan Minyak Nasional/ National Oil Company) with Ibnu Sutowo as the 
Chairman (Darmono, ed., 2009, p. 146). The company succeeded in exporting its first 
production in 1958. 
Another state oil company was Pertamin. The company was originally known as 
NIAM, a joint venture between BPM and the Dutch government. After Indonesia’s 
independence, it became Permindo (Perusahaan Minyak Indonesia/ Indonesia Oil 
Company) in 1959 as a joint venture between BPM and the GoI (Darmono, ed., 2009, p. 
147). After their old concession ended in 1960, the GoI took over all of the company’s 
assets in the country and Permindo became Pertamin (Perusahan Tambang Minyak 
Nasional/ National Oil Mining Company). It was responsible for distributing and oil 
marketing within the country and abroad. Pertamin took control of all oil and gas 
marketing and distribution tasks as well as facilities from the three major companies 
(Shell, Stanvac and Caltex) in 1963. Its position was legalised by Ministerial regulation 
Number 90/MP/OIL and Ministerial Regulation Number 66/MP/GAS in July 1966. 
The government decided to maintain order and control of the situation in the 
Sumatra and Java oilfields by appointing the Indonesia Army to handle the situation. Both 
regions were managed and controlled by the Armed Forces of Indonesia until the  
situation settled. PTMRI in Central Java was renamed Tambang Minyak Nglobo (Nglobo 
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Oil Mining/ TMN), which later became PN Permigan (Perusahaan Minyak dan Gas 
Nasional/ National Oil and Gas Company). PN Permigan was established with 
Government Regulation Number 199 in 1961 and was responsible for operating oilfields 
in Cepu, Surabaya, Bongas (West Java), and Bula (Pulau Seram) after the GoI bought it 
from Shell. Permigan was found to have an affiliation with pro-communist elites during 
the political upheaval between the Communist Party and the Indonesian Army in 1965 
(Sanusi, 2004, p. 23-24). 
After the conflict was resolved, Ibnu Sutowo dissolved Permigan. According to 
Ministerial Regulation Number 6/M/OIL and number 66/M/GAS in 1966, PN Pertamin 
took over Permigan’s tasks in marketing and distribution of oil and gas. The oil facility in 
Cepu was transformed into an oil and gas government training centre as part of the Oil 
and Gas Academy. The Academy was established in 1962 in Bandung, West Java, under 
management of the Ministry of Oil and Gas (Darmono, ed., 2009, p. 148-149). 
Prior to the establishment of Pertamin and Permigan in 1961, the GoI established 
its first state-owned hydrocarbons companies, Permina in 1957 (Darmono, 2009). The 
Army was mandated by the central government to keep peace in the surrounding area of 
the North Sumatra oilfields. General A.H. Nasution, the Army’s Chief Commander in 
Sumatra, appointed Major General Ibnu Sutowo – an Army doctor who was known for 
his hardworking character – to turn around the Indonesia hydrocarbon industry which had 
been dominated by foreign companies for more than 50 years with zero Indonesian 
involvement (Karma, 1979). Although Indonesia lacked the necessary capital and 
technical capability to manage the industry at the time, Ibnu Sutowo proposed a 
nationalistic project to strengthen the GoI and NOC bargaining position in comparison to 
the FOCs. He worked together with the Indonesians who had previously worked in the 
oilfields to recover the facilities. Later, in 1968, he became the first President Director of 
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Pertamina and was also appointed as Minister of Mines. This event marked the beginning 
of the military’s dual role in the security and civil sectors. Thus, the establishment of first 
NOCs could be seen as a competition among Indonesian key elites, the Armed Forces and 
the technocrat-bureaucrats in the government. 
Even though this contractual system was better than concessions, the majority of 
the public wanted to take over all oil industry activities. This situation encouraged the 
government to establish an integrated national oil industry by bargaining to buy all oil 
production and refinery facilities of Shell, Caltex, and Stanvac (Purwoto and Kuncoro in 
Kuncro et al., 2009, Chapter II, p. 19-20). Shell’s assets were bought in 1965, but 
Stanvac’s facilities were not acquired until 1969. In addition, the government released a 
new contractual system called profit sharing contracts to replace the contract of CoW 
work. From 1966 to 1975 (end of Ibnu Sutowo leadership period), there were 59 already- 
signed production sharing contracts (PSCs), while during the Piet Haryono era there were 
25 PSCs. 
In conclusion, the development stage in the governance of Indonesia’s 
hydrocarbon industry was the establishment of Pertamina with authority as supervisor and 
manager of the oil contractors. A short historical explanation in this subsection is 
important to demonstrate how personal exchanges were dominant prior to 
institutionalisation of the interaction between government and companies. After 
Pertamina gained authority over the industry, the institution entered the first stage of its 
development, which is similar to North, Wallis, and Weingast’s limited access order 
(LAO). 
The oil and gas sector contributes significantly to the national revenue (Kuncoro, 
et al., 2009, p. xiv ). From 2003 to 2006, it shared 29% of national revenue and 69.5% of 
non-tax revenue. Until 2006, the exploration activities found 1.23 billion barrels of oil 
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and 1.37 trillion barrels of gas. However, more than 90% of oil production came from the 
top ten companies with Chevron Pacific Indonesia as the top player. On the other hand, 
87 to 93% of gas production was dominated by ten companies with Total as the leading 
one. Pertamina was still a secondary player in both oil and gas production. 
Chart 3.1. Indonesian Oil and Gas Production Comparison 
 
 
 
 
Source: SKK Migas, 2014 
 
Indonesia’s upstream activities exist both offshore and onshore (Kuncoro et al., 
2009, p. xv). The offshore operation is concentrated in East Kalimantan, while the 
onshore activities are concentrated in Riau, South Sumatra, and East Kalimantan. Gas is 
mostly produced from oil and gas fields in South Sumatra and East Kalimantan. 
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Figure 3.1. Indonesia Oil Reserves 
 
 
 
Source: Directorate General of Oil and Gas, Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, 2013 
Figure 3.2. Indonesia’s Gas Reserves 
 
 
 
Source: Directorate General Oil and Gas, Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, 2010 
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Since 2001, there has been no significant exploration activity and very little 
investment in exploration. This condition has been worsened by old, dry oilfields 
exploited since the 1970s as well as broker activities in the oil industry, especially 
regarding the ability of Pertamina and the government to buy or sell oil directly from 
producers or to consumers. Another problem that an unhealthy oil trading system has 
created inefficiency in collecting revenue from national production and consequently the 
government and Pertamina have lost profits from oil exports. This practice was already 
known since the 1980s, but the government did not take any action to reduce or limit it 
because influential political and economic elites were enjoying significant profits from 
this activity, with no concern about public needs and the national interest. 
Oil rent has funded various national development projects (Patmosukismo, 2011, 
 
p. 131-155), especially during the Oil Boom. During the early 1970s, oil contributed 27% 
of the total national revenue and in 1981 its contribution doubled to 71% (Purwoto and 
Kuncoro in Kuncoro et al., 2009, Chapter II, p. 22-23). Pertamina also succeeded in 
rebuilding oil facilities and locating new onshore oil and gas sources. The first new 
offshore resource was found by Japan Petroleum Company (Japex) in 1965. Afterwards, 
there were several identifications of offshore oil reserves in many areas. In 1958, 
Indonesia was also able to export raw oil until the country became an OPEC member 
from 1962 to 2006. Unfortunately, during this peak period, Pertamina’s profit was not 
managed by the Ministry of Finance (Purwoto and Kuncoro in Kuncoro et al., 2009, 
Chapter II, p. 23). It was intended to fund and was used by the Army and President 
Soeharto’s cronies to build their business empire. Pertamina’s financial condition was 
covered during Ibnu Sutowo’s management and was revealed after overseas newspapers 
revealed Pertamina’s financial crisis in 1974. Up to 1976, Pertamina was unable to 
develop a strong national oil industry with the available revenue. 
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Moreover, the company had incurred debt from various overseas banks to build 
the infrastructures needed for the oil industry and to invest in various social and business 
sectors, as well as to function as a money machine for politicians, the Army and President 
Soeharto’s cronies. The company invested in many non-oil sectors without government 
consultation (related ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance). This condition led to the 
NOC financial crisis during the first Oil Boom in 1973. Foreign media and the Sinar 
Harapan, a national newspaper, were among the first to release the news (Setiono and 
Juwono, ed., 2013, p. 43). The Minister of Mining and Energy, Mr. Sadli, reacted in 
August 1975 by announcing that the government would take over Pertamina. Several 
ministers and heads of governmental bodies worked together to overcome the crisis. 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
The intention of this study is to analyse institutional change in the hydrocarbon 
and mining industries in Indonesia. I took an interest in this topic because the tendency to 
study resource governance in developing countries obscures the fact that resource 
governance consists of a complex web of interaction and relations among actors with 
institutional arrangements related to their interests, operations, and responsibilities. For 
the purpose of this study I compare institutional arrangement in the hydrocarbon and 
mining industries in Indonesia, finding that both have different configurations and 
trajectories despite being conducted by the same government, led by the same Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources for their operations and Ministry of Finance for their 
financial affairs. 
These different resource governance styles are difficult to identify and analyse 
when we use the resource curse and resource nationalism because both frameworks direct 
our attention more towards resource governance performance and outcomes. On the other 
hand, using historical institutionalism has enabled me to find the differences as it is 
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necessary to investigate the historical path of both industries and track the development of 
both institutional arrangements until the present. Resource governance literature provides 
an important insight to focus my analysis into government and business entities as the 
main actors in institutional change. Various literatures derived from resource governance 
and institutionalism are also used to complement this analysis. Governing 
interdependence and governing capacity, as developed by Weiss and Hobson (1999), as 
well as frameworks of government and business relations are used to assess the 
mechanisms and processes of institutional change in Indonesia’s resource governance. 
This chapter is crucial to establish a template of the resource governance 
established by GoI and developed over time through its continued and long lasting 
relations and interactions with the private sector. It provides analysis about the political 
and economic environment affecting institutional structure and arrangement occurrence. 
Both institutional arrangement and actors’ capacity have developed significantly since 
1945. The bridge between those processes of change is the actors’ interactions and their 
relationships. Hence, dynamism and change is an important analytical framework in both 
empirical and theoretical terms. Understanding change is important to lessen the gap 
between theoretical or hypothetical situations and empirical or factual conditions in 
political economy. This understanding requires knowledge and understanding about the 
complexity of situations that influenced the scope of the case and the related actors. It 
therefore provides a better and more complete picture of what actually happens in the 
field instead of assuming where and why things go the way they do solely based on 
partial information about the situation. Thus, it is valuable to combine historical 
institutionalism with the other analytical frameworks employed in this study. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
INDONESIA’S HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The hydrocarbon industry in Indonesia has a distinct institutional arrangement that 
is different from other mining governance systems in the country. This uniqueness is 
primarily determined by its institutional structure generated from the contractual system 
between government and businesses, as well as national political and economic  
structures. Such structures determine actors involve within the arrangement; however, 
they do not mean the actors involved are solely established by the institution. 
Hydrocarbon governance is influenced by various institutional arrangements involving 
national and subnational structures, as well as political, societal, financial, monetary, 
environmental, and administrative structures. The governance is also determined not only 
by government-business relations, but also inter and intra-governmental relations, inter 
and intra-business relations, business-society relations, and government-society relations. 
Therefore, at an empirical level, resource governance has an extremely complex web of 
interactions involving various levels and forms of institutional arrangement. For 
analytical purposes, this thesis focuses on government-business relations to explain the 
institutional change and transformation in Indonesia’s hydrocarbon and mining industries. 
The history of the national hydrocarbon industry is much more than Soeharto’s 
cash cow, the rentier state tendency, and the resource nationalism vs liberalism discourse. 
Looking back to the beginning of the industry after independence in 1945, former 
Indonesian workers in the oilfields occupied the land and attempted to convince the 
government  that  they  could  continue  the  operations  and  that  the  industry  should be 
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managed by Indonesia for Indonesian people (Yuwono, 2014, p. 43-50; Bartlett III, et al. 
1972. P. 57-130). This sentiment emerged from the painful experience of being neglected 
and discriminated and the wealth gained from their natural resources during decades of 
foreign occupation, as well as from the fear of once again being mere bystanders after 
independence. Unfortunately, studies about resource governance in developing countries 
have often neglected such historical facts. This initial decision determined the next steps 
taken by the government through various agencies and reactions of the companies related 
to both sectors to the newly independent country, as well as the institutional arrangements 
established in the sectors. During 1960 to 1971, both hydrocarbon and mining industries 
had a similar governance trajectory and structure. However, as the nation’s governmental 
structure changed and transformed, the hydrocarbon and mining industries were governed 
by different institutional arrangements despite still being controlled by the government of 
Indonesia (GoI) (Machmud, 2000). 
This thesis provides an analysis of the institutional change experienced by the 
hydrocarbon and mining industries in Indonesia. This specific chapter explores why and 
how governance in the hydrocarbon industry has developed, changed, and transformed to 
its current state in 2019. The analysis contains the development of institutional 
arrangement and its surrounding political and economic environment. 
4.1. The Rule Element 
 
The GoI had a significant opportunity to attract foreign oil companies as a result 
of the already-known oil reserves and production before independence, especially 
investment from Japan and the United States. However, national sentiment was 
paramount after independence, especially hatred towards Dutch companies. There are 
three rights in the hydrocarbon industry: mineral rights, mining rights, and economic 
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rights (Sanusi, 2004). Based on the Dutch Colonial Mining Law before independence, the 
concessionary contract was the only model of oil contract (Jin-Bee, 1982, p. 11-17 ). 
Based on this model, the government did not have any control over company activities. 
Furthermore, government only collected royalties and taxes. In other words, companies 
had ownership rights over the land and the resources beneath and above it during the 
contract period (Darmono, 2009, Chapter VIII). This system was greatly opposed by the 
GoI because, according to article 33 in the 1945 Constitution, the government had sole 
ownership over the land and all resources beneath and above it and was obliged to use it 
to provide welfare and wealth for the citizens. 
 
The first regulation for the mining industry in the Republic of Indonesia, including 
the hydrocarbon sector, was the Law No. 44 Year 1960 (Darmono, 2009, p. 164; Carlson, 
1977, p. 11). The law was intended to replace the Indische Mijnwet 1899 as a basis for oil 
negotiation and contract after independence (Carlson, 1977, p. 8). However, the gap 
between intention and actual outcome was proven to be wide as inexperience negotiators 
and unprepared organisational infrastructure resulted in a series of stalled negotiations 
between the government and the three big companies which existed as a colonial legacy 
(Shell, Stanvac, and Caltex). The negotiation mainly discussed the transition from the 
colonial concessionary contracts to another form of contract, namely Contract of Work 
(CoW). Distrust between both actors was not unprecedented as this was the first time they 
negotiated face to face in an unstable political and economic condition of newly 
independent country and under threat of the Lasykar Minyak (the Oil Troops), who 
occupied the companies’ oilfields immediately after independence. The occupation and 
Soekarno’s later choice to halt any decision regarding the oil industry had cost them more 
than 10 years of operation and profit. The CoW with Shell, Caltex, and Stanvac was 
negotiated from 1960 to 1963 (Machmud, 2000, Chapter 3). The negotiation stalled and it 
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was hard to achieve any agreement because the companies were reluctant to agree to the 
GoI’s new proposal. It specified GoI involvement in managing industries and it also 
stated the FOCs’ position as contractors for state-owned oil companies. The GoI was 
determined to renew the contracts as mandated by article 33 in the 1945 Constitution1 due 
to the growing nationalist sentiment among elites and people, and awareness of the 
importance of its hydrocarbon sector for national political and economic plans as well as 
for foreign countries. Moreover, through the new contract, it was expected that national 
oil companies and the GoI could not only gain a larger share but also learn how the FOCs 
operated and managed the industry. 
 
This condition was relaxed a little bit after Soeharto took over the presidency and 
passed Law No. I/ 1967, open for foreign investment in the sector. The Law was 
complemented by Law No. 8 Year 1971, which legalised Pertamina as the only national 
oil company with vast authority to govern the hydrocarbon industry. These laws were 
valid and became the basis for resource governance in the sector for 30 years. Other 
regulations were made based on needs at the time. During that period of time, Pertamina 
remained unbothered as the leading actor in the industry in spite of the existence of 
related ministerial changes and the development of a national bureaucratic system. 
 
Institutional change in the regulative element of this sector was mainly affected by 
domestic discourse between nationalism and liberalism, as well as the road to openness in 
the national political and economic environment. The government committed to have a 
continuous interaction with the outside world through various international organisations 
and to adopt a variety of international agreements. This affected the way in which 
governmental agencies functioned, transforming and developing their organisational 
 
1 
Article 33 Constitution 1945 stated that land, water, and the natural resources beneath shall be 
controlled by the State and be exploited for the maximum welfare of the people 
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capacity to do their job and to cooperate with foreign organisations and enforcing the 
adoption of international codes of conduct in both activities. This implies that government 
have capacity to engage in discussion concerning different type of states involving new 
ideas and approaches and to 
 
Pertamina also developed the ability to absorb knowledge and learn from the 
FOCs in terms of business operations to organisational and managerial aspects. Learning 
by doing was the system set and developed by Soeharto and Ibnu Sutowo to empower 
Pertamina in conducting its task as regulator and business entity, although the company 
was criticised for being a cash cow for Soeharto and his cronies, as well as being 
inefficient and lacking the capacity to dominate oil production nationally. Despite its 
weakness, it is both unfair and a huge mistake to undermine the things that only Pertamin 
achieved by being in its position for 30 years prior to the newest Law No. 22 Year 2001, 
which separated the company’s regulator and business functions. 
 
The regulator function is taken back by the government by establishing an 
Independent Regulator Agency (IRA), namely the Implementing Body of Oil and Gas 
(BP Migas) that only survived for 10 years (Davidson, 2015b). Although Davidson 
ignored the long history of this agency, which was actually born and established by 
Pertamina under the name BKKA (Badan Koordinator Kontraktor Asing/ Coordinating 
Body for Foreign Contractor) in his article about the demise of BP Migas, this system of 
managing oil and gas contractors through a third party established by the government has 
been proven to be advantageous in ensuring the industry run wells and is generally under 
direct government supervision. Although it is not problem-free, this system is the primary 
reason behind the government’s success in governing the industry until 2019 despite all 
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the problems and unsatisfying outcomes caused by the plummeting national oil 
production. 
 
BP Migas was dissolved in 2012 by the Judicial Committee under acquisition of 
being against the 1945 Constitution as the agency was not a national company involved 
directly in oil and gas business operations (Sihotang, 2014). In addition, its position in the 
government structure was also problematic as the board of directors was directly 
appointed by and had sole responsibility towards the President. Moreover, its image of 
preferring to advocate foreign companies’ interests rather than the national interest 
became a subject of criticism from nationalist factions among elites and citizens. On the 
other hand, Davidson (2015b) stated his assumption about the political economic 
circumstances behind the 2010 Committee decision to dissolve the agency despite the 
results of similar proposals and judicial review processes in 2003 and 2007 that were in 
favour with BP Migas. Unfortunately, the decision was not followed up by House of 
Representatives through the creation of a new oil and gas Law to replace the 2001 Law, 
which was in fact the basis of BP Migas’ establishment in 2002. The result is that now, 
SKK Migas, established by President Yudhoyono as a temporary body to function as a 
regulator in the hydrocarbon industry, is an agency without the exact authority to 
complete its regulatory task (Lubiantara, 2017). The anecdote is that SKK Migas is the 
one that has a relationship with the companies, but Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR) is the one that marries them at the end. After the marriage, the 
agency is responsible for managing their day-to-day affairs with the companies (Sidemen, 
2015). 
 
In general, the regulatory development of the hydrocarbon sector could be 
categorised as both incremental and revolutionary, especially from the 1971 governance 
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regime to 2001. Pertamina was the centre of the hydrocarbon industry for almost 30 
years. It established several systems to manage hydrocarbon contracts in Indonesia. In the 
earlier era, foreign oil companies were only allowed to operate in Indonesia by making a 
joint venture with Pertamina. The oil contracts given during this period were CoWs, 
which were a replacement for the concessionary contracts given by the colonial 
government before Indonesia’s independence in 1945. In the CoW system, the 
government appointed the companies as contractors for Pertamina with the main task of 
oil mining operations in the agreed oilfields (Machmud, 2000, p. 48-51). The CoW was 
not the best choice because it was considered as a concession model in new terms. The 
system actually meant that the GoI and NOCs had greater control over and a bigger share 
of oil production, but it was different in the implementation. NOCs still did not get access 
to FOCs’ operation and development plans, while the GoI also did not get as large a share 
as expected. This indicates that the government’s main function was collecting tax and 
other forms of rent from oil production. 
 
Initially, the government did not have a clear policy regarding the oil industry 
(Bartlett III, et al. 1972, p. 104-130). However, public opinion led to two choices, 
nationalisation or forming national companies to conduct operations in Indonesian soil. 
The government looked for a new contract model which it believed could satisfy both the 
national interest and national sentiment. On one hand, the government wanted to build a 
strong oil industry through national capital and capacities. On the other hand, it had no 
money to fund any development plans. Foreign investment was required to fund the 
newly established country. Nevertheless, a traumatic colonialism period caused by 
discrimination and exploitation of both Indonesia’s natural richness and manpower also 
needed to be overcome. The government had to maintain Indonesia’s independence while 
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gaining Indonesian’s trust and support2. The government proposed the new CoW model 
to replace concession model. The first CoW was signed between Pertamin and PAN AM 
in 1962 (Darmono, ed., 2009, p. 20; and Machmud, 2000, p. 48). This agreement referred 
to the first Government Regulation about Oil and Mining Industry No. 44/ 1960. The law 
affirmed foreign oil companies’ status in Indonesia’ oil industry. FOCs no longer had the 
right to mine and sell oil because they were contractors for the national oil companies. 
Thus, they had to sign contracts as contractors with Pertamin or Permina or Permigan in 
order to continue their operation in Indonesia. However, Shell, Caltex, and Stanvac were 
hesitant about this new position. After a series of negotiations, they agreed with this new 
contractual system. The agreement was known as the Tokyo Agreement (Jin-bee, 1982, p. 
21; and Machmud, 2000, p. 48). The contract with PAN AM was considered as a 
prototype and became a pilot project to convince the big three to agree to the 
government’s proposal (Machmud, 2000, p. 51-53). 
According to this new law, the companies agreed to waive their concession 
contracts with the former colonial government and became contractors for a state-owned 
company (Machmud, 2000, p. 48). They were given 20 years to continue operations in the 
agreed areas and 30 years to explore new working areas. In addition, they had to provide 
oil for domestic needs and all facilities bought within the period would be owned by the 
GoI within 10 to 15 years (Darmono, ed., 2009, p. 21). Shell received two working areas 
in South Sumatra and Kalimantan, while Caltex took locations in East and West Java and 
Stanvac only got a working area in Sumatra. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Being a legitimate and trusted government was very significant in order to maintain Indonesia’s 
independence. This was because Indonesians consist of several tribes and societies. The main focus of the 
government was to build and spread nationalism, national identity, language, and culture that could be 
accepted by all societies and tribes. 
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The CoW was replaced by production sharing contracts (PSCs). This type of 
contract was adopted from Indonesia’s traditional law between landowners and farmers 
(Machmud, 2000, Chapter 3). The first prototype was signed between Permina and the 
Independent Indonesian American Petroleum Company (IIAPCO) in 1966. There was 
doubt about the legality of the first PSC signed by Ibnu Sutowo and IIAPCO. A number 
of economists and politicians considered it as a violation of Law No. 44/ 1960, relating to 
the mining and hydrocarbon industries, and Law No. I/ 1967, relating to foreign 
investment (Machmud, 2000, p. 54). Afterwards, there was a group of politicians and 
economists who supported the CoW model and another group were more supportive of 
the PSC system. The State Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Mining and Energy 
considered CoW as the shortest and most feasible way to get rent from FOCs’ operations. 
The government needed to get significant amounts of money as soon as possible in order 
to implement their development plan and build a strong and prosperous Indonesia 
domestically and abroad. 
PSCs were intended to allow the flow of information from the oil contractors to 
benefit Pertamina. The flow of information used several documents that needed to be 
submitted and approved by Pertamina before the contractor could start their activity. In 
addition, there was also an obligation for the contractors to submit reports quarterly and 
annually. Ibnu Sutowo, the first Director of Pertamina, proposed this system to develop 
the NOC’s capacity as a mining company rather than just as a supervisor for contractors 
(Bartlett III, et al. 1972, p. 5-15). 
However, Pertamina acted outside its authority by investing in other economic 
sectors not related to its core status as an oil company. This condition led to the Pertamina 
financial crisis in 1976. Following the crisis, the company lost its freedom to manage and 
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obtain more capital for mining operations. An important lesson from the Pertamina crisis 
was to diversify the source of national income. 
Ibnu Sutowo initiated the PSC as a new form of oil contract in Indonesia(Bartlett 
III, et al. 1972, Chapter XIV). This contract was inspired by traditional agricultural 
contracts between farmers and landlords in Java. There were then several modifications to 
adjust to domestic and global challenges. PSC was meant to underline the ownership right 
of Indonesian over their land and any economic activities done (Bartlett III, et al, 1972). 
The contract is the sole model especially in upstream activities of the industry although 
the Law stated that other scheme could also be used. Government has bigger share in in 
the financial scheme of the contract (Lubiantara, 2015). This is to ensure that domestic 
demand on oil products is fulfilled by national production. Some financial related clauses 
in the PSC underlined government’s perception in governing the industry (Henderi, 
2017). The cost recovery clause in the contract implies government participation and 
commitment to develop the industry; given the government’s authority to explore and 
exploit hydrocarbons from the land, companies are contracted to do so by giving them 
authority to operate in certain oilfields during certain periods of time. 
 
After independence, oil products and revenue from oil industry is used to fund 
development and industrialization projects. However, after national production plummet 
before 2000, Indonesia is highly dependent on oil import to support national industries. 
The country decided to end their membership in OPEC in 2006 following the change of 
country’s status from oil producer to net oil importer. This signalled a challenge to 
enhance exploration activities to find new oil sites despite the risk is high and the 
outcome is uncertain. Pertamina shift their focus from being a bystander with limited 
contribution to national oil production into a competitive companies seeking new 
contracts, especially in the commercial oilfields in which previous contract is already 
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ended. Its position as state-owned company gave them special privilege position where 
the company could submit proposal to target certain oilfields to the government. Such 
policy is challenged by the initial contract holder that wishing to renew their contract. 
 
The first generation of the contract was those that were signed from 1964 to 1977. 
These contracts stated that Pertamina was the main operator and the contractors were 
obliged to provide all costs of operation (Lubiantara, 2015). The contractor could receive 
cost recovery payments amounting to 40% of total production each year and 60% of the 
production would be divided with Pertamina. Pertamina received 65% and the contractor 
got 35% (Henderi, 2017). Pertamina had to pay taxes based on the contractors’ income. In 
addition, contractors had to prioritise the fulfilment of domestic obligations (minimum 
25% of production) with a basic price of US$ 0.20 per barrel per day. All equipment and 
facilities bought by the company were owned by Pertamina and 10% of the contractor’s 
interest was given to the national company after commercial production. From 1974 to 
1977, due to the Oil Boom, contractors were obliged to make additional payments to the 
government due to higher international oil prices (Sanusi, 2004, p. 30). 
The second generation of PSCs was introduced in the 1980s. The change in the 
contract resulted from the United States’ policy. The US government asked the 
contractors to pay their taxes directly to the host government rather than Pertamina as the 
national oil company. This contract stated that all operational costs could be considered 
for calculation as cost recovery. After total production and costs was calculated, 65.91% 
of production went to Pertamina and 34.09% went to the contractor. Moreover, for gas, 
31.08% went to Pertamina and 68.20% went to contractor (Nasir, 2014, p. 272). The 
contractors were obliged to pay 56% of their taxes to the GoI and could also get several 
incentives regarding domestic market obligation (DMO) and capital calculation. 
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Alongside PSCs, Pertamina also signed several other types of contract (Sanusi, 
2004, p. 131). The first type is Technical Assistance Contract (TAC). This contract was a 
partnership between Pertamina and private oil companies in order to rehabilitate mature 
wells or abandoned oilfields in Pertamina’s working areas. The company was responsible 
for all operation management, while the contractors provided money for the projects. The 
contractors could claim cost recovery maximum 40% per year and received 35% of net 
production (total oil production after taxes). The second type is Enhanced Oil Recovery 
(EOR), which was a joint venture between the company and FOCs in order to increase oil 
production in Pertamina’s oilfields. The NOC was obliged to cover 50% of operating 
costs, while FOCs covered the other half. 
The institutionalisation of the industry happened after the Indonesian government 
gave Pertamina authority for managing the oil contractors and oilfields. This institution 
was influenced by changing domestic political, economic, and social conditions. It was 
also influenced by the changing prices and conditions in the international hydrocarbon 
market. In 1980, when the second Oil Boom took place in the international oil market, 
FOCs once again gained momentum to get more preferable conditions to invest in the 
hydrocarbons industry. In this era, FOCs, NOCs, and the government went hand in hand 
to gain larger profits from hydrocarbons. 
According to Sidemen (2015), there was dissatisfaction with the 1971 regulation. 
FOCs wanted more transparent and accountable hydrocarbon business management, 
while many governmental bodies as well as local governments asked for opportunities to 
become involved in the business with the hope of financial gains. Hydrocarbon 
investment used to be managed under one control, Pertamina; even though Pertamina was 
also a player in the industry, it managed FOC contracts as well as any administrative 
requirements for an operation to begin within an area. This system could cut negotiation 
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costs and shorten any administrative and political preparations before operations. 
However, Pertamina could not work alone in order to empower and educate domestic 
private companies with regards to their involvement in the industry, as well as the 
involvement of local governments and wider society. With big responsibilities from 
upstream to downstream operation management, Pertamina could not establish efficient 
public communication with local governments and society around working areas. This 
condition led to misunderstandings between the company, government and society. 
Pertamina was accused of being corrupt and a golden goose for maintaining Soeharto’s 
regime. While this may have been true, it was not the whole picture of this vital national 
company. 
Furthermore, according to Yuwono (2014), the oil and gas industry in Indonesia 
was used as a money machine for political elites, especially President Soeharto, to build 
his family’s companies. Soeharto used Ibnu Sutowo and his ideas to develop Pertamina’s 
business in non-oil sectors; he gave permission to Ibnu Sutowo to sign contracts with 
foreign oil companies and to obtain foreign debt. In the Soeharto era, Pertamina was the 
government’s right hand and provided services to the citizens as well as finances for to 
the ruling party (the Golkar Party). This condition made it a rent-seeker and rent-collector 
company. Pertamina could not develop maximally as a business entity because of its dual 
position as an oil company and as the oil contractor supervisor. The crisis, the slow 
development of Pertamina’s capacity as oil producer, and the suspected corruption led to 
a decrease in the oil industry’s contribution to total national income from 71% in 1971 to 
24% in 1993/1994 (Purwoto and Kuncoro in Kuncoro et al., 2009, Chapter II, p. 36). 
Since then, oil and gas has contributed between 20 and 30% of total state revenue. 
Pertamina’s monopoly in the hydrocarbon industry was used by the President and 
his inner circle to build and maintain their influences in business and politics. Thus, the 
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reformation era of Indonesian politics since 1998 also triggered parliament to issue Law 
No. 22/ 2001, which was followed by government regulation specifying Pertamina’s 
change in status from PN Pertamina to Pertamina Persero. This new law emerged as 
parliament and government were concerned about Pertamina’s power in the national oil 
industry and also as suggested by World Bank in its 2000 study on Indonesia Oil and Gas 
sector (World Bank, 2000). This company monopolised all activities in the oil sector 
without the government’s control. This was understandable due to the company’s position 
as a public service company with an obligation to provide sufficient oil and gas for 
domestic needs. However, the government’s weak control meant that Pertamina acted 
beyond its obligations and was not able to perform well. This condition was understood 
after 2001, when Pertamina only contributed 10% of the total national oil production. 
This means that more than 90% of national oil was exploited and managed by foreign 
companies (Syeirazi, 2009). The government’s aim of building a strong national oil 
company that could dominate national oil industry had yet to be reached. This condition 
was the source of strong criticism of the new law from academics, economists, and oil 
practitioners. They argued that liberalising the national oil industry and removing 
Pertamina as regulator in both upstream and downstream operations would only weaken 
the position and control of both the company and the government in the national oil 
industry. 
After the Ibnu Sutowo era, Pertamina struggled to balance economic needs with 
social responsibilities (Daryono, et al. 2013, Chapter VIII). This was a hard task for any 
state-owned company, especially those involved in both upstream and downstream 
operations. The company had a specific managerial body, with BPPKA (Badan 
Pembinaan Pengusahaan Kontraktor Asing/ National Development and Foreign 
Commercial Contractors) assigned to deal with all issues related to oil contracts and 
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foreign contractors (Darmono, 2009; and Machmud, 2000, p. 49). Consequently, 
Pertamina could cut bureaucratic lines in oil investment as the negotiation and the signing 
of the contracts, as well as all related permissions from various governmental bodies and 
provinces, were overseen by this body. This system meant that Indonesia’s oil industry 
became attractive and friendly towards foreign companies. On the other hand, the 
government could not learn about and control the oil industry because it did not have 
first-hand experience in the field and therefore could not fully grasp the reality and 
practicality of running an oil business. This created various economic problems as well as 
political and formal issues when the government took over the oil industry management 
in 2001. 
An important development in the industry was the establishment of a body called 
Dinas Koordinasi Kontraktor Asing (DKKA/ Foreign Contractor Coordinating Body) in 
the late 1960s. Its main task was to negotiate and deal with FOCs. This body was part of 
Pertamina and was renamed Badan Koordinasi Kontraktor Asing (BKKA/ Foreign 
Contractor Coordination Body) in the late 1970s and later Badan Pembinaan 
Pengusahaan Kontraktor Asing (BPPKA/ Foreign Contractor Supervisor Agency) in the 
late 1980s (Machmud, 2000, p. 150). This body had a direct line of command to the 
President Director of Pertamina and was known to exercise huge control in managing 
contracts with FOCs and supervising their operations. This body successfully built a good 
relationship with the FOCs, but without coordinating and involving the related ministries 
and local government. Thus, it experienced strong criticism from the government and 
FOCs during the 1990s, as well as attempts to issue a new oil and gas law. Pertamina’s 
monopoly in the hydrocarbon industry was used by the President and his inner circle to 
build and maintain their influences in business and politics. Thus, the reformation era of 
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Indonesian politics beginning in 1998 also triggered parliament to issue Law No. 22/ 
2001 about oil and gas industry. 
In the earlier era, the hydrocarbon business was under Pertamina’s governance 
and the company was mandated by national law to represent the government as manager 
over the resources as well as the main player in the industry. All companies that wanted  
to operate in the oilfields needed to sign a contract and gain approval for their Work and 
Budgetary Plan (including the Plan of Development) (Utomo, 2010). This power 
encouraged Ibnu Sutowo to overstep his authority by investing outside the company’s 
core business and buying oil tankers with administrative problem, ultimately leading to 
the “Pertamina Crisis” in 1976. Afterwards, the government closely and strictly managed 
and oversaw the management of Pertamina, including restrictions on funding and capital. 
From the 1980s until 2001, the company was more focused on governing the hydrocarbon 
industry rather than its core duty as a company. 
It was difficult for Pertamina to gain public and government trust. The 
government only gave limited capital to improve the company’s performance and make 
new investments needed in order to fulfil its obligation in providing hydrocarbon products 
for the domestic market. On the other hand, the local government asked for direct 
involvement in the industry (including the rent collected by the central government). This 
political and economic condition meant that Law No. 22/2001 was a good starting point 
for creating a transformation both in Pertamina’s business management and in the 
national oil industry’s rules of the game. 
The 2001 Oil Law was meant to create a national industry that could have a strong 
bargaining position in the global oil industry while also being transparent and 
environmentally friendly. The state authorities were divided between regulators, the 
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government, and corporations in order to encourage and maintain a competitive domestic 
oil market. Once, Pertamina was responsible for all functions. However, legally it became 
identical to the other oil companies. The regulator of the upstream industry was the 
MEMR, which was helped by the Implementing Body, and the downstream activities 
were managed by BPH Migas. 
BP Migas (Badan Pelaksana Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi/ Implementing 
Body of Upstream Oil and Gas Industry) was established in 2003 as mandated by the Law 
of Oil and Gas No. 22/ 2001. The GoI formed this new government agency to represent 
the state in signing contracts with FOCs (Syeirazi, 2017). The agency was also 
responsible for monitoring and managing upstream oil and gas operations, while 
downstream activities were managed by BPH Migas (Badan Pelaksana Hilir Usaha 
Minyak dan Gas Bumi/ Government Agency on Downstream Oil and Gas Industry). BP 
Migas was a state-owned non-profit legal entity, which led to criticism from politicians as 
well as domestic academicians and practitioners. 
The Special Task Force for Upstream Hydrocarbons and Gas Business Activities 
(Satuan Kerja Khusus Migas/ SKK Migas) is an institution established by the GoI under 
Presidential Regulation No. 9 of 2013 on the Management of Upstream Hydrocarbons 
and Gas Business Activities. This organisation is assigned to manage the upstream 
hydrocarbons and gas business activities under a cooperation contract. This institution has 
been established to exploit the state’s hydrocarbon and gas natural resources and therefore 
generate the maximum benefits and revenue for the greatest welfare of the people. This 
agency replaced the former Implementing Body (BP Migas) which was established in 
2001 (SKK Migas, 2012). 
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It would appear to have strengthened the government’s bargaining position in the 
industry, especially regarding communication and negotiation with foreign companies, 
although the side effect has been the creation of uncertain and unpredictable political 
conditions and an unsupportive environment for oil investment. As predicted, the oil 
production plummeted and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono declared Indonesia as a 
net oil importer and thus halted their membership of OPEC. 
From the learning process, we can also conclude that the historical regulations 
considered society as nothing more than users of oil and gas. As a matter of fact, in the 
beginning, it was a society group which initiated the rehabilitation of the already- 
destroyed oil refinery facilities in Sumatra and Java. They also pressured the government 
to take over the facilities from FOCs, as well as pushing (and accelerating) the 
government’s decision to establish national oil companies. 
4.2. The Procedure Element 
 
Ibnu Sutowo began to set up a strategy to develop Pertamina as well as the oil 
industry. With a new regulation and contractual agreement, Pertamina succeeded in 
several ways (Purwoto and Kuncoro in Kuncoro et al., 2009, Chapter II, p. 22-23). It was 
able to improve national oil production from 490,000 barrels per day in 1965 to 1.62 
billion barrels per day in 1979. This achievement was also influenced by the first Oil 
Boom in 1973. The oil and gas sector’s contribution to national revenue improved 
significantly from 66 trillion Rupiahs (27%) in 1969/1970 to 8.628 trillion Rupiahs (71%) 
of total revenue. This profit was invested to fund national development programmes in all 
sectors. Despite this, in the following year the country had to deal with high inflation. 
Another of Pertamina’s achievements was building new refineries and exploring new 
offshore oilfields. The first offshore commercial founding was by Japan Petroleum 
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Company (Japex) in North Sumatera’s offshore area in 1965. In addition, Indonesia had 
proven itself as an oil exporter since 1958 and joined OPEC in 1962. 
 
Indonesia began to diversify its hydrocarbon industry in the early 1970s 
(Hertzmark, 2007, p. 13). Mobil Oil one of the first companies to discover gas in Arun, 
Aceh. Gas exploration and production was developed with Japan as the main export 
destination. The company completed the first LNG facility in Indonesia in 1977. In 
addition, Gas was also found in Bontang, East Kalimantan during the 1970s and the field 
started to produce gas commercially in 1979. Revenue from LNG exports helped 
Pertamina to recover financially after the company’s financial crisis in 1976. Indonesia’s 
gas production increased steadily until the country became one of the largest LNG 
exporters in the world. 
The GoI established Perusahaan Gas Negara (PGN/ State Gas Company) in 1965 
and the company became a public corporation 1984 with main responsibility was 
distributing gas to medium-sized industries and households (PGN, n.d.). The government 
issued a policy through a Presidential Decree in August 1997 that regulated national gas 
development, transmission, and distribution (Darmono, 2009). It was intended to clarify 
the relationship between Law No. 44/ 1960 and Presidential Decree No. 37/ 1994 with 
regards to the roles of Pertamina and PGN in the national gas industry. Prior to 1994, 
Pertamina had exclusive rights for transmitting gas. 
The Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) was responsible for the development 
and implementation of government policies in the energy sector (World Bank, 2000, p.  
4). It worked together with other related ministries through a Badan Koordinasi Energi 
(BAKOREN/ Energy Coordinating Board). The Ministry was established in 1978 to 
manage the state energy industry, which included Pertamina, PGN, and PLN (Perusahaan 
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Listrik Negara/ State Electricity Company). The World Bank (2000, p. 16) explored the 
cause of Pertamina’s inefficiency in their study about Indonesia’s hydrocarbon industry 
and argued that the inefficiency was caused by outdated legislation, especially regarding 
the implementation of government interference in Pertamina’s decisions and operations. 
During President Soeharto’s regime, the company was used to award contracts to the 
President’s children, family members, and government officials. The company had to deal 
with its public service obligation (PSO) to meet the domestic market demand on oil and 
gas, while simultaneously signing contracts with inefficient domestic business entities 
related to the President. Thus, it focused on producing a certain amount of oil and gas 
without paying proper attention to the most efficient production methods. Moreover, it 
had to fulfil the PSO rather than spending more capital and energy on exploration and 
exploitation activities. Those conditions led to distrust from the GoI and society about 
Pertamina’s ability and capacity to run pure hydrocarbon business activities under Law 
No. 22/ 2001. 
BP Migas (Badan Pelaksana Usaha Hulu Minyak Bumi dan Gas/ Upstream Oil 
and Gas Agency) was established in 2003 (Latham and Watkins, 2012, p. 1). It was a 
state-owned non-profit legal entity formed by the government to replace Pertamina’s 
position as regulator of the hydrocarbon industry. Based on the 2001 article, BP Migas 
had several tasks throughout the process of contract provision. Firstly, it provided and 
gave advice to the MEMR regarding listing, updating, and preparing the working areas 
and contracts with oil companies. Secondly, it was responsible for negotiating and signing 
contracts with contractors. Thirdly, it conducted assessments for field development plans 
for working areas which were going to produce for the first time and submitted these 
plans to the MEMR for the Ministry’s approval. Fourthly, It was responsible for 
approving plans for the development of exploration and production operation in general 
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as well as the working plans and budgets. It had to conduct monitoring of oil companies’ 
operations and report its findings based on the PoD, working, and budgeting plans to the 
MEMR (Partowidagdo, 2009). Finally, it was also charged with appointing sellers for the 
government’s oil share in order to maximise the state’s revenue and profit. 
BP Migas’ state-owned non-profit legal status led to criticism from politicians as 
well as domestic academicians and practitioners. At least three judicial review proposals 
have been submitted to Constitutional Court regarding articles in Law No. 22/2001 about 
the establishment of BP Migas. The latest proposal was granted in November 2012. The 
Court argued that state control in conducting business should be represented by a state- 
owned enterprise which signs a contract with other business entities. 
The Special Task Force for Upstream Hydrocarbons and Gas Business Activities 
(SKK Migas) replaced BP Migas. This institution was established by the GoI under 
Presidential Regulation No. 9 of 2013 on the Management of Upstream Hydrocarbons 
and Gas Business Activities. SKK Migas is assigned to manage the upstream 
hydrocarbons and gas business activities under a cooperation contract. The establishment 
of this institution has been designed to exploit the state’s hydrocarbons and gas natural 
resources to generate the maximum benefits and revenue for the greatest welfare of the 
people. 
 
Since Law No. 22/ 2001, administrative procedures have become more 
complicated because the contractors have to deal with various governmental bodies and 
local government directly rather than with assistance from Pertamina (IPA, 2015). There 
was a transfer of authority and responsibility under the new law followed by Government 
Regulation Number 35/ 2004. The MEMR has the responsibility to list a working area for 
bidding. It also determines whether and to what extent PSC terms need to be changed to 
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attract new investment, whether additional blocks should be put on offer and whether 
specific terms of PSCs should be approved. The Ministry also expects to consult with 
local governments as the areas are under their management. In the old system, the 
Ministry interacted with FOCs through Pertamina. Pertamina was responsible for 
monitoring upstream activities and reservoirs, maintaining data about reservoirs and cost 
accounting for refined price setting. 
Those factors have affected the development and the future of Indonesia’s 
hydrocarbon industry. From 2001 to 2016, there was a significant decline in Indonesia’s 
oil production and therefore President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono decided to end the 
country’s OPEC membership in 2006. Moreover, there have been very few surveys and 
exploration activities in new areas, while the number of foreign companies interesting in 
the industry has also fallen. Existing contractors, both FOCs and Pertamina, are more 
focused on operating in existing oilfields because these require less capital and resources 
and are less risky. Unfortunately, some remote areas with potential oil and gas reserves as 
well as deep sea water areas remain untouched. 
Pertamina gets first offer for any open oilfields by paying attention to its technical 
and financial abilities. This is mainly because the government retains ownership of the 
working areas, meaning that that FOC has to return the areas to the GoI through the 
MEMR at the end of the contract. Moreover, all data about the area should be submitted 
to the Ministry because it belongs to the GoI. Data exchange among contractors can be 
conducted after the MEMR gives permission. 
The GoI sets its investment priority sectors every five years. Under the National 
Mid-term Development Plan in 2010-2014, the oil and gas industry was one of five 
priority sectors. Oil and Gas Law No. 22/2001 was determined to have created an 
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inefficient and bureaucratic system in Indonesia’s oil industry. The fiscal policy stated in 
the law was also unattractive for new and existing investors. This is because Indonesia’s 
oilfields are already mature and therefore the country requires more capital and higher 
technology in order to produce oil while new fields are still difficult to find, mostly 
because they are located in deeper areas or offshore, which adds further challenges 
regarding the environment and acceptance from the surrounding neighbourhood. 
Furthermore, FOCs had to pay taxes after they began producing oil as stated in the 
lex-specialis principle of Law No. 8/ 1997, but this provision has been replaced by Law 
No. 22/2001 which requires companies to pay taxes before they have found and produced 
oil. This change in regulation and policy has discouraged FOCs from taking risks and 
funding new surveys and other explorative operations to find new oilfields, while 
Indonesia desperately needs such activities to maintain and increase oil production. From 
the 1980s until the early 1990s, 200 wells were drilled per year; however, since then only 
30 wells have been drilled per year. 
BP Migas (Badan Pelaksana Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi/ Implementing 
Body of Upstream Oil and Gas Industry) was established in 2003 as mandated by the Law 
of Oil and Gas No. 22/ 2001. Davidson (2015b) categorised the agency as an Independent 
Regulatory Agency (IRA). The GoI formed this new government agency to represent the 
state in signing contracts with FOCs. Moreover, the agency was also responsible for 
monitoring and managing upstream oil and gas operations, while downstream activities 
were managed by BPH Migas (Badan Pelaksana Hilir Usaha Minyak dan Gas Bumi/ 
Government Agency on Downstream Oil and Gas Industry). Law No. 22/ 2001 generated 
several regulations and protocols in adjusting the governance of the industry into the new 
system with BP Migas as the focal player representing the government. Based on 
Ministerial regulation No. 040 and 033/ 2006, the MEMR offers working areas through 
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auctions or direct proposals. Direct proposals follow up on an FOC’s proposal regarding 
one or more open working areas after joint study conducted between the FOC and the 
GoI. This regulation appointed the Agency to oversee management and operation of 
FOCs. The oil contracts last for 30 years, including the exploration and exploitation 
period, and they could be renewed for an additional 20 years. The contractor should begin 
their operation a maximum of 180 days after the contract is signed. In case the contractor 
cannot fulfil their obligation, the agency could advise the MEMR to end their contract. 
The GoI could ask the FOCs to offer the contract to a national company before offering it 
to others. The right to use the land should also be negotiated between the community and 
the FOC, and the landlord should give their permission to operate within the areas as long 
as the FOC are able to present the relevant contract. FOCs also have an obligation to 
empower surrounding society, protect the environment, and use local manpower and 
products. Foreign workers can only be used in the positions and tasks where Indonesians 
are unavailable or do not have the requisite capabilities and expertise. 
 
The implementing body’s task was to oversee the implementation of contracts, 
while the MEMR had to develop the contracts and cooperation with FOCs. The regulation 
also positioned Pertamina and other FOCs on the same page with the same treatment. 
JOB and JOA were managed by the new agency, while TAC and EOR remain under 
Pertamina’s authority until the end of the contracts. The TAC and EOR working areas 
still belong to Pertamina and the NOC has also had to sign a contract with the agency, just 
like other oil companies in Indonesia. 
 
From the explanation above, it is evident that Law No. 8/ 2001 led to greater 
uncertainty and unpredictability in the national oil industry. BPPKA (National 
Development and Foreign Commercial Contractors) was removed from Pertamina, and 
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the government established BP Migas (Implementing Body of Oil and Gas Industry) to 
handle all issues related to oil contracts and contractors. Unfortunately, Pertamina was 
positioned on the same page as other oil companies but with a different mandate as a 
public service company. This factor has been the main source of criticism from several 
analysts, politicians, and practitioners, who believed that this law led to liberalisation in 
the national oil industry by letting national oil companies compete with other foreign and 
private companies to get oil contracts. 
 
On one hand, the law gave Pertamina a good opportunity to focus more on its 
position as a business entity, develop its business strategies and operation, and prove its 
abilities domestically and abroad. On the other hand, the government, which did not have 
any practical experience regarding oil and gas operation, had to deal with establishing a 
new oil industry management system based on the new law. This required a speedy 
learning process and consideration and acceptance from foreign contractors, especially 
with several contracts due in the years following 2001. As expected, several companies 
did not renew their contracts for various reasons: oil production plummeted and there was 
no new exploration operation, while the old oilfields were drying. Fortunately, the 
situation was recovered due to significant development in the gas industry. The gas 
production increased each year, meaning the national company (PGN/ Perusahaan Gas 
Nasional/ National Gas Company) was able to play a significant role in the operations 
even though it was not as powerful as Pertamina. 
 
Another important step was to cut off Pertamina’s monopoly position in 
downstream activities. It was important for the government and Indonesian citizens to 
open access towards downstream projects in order to get the most value for their money 
in purchasing oil and gas products. Competition created efficiency and guaranteed the 
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availability of the products in the domestic market. However, it would not be easy for 
private and foreign players to involve in this project because Pertamina had been there for 
a long time with facilities and access to the deeper areas. 
 
Regarding government and foreign companies’ relations, the GoI issued incentive 
packages to stimulate foreign investment in Indonesia, particularly in the hydrocarbon 
industry (Sanusi, p. 129-131). This decision was influenced by a significant decrease in 
national oil production. The decline of survey and exploration activities to search for new 
oilfields, combined with the mature oilfields that had already been exploited exhaustively 
and the high cost of developing oil operations in unconventional areas, resulted in this 
scenario. Therefore, the GoI issued several packages that were expected to boost 
investment in the upstream operations. 
 
The first package was launched in September 1988 and tried to give more 
attractive financial regulations to the company, especially reducing the DMO and first 
tranche petroleum (FTP) figures which would need to be paid by FOCs. The second 
package was launched on February 1989. The GoI launched those packages because of 
slower global oil investment caused by cheaper oil prices and the emergence of new oil 
producing countries in Central Asia and Latin America. Furthermore, the incentives were 
also given in order to encourage more surveys and exploration projects due to the 
decrease in Indonesia’s oil production from mature oilfields. Indonesia needed new 
oilfields to maintain pace with OPEC’s production obligations and to fulfil domestic 
demands. The third package was announced in August 1992 and was meant to encourage 
exploration in unconventional areas, such as deep water and frontier territories. The last 
package was announced in January 1994. 
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Under the new law, an FOC had to spend more time and money on preparing any 
requirement needed before they could actually operate in the area. Various ministries and 
local government policies needed to be fulfilled by the FOCs themselves. BP Migas and 
SKK Migas could only assist them along the process. Thus, the hardest problems, such as 
the overlapping use of working areas, could not be solved quickly. 
 
Pertamina conducted integrated management operations consisting of exploration 
and exploitation activities, refineries, transportation and selling of oil and gas. To do so, 
they established various subsidiaries in the region and abroad. They also bought refineries 
and facilities from Shell and Stanvac, which has often been considered as a 
nationalisation move by academicians and researchers (compare between Sanusi and 
Purwoto and Kuncoro in Kuncoro et al., 2014, Chapter II). 
 
Based on Law No. 8 Year 1971, Pertamina was the sole player in the national oil 
industry. Its economic activities were meant to provide national development funds. In 
order to do so, they cooperated with various oil contractors, especially onshore. The 
company established a new contractual system to replace the old concessional contract 
which was considered incapable of maximising rent from oil industry activities. It was 
legalised under Law No. 44 Year 1960 and known as the kontrak karya (Contract of 
Work/ CoW) (Purwoto and Kuncoro in Kuncoro et al., 2009, Chapter II, p. 19). Foreign 
companies were contractors according to this law and did not get concessionary rights in 
oilfields. However, Ibnu Sutowo suggested a different type of contract. He proposed the 
PWC, which was expected to maintain Indonesia’s mineral and mining rights. Thus, the 
main duty of foreign companies was to be operators of NOCs. They would be paid after 
they succeeded in exploiting oil and would get their share of the oil production profits 
based on the contract. 
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During the initial stage of government involvement in the hydrocarbons industry, 
state-owned hydrocarbon companies such as Permina, Pertamin, and Permigan officially 
operated under the supervision and guidance of the Department of Mining. However, in 
the field, they could operate effectively by associating closely with local military 
authorities. This was the beginning of official military activity in Indonesia’s hydrocarbon 
industry. Later on, when those three companies merged as Pertamina, General Ibnu 
Sutowo, one of higher officials in Indonesia’s Military Troops, became the first President 
Director. Consequently, the government issued Law No. 8/1971, which strengthened 
Pertamina’s monopoly as the sole company mandated to operate and control the 
hydrocarbon industry. 
 
Financial sharing scheme stated in previous section is designed by government as 
the result of compromise between two opposite opinions; the pro and contra factions of 
foreign companies’ entry into one of vital industry in the country. The pro-foreign 
investment faction argued that, realistically, the country do not have enough financial and 
technical resources to do all operations just by domestic force and resources. Hence, 
foreign companies, that have both capital and technical capacity needed to extract natural 
resources, are needed. On the other hand, the contra faction posit that we need to ensure 
that the country’s natural resource should be extracted to generate wealth for the people, 
not the foreign companies per se. The companies’ sole interest to generate profit as much 
as possible without consideration toward people who actually own the land and the 
resource are generally proven to produce both environmental and normative problems. 
The elites are always suspected to let the companies do as they see fit as long as they gain 
benefit, either politically or economically, from such attitude. 
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The existence of foreign oil companies triggered protests from some groups of 
Indonesians, especially from the Persatuan Buruh Minyak (Oil Labour Union/ 
PERBUM). The major event was a large demonstration initiated by PERBUM in Plaju 
oilfield, South Sumatra (Darmono, ed., 2009, p. 22). The protesters demanded a 
nationalisation policy towards FOC assets in the country, letting the workers take control 
of operations. Although the government did not enforce such a nationalisation policy, it 
established a working group consisting of representatives from national and foreign oil 
companies, the military, the Ministries of Oil and Gas, and the Labour Union (Darmono, 
ed., 2009, p. 23). Their main task was to evaluate FOCs’ operations and provide 
recommendations to the government. The government took the first step to handle the 
situation by buying refineries and distribution facilities from the three major companies. 
 
After this first heroic involvement of society in the hydrocarbon industry, both 
society and local government did not have any access to the governance of this sector. 
The national government monopolised important interactions with the companies, while 
the subnational government had only limited access to the profit sharing scheme of 
natural resource revenue from central to local government. Moreover, society was also 
treated passively as merely an object of the companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) projects. Consequently, society could ask companies to fund social events or build 
public facilities for the citizens in their working area. Therefore, at this stage there was 
still very limited subnational government and societal involvement in the industry. 
 
There are always different points of view regarding this development. Some 
people saw it negatively as the government decided to liberalise this crucial industry 
while the NOC – Pertamina – still had limited capacity and capabilities to take control. 
The situation was known as the foreigner’s domination within a national industry and 
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national economic matters. On the other hand, others considered it in a more optimistic 
way. It was an opportunity for both the government and Pertamina to mature and to be 
able to do their tasks more effectively and efficiently. Previously, the line between 
regulators, policy makers, and business operators was too vague. Nonetheless, a simple 
question still remained unanswered: What would be best for the state as well as the 
company in their mutual relations? What was wrong with previous arrangement and what 
needed to be fixed in the new one? 
 
The government looked for recognition as an already-democratised and liberal, 
country, while the international community asked for more transparency, accountability, 
and openness of national industries, especially in the closely regulated hydrocarbon 
industry. Those circumstances led to a decision to replace the 1971 Oil and Gas Law with 
Law No. 22/ 2001. The new regulation changed Pertamina’s function as regulator and 
policy maker in the industry, returning these roles to the government through the MEMR. 
Pertamina was positioned in the same level as other oil contractors (the FOCs and private 
national companies) with the main task of fulfilling domestic demand for oil and gas 
products. The next challenge was that, due to this strategy, FOCs needed more time to 
comply with various ministerial regulations, local government desires, and pressure from 
local people before actually doing their job, whether it was explorative or exploitative 
operation. The contract period was too short to complete political matters or explore more 
potential areas. 
During the 1990s, the GoI sought a more significant role and authority in 
managing the hydrocarbon industry. The Ministry, for example, submitted a draft to the 
House of Representatives. It was rejected by the House due to its counter-productive 
proposal to dismiss Pertamina. Afterwards, the GoI asked for a World Bank 
recommendation to reform the industry. This international body released its report about 
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Indonesia’s reformation plan in the oil and gas sector in 2000 and argued that Pertamina’s 
monopoly role was inefficient because the company was acting both as a contractor and 
manager of overall operations and activities within the industry. It stated that it was 
important to reform Pertamina by detaching and simplifying some of its activities, 
operations, and roles. It was also important to reform the company internally in order to 
create healthier structures and procedures as a business entity. In other words, the 
industrial structure of the hydrocarbon sector as well as the government agencies involved 
in the sector should be liberalised. World Bank argued that liberalisation was necessary to 
deal with future challenges such as low oil prices, slow investment in the sector, declining 
oil production, and fulfilling domestic demand (World Bank, 2000). Furthermore, WB 
proposed that Pertamina was positioned on the same page with the same treatment as 
other oil companies. The first important step would be a separation between the 
contractor and manager roles. Thus, BPPKA was to be removed from Pertamina and the 
GoI would relocate it as another government body or as a part of the MEMR. 
4.3. Process and Mechanism of Change 
 
Development projects were considered to be very important during the Soeharto 
regime. His ability to deal with challenges in the national economy was determined by his 
decision to centralise all political economic decisions. Authoritarianism was considered  
as important choice to pursue a stable political situation and ensure economic 
development projects ran smoothly and were funded well by resource rent. This position 
generated many problems for Pertamina in balancing its role as part of the government 
and as business entity. Ultimately, the company had more regulative and controlling 
functions with regards to oil contractors, mostly foreign companies, as opposed to actual 
mining operations. However, Pertamina succeeded in a downstream project by 
establishing a national distribution system ensuring hydrocarbon products, especially fuel, 
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could be used nationwide. Although the task was not done perfectly, the company showed 
that its 20-year monopoly in downstream activity had gained it sufficient leverage to sell 
their fuel products in Indonesia after 2001. 
In this section I will analyse the mechanism and process of changes in the national 
hydrocarbon industry by combining my interpretation of the institutional change 
frameworks developed by Campbell (2004), Lowndes and Robert (2013), and North 
(1991 and 2005). It will explore the dimension, source, process, and mechanism of 
institutional changes. There are three dimensions of institution being studied (the rule, 
procedure, and normative institutional elements), two sources of change (endogenous and 
exogenous sources), two change processes (incremental and revolutionary), and two 
mechanisms of change (path dependence and punctuated). In addition, there are several 
indicators that change happen in an institutional arrangement and could affect all 
dimensions as proposed by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009): the shift from personal to 
impersonal exchange, the establishment of perpetual-life organisations, and credible 
commitment. Such indicators could be seen as part of institutional actors’ road and 
commitment to a more open, transparent, accountable, and accessible institutional 
arrangement to create a more stable but flexible order, minimising risk from their 
dynamic activity and interaction with the environment and other actors as well as solving 
internal and external problems and challenges during their period of contract and 
interaction. 
First of all, it is important to analyse the positioning of actors in the governance. 
The MEMR is the regulator, together with other ministries. Companies, on the other  
hand, are objects of the regulation conducting both administrative affairs and business 
operations in the country. This structure could be seen as a simple arrangement based 
only on the different tasks and roles of the organisations as primary actors. Nevertheless, 
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we should look beyond institutions as the first hypothesis states that an actor is not doing 
their task and dealing with other actors and the environment in a stagnant manner. Actors 
develop their knowledge, strategy, and capacity through their exposure to the world 
outside their own organisation. To do so, the actor themselves should decide and commit 
to interact in a cooperative and, if possible, a collaborative way with other actors in order 
to achieve their goals. Economists always argue that a compatible goal and the actors’ 
respected comparative advantage could be an incentive to build a cooperative and 
collaborative action in achieving the common goal. This would allow also allow them to 
achieve their personal goal as long as this does not prevent others achieving their goals or 
hurt their relationship (). In this regard, economic institutionalists like North (1991) 
emphasise the importance of the institutionalisation process in order to prolong the 
already established good relationship, attracting newcomers to join such institutions, 
protecting rights and ensuring compliance through institutional rewards and punishments. 
Each organisation will identify itself as belonging to either the government or company 
category and could benefit from such an arrangement by compromising, making credible 
commitments, and compliance with regulation and standardised procedures. 
The institutional structure put Pertamina at the centre of resource governance. The 
company led the industry by acting as an administrator as well as a mining operator. This 
dualism was criticised and considered suspicious as such structure put the NOC in an 
awkward position. As administrator, Pertamina had access to all papers and reports about 
the companies’ business plans and operations, meanwhile, as a fellow oil contractor and 
oilfield operator, the NOC was their competitor. Although its contribution to national oil 
production and revenue from its business activities was way below the big foreign 
companies, this arrangement was disadvantageous for NOC as Pertamina had a wealth of 
information about the company’s affairs and operations in Indonesia. This information is 
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usually considered as a business secret and it could become source of unfavourable 
government policies. 
In spite of the problematic institutional structure, such a strategy is commonly 
used by developing countries to gain control and simultaneously speed up the learning 
process to govern the industry and conduct mining and business operations. Both 
activities were something new and Indonesia’s role in resource governance was oppressed 
during the colonial period. Independence created an opportunity for direct involvement in 
all sectors of economic activity and protection of national interest while also managing 
their interdependence relationship with FOCs. This privileged position for Pertamina get 
was demonstrated after the new Oil and Gas Law No. 22 Year 2001 cut off its 
administrator role and mandated the NOC to focus on expanding its business operation 
and on increasing its contribution to national oil and gas production and revenue. 
Pertamina has proven publicly that, despite criticism and accusations regarding its 
former function as Soeharto’s cash cow for his family members and cronies, the company 
has shown positive improvement in terms of its ability to compete with its foreign 
counterparts and obtain new contracts in various potential oilfields. Its learning process 
for over 30 years has been advantageous in its strategy to be equal competitor within the 
hydrocarbon industry’s new institutional structure and arrangement. In downstream 
projects, its dominant position is unbeatable. The NOC has access to all regions in 
Indonesia, including small cities. It has the requisite infrastructure to distribute fuel as 
such tasks were its primary responsibility before the new law was released. This task and 
monopoly position as the sole fuel distributor, which is approved and allowed by law, has 
also been taken by the government. It is not been done perfectly but it will be beneficial 
in the company’s future efforts to complete its task as the only national oil company the 
country has. 
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Pertamina has been successful in dealing with major changes in its legal role and 
task. Moreover, the way the government has managed state-owned companies is also 
changing. Other than Law 1971, which regulated all organisational structure, authority, 
and responsibility of Pertamina, other policies regulated all organisations of state-owned 
companies under one Ministry. Thus, particularly for its organisational structure, the 
NOC is managed by the Ministry of State-Owned Companies. This development means 
that the national government has generally attempted to share tasks and authority among 
their ministries and agencies in order to properly manage and be responsive in dealing 
with any problems and challenges. 
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CHAPTER V 
INDONESIA’S MINING INDUSTRY 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The mining industry is a high capital and high risk business. The companies use 
transportation (mainly through land and water) several times during the exploration, 
processing, production, and distribution stages (a Foreign Mining Company, 2016). Thus, 
both the availability of fuel and government permission to use the land and water are 
crucial for the company. Moreover, it needs to seek new sources of metal periodically in 
order to secure production and fulfil its customer contracts. However, new exploration 
also means new contracts so these companies will have to spend more time negotiating 
with the central government; as well as dealing with local government and local people 
prior to starting their project. The licensing or contract is strictly a license to mine and 
does not include license to do other related activities such as to use land and river, to 
build mining sites, shelters, and stockpile warehouses, or to move their materials from 
one place to another (Arif, 2014). There are also several requirements, permissions, and 
documents that should be submitted beforehand and each activity should be stated in the 
plan of development (PoD) reported to the government and also approved by the 
government before starting their operations (Sudrajat, 2013). 
Indonesia’s mineral production mainly involves coal, bauxite, copper, tin, and 
nickel from several producing regions such as Kalimantan, Sumatra, Papua, Sulawesi,  
and Maluku (Darmono, 2009). PTBA and PT Timah (Persero), which are owned by the 
GoI (65%) and the public (35%) produce coal and tin. Unlike PT Timah, the dominant 
domestic tin producer (Salim and Munadi, 2016), Adaro, an FMC, is the one that 
dominate domestic coal production (Arif, 2014, p. 65 and 67). Meanwhile, Antam Tbk, 
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another state-owned mining enterprise, produces nickel, ore and bauxite, as well as small 
amounts of gold (Antam, 2016). On the other hand, Copper and gold production and 
exportation has been dominated by PT Freeport Indonesia since 1967 (Darmono, 2009). 
The country’s mining industry is very dynamic with the involvement and interaction of 
three major players: the GoI, the NMCs, and FMCs. The actors’ ability, specialisation, 
local contribution, and support from their home country could determine their bargaining 
position and power in the interaction with national and local governments. 
The interactions among companies are limited and mainly relate to the need for 
bigger companies to hire out some of their projects to service companies (subcontractors). 
However, each company also mostly negotiates directly with the government and 
legislative bodies. Thus, the mining business association has a minimal role and 
contribution from the perspective of business and state interactions. 
Indonesia has abundant mineral resources and the country has also been known as 
one of the world’s biggest producers of coal, tin, nickel, and copper. Unfortunately, 
NMCs, like PTBA and Antam, have minimal contribution despite having been active for 
the past 40 years. This is because they mainly export raw minerals, which have the 
smallest economic value in the market, without processing it. Export destinations such as 
China and Japan become richer by processing these materials, producing various end 
products, and selling them back to the international market. Indonesia is not far behind 
other countries in terms of human resources and technological abilities to process the 
minerals. The NMCs need government incentives and support to fund their operations. 
5.2. The Rule Element 
 
The GoI intended to follow the nationalist sentiment and planned to monopolise 
mining industry. They established a Badan Pimpinan Umum Perusahaan-perusahaan 
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Tambang (BPU Tambang/ General Authoritative Agency for Mining Companies). The 
Agency managed several foreign mining companies which were nationalised as instructed 
by Law No. 10 Year 1959 (Darmono, 2009, p. 180). However, the government 
development project had to be funded, yet there was no money available to do so. The 
quickest solution was to seek for international help through loans, aid, and investment. 
In order to handle the problem, government issued the 1967 Foreign Investment 
Law which allowed foreign investment in vital sectors such as mining as long as the 
investors collaborated with national companies in the activities and operations (Darmono, 
2009, p. 180). The government intended to ensure a technological and know-how 
knowledge transfer from MNCs to national business entities. By doing so, the 
government attempted to develop strong national companies that could be entrusted to 
manage the abundant resources. This Law created an opportunity for foreign companies 
to take part in Indonesia’s mining industry. However, this requirement is omitted in 1994 
so that FMCs could conduct their operation without has to cooperate with domestic 
company. The GoI’s main purpose was to collect company and production taxes from 
their operations in order to fund its development projects, to maintain the country’s 
independence, and to develop national political and economic conditions (Darmono, 
2009). FMCs were the only reliable business entities for conducting mining operations in 
the country at that time as there was still no capable and reliable domestic private mining 
operation. 
Hence, the mining industry was generally regulated by two laws; the Law about 
Foreign Investment No. 1 Year 1967 and the Law about General Mining No. 11 Year 
1967. Both laws allowed the GoI to commence mining by inviting foreign investors and 
companies to mine by themselves and by collaborating with national mining companies. 
Since independence, both the public and the GoI had considered the mining industry as an 
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important sector in supporting the national economy and providing welfare for citizens. 
Thus, both the government and ex-colonial companies’ Indonesian mining workers 
committed to governing and taking part in the industry by nationalising Dutch-based 
mining companies and establishing several national mining companies. These companies 
were previously managed by BPU Tambang (General Authoritative Agency for Mining 
Companies). 
According to the law, mineral sources were divided into three categories based on 
the importance of different minerals to the national economy as perceived by the GoI.  
The A type consisted of minerals considered as having strategic economic value such as 
hydrocarbons and coal, while type B consisted of vital minerals often used in industry, 
especially metals, and type C included minerals which were not included in either type A 
or type B such as granite, nitrate, marble, etc. The national government managed the 
mining industry for types A and B, while the subnational government was given authority 
for managing the type C mining operations under their jurisdiction. From 1945  until 
1999, the national government has absolute power in negotiating with mining companies 
and managing the mining industry as a whole. The Mining Law and its derivation, 
Government Regulation No. 32 Year 1969, placed the national government at the centre 
of mining industry governance. The subnational government, particularly at the municipal 
level, was given the authority to manage the mining industry after the enactment of the 
1999 Decentralisation Act (Hayati, 2015, p. 41-42 and Trihastuti, 2013). 
After 1970, the government established three national mining companies by 
merging three nationalised mining companies: PTBA (Perusahaan Tambang Batu Bara/ 
National Company for Coal Mining), PN Timah (National Company for Tin Mining), and 
PN Aneka Tambang (Antam) (Darmono, 2009, p. 133-135). Government capital was the 
only source of funding for the companies. However, in 1995, the government gave the 
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companies permission to collect public capital to expand and develop their operations 
(Darmono, 2009). Thus, in 1995 they conducted an initial public offering for 35% of their 
stock while retaining 65% government ownership. By doing so, they could boost their 
production and industrial activities. They could build more smelters, factories, mineral 
processing facilities, ports, and establish relevant and significant subsidiaries to support 
their development projects and international operations. 
The 1967 Law regulated the contractual system for government and mining 
companies’ relations (for both the hydrocarbon and general mining industries). There are 
three types of contract signed between government and companies: they are CoW, CCoW 
(Susilo and Pratomo, 2004, p. 27-30; Darmono, 2009, p. 182-196), and Mining 
Authorization for People’s Mining and Regional Mining Permit (Sigit, 1986 in Susilo and 
Pratomo, p. 139; Darmono, 2009, p. 194). 
Foreign investors had liberty to operate and explore the related working areas 
covered in the contract, but they also had an obligation to share the profits from product- 
selling activities. In order to learn about business operations, the government also stated 
that foreign investor should establish joint projects with national companies in their 
domestic operation (Darmono, 2009). In the early stages of their implementation, they  
had to face the challenge of societal resistance towards foreign companies. Some of the 
resistance movements forced several foreign companies to halt their operations or sell 
their contracts to the government. On the other hand, the only income for the government 
at that time came from mining operations; thus, the government had to look for a strategy 
to maintain social and political harmony while developing domestic industries as the main 
foundation of national economic development. 
The government could reach an agreement with foreign companies in a CoW 
format. The companies are considered as government contractors with rights and 
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obligations. Paying tax and royalties as well as complying with national regulations are 
among the obligation towards the government, while freedom to conduct mining 
operations as well as to gain profit from the production and trading activities in agreed 
mining areas are among their rights. The contract with Freeport McMoran was the first to 
contract in CoW format (Haluk, 2014, Soehoed, 2005a and 2005b). From 1967 to 2017, 
eight generations of CoW were signed between the government and companies. The 
differences between them mainly involve the specific financial obligations of companies 
towards the government. However, there was a five-year period from 1975 to 1996 when 
these contracts were managed by PTBA, an NMC (Darmono, 2009, p. 190-192). In 1996, 
the Ministry of Mining and Energy (MME) took over the authority to manage mining 
working areas and to negotiate and sign contracts with the companies and the system was 
renamed as the Coal Contract of Work (CCoW) (Arif, 2014). 
The returning authority of the MME as the one that signed the CCoW was 
considered as implying that the government and the companies are at the same level in 
front of the contract. It also means that any change in the existing contract should be 
negotiated and agreed between both parties. This situation can also be seen as a violation 
of Mining Law 1967 (interview with a Member of Parliament, February 2017). 
Nonetheless, the no law-based system ran without challenges from any governmental 
agencies until Mining Law No. 4/ 2009 was issued. The system was consequently finally 
recognised by national law and put under supervision of the MEMR (previously known as 
the MME). 
5.3. The Procedure Element 
 
From 1967 to 1999, there was a relatively stable policy regime due to an 
unchanging president and strictly controlled political, economic, and social sectors. The 
local authorities did not have real authority to manage their potential and already-proven 
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natural resources. National companies still learnt to manage the companies, to conduct 
mining operations, and to use technology and machines related to their operations. 
Domestic energy consumption also increased steadily, while international exploration and 
consumption increased rapidly due to vast industrial development in developed and 
developing countries. However, exploration of new mineral sources was mainly 
affordable only by large, foreign companies with abundant capital to fund their operations 
and the latest technology to reduce exploration costs and minimise risk (Sigit, 1995, p. 
186-188). During this time, Indonesia still lacked skilled manpower and had no capital to 
develop NMCs. The government decided to give up 35% of its share of the NMCs so the 
companies could collect more public funding to develop their businesses. The conditions 
also improved with the increasingly educated and skilled domestic manpower who could 
take part in more managerial and technical jobs. 
The first important agenda that should be underlined in the mining industry is the 
designation of mining areas and tender processes for mining working areas. This process 
depends heavily on good communication and intense sharing of data and knowledge 
between the government and companies, especially the data about potential mineral 
sources in a geographical location. In this regard, the government established a system 
which ensures reliable information because, in order to obtain a contract or mining license 
in certain areas, companies require approval from the MEMR about the status of the 
mines. However, the government is not active in its control of the mining industry as it 
has limitations such as limited knowledge regarding operational activities. More 
importantly, however, it also has limited capital and manpower to do the job. 
The second agenda relates to the divestment policy to transfer the ownership and 
control of companies’ operations to domestic actors. The domestic players could be 
national or subnational governments; national or local companies; domestic private 
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companies; or a collaboration between those actors. The divestment policy means that 
mining companies which originated from outside Indonesia (foreign companies) or those 
with operations in more than two countries (MNCs) should transfer a minimum of 50% of 
their share towards national actors on a gradual basis. A successful example of this policy 
is PT Indonesia Asahan Aluminium (PT Inalum), which was taken over by the 
government in 2013 (Sudaryana, 2016). The company was established in 1976 by a 
consortium consisting of 12 Japan-based companies, which held a 90% share in the 
company, and the GoI, which had a 10% share. The government’s share increased to 25% 
in 1978, to 41% in 1987 and 1998. The GoI took full ownership in 2013 following the 
initial agreement with the consortium and the company officially became a state-owned 
company. On the other hand, The GoI only owns approximately 9.36% of PT Freeport 
Indonesia despite the company entering the country more than 40 years ago. The 
divestment programme is not working smoothly for Freeport and the GoI. The process 
has been negotiated since 2001, but still there is no significant development as of March 
2017. 
The third agenda relates to the utilisation of local content and the moratorium on 
giving new mining licenses in 2014 for a certain amount of time. The first policy was 
aimed to help the growth of local and domestic mining service companies by emphasising 
foreign companies’ obligation to use materials produce domestically as well as services 
provided by domestic companies unless no companies provide such services (Sudaryana, 
2016; Poeradisastra and Haryanto, 2016). The moratorium was issued as part of the 
government’s project to evaluate all mining licenses, which significantly increased in the 
years following 2001. The project is known as a clean and clear project. Thus, during the 
evaluation period, the subnational government is not allowed to issue new mining 
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licenses to domestic and foreign companies until a further decision is taken by the 
national government. 
In addition, there has been another important agenda relating to mining industry 
governance in Indonesia since 2014. The government banned raw mineral exports and 
added an obligation for mining companies to pay a certain amount for reclamation 
projects based on their working areas (Sudaryana, 2016). The GoI had already issued  
such a policy earlier to encourage industrialisation of agriculture, farming, and non-metal 
mining products, which was expected to increase the economic value of the raw materials 
. In this regard, it is also a policy which emphasises the government’s goal of developing 
downstream operations within the mining industry (Antam, 2016). The national mining 
industry’ focus on upstream activities has caused not only severe environmental 
degradation in respected mining areas, but also in the surrounding areas which endangers 
the livelihood of local people. In the wider picture, the decentralisation policy launched at 
the end of the 1990s meant that the local governments and people within mining areas 
became heavily dependent on income from companies’ activities as well as their CSR 
projects (Septiari, 2014). 
On one hand, the condition is to be expected from such a policy. On the other 
hand, the existing mines already have limited mineral reserves and potency as they have 
already been exploited for more than ten years. Therefore, in the next ten years, the local 
governments and its citizens should seek for a new reliable source of income to avoid 
further social, economic and security issues in the future. The national government has 
realised this problem and it has already established a reclamation after-mining policy as a 
system that is expected to solve both environmental and social problems. So far, the 
success story of this reclamation is West Sumatra ex-coal mining area in Ombilin. The 
mine was operated by a national company and was already unable to keep up with the 
152  
increasing production costs due to old mining equipment and a significantly decreasing 
number of coal productions. 
After independence, the government established a ministry to represent the 
government, protect the national interest and achieve national development projects and 
priorities related to mining, energy resources and the extractive industry: the MME 
(which then became the MEMR). The Ministry worked closely with President Soeharto in 
deciding important matters related to the industry. During his regime, Soeharto controlled 
governance in all sectors, especially important sectors such as the mining industry. Thus, 
the ministries, subnational governments, and other governmental bodies only had limited 
liberties in making decisions and taking action even though they had the authority to do 
so. 
The government regulations related to the mining industry have become more 
complicated with the openness and development of Indonesia’s political, economic, and 
social systems. The more the country’s elites and people interact with external actors and 
environments, the more awareness they have about the way in which they have to deal 
with various actors in national and international arenas. Moreover, they also have greater 
awareness about their own potencies, strengths, and weaknesses in dealing with others. 
Various governmental agencies and citizens also develop new desires, knowledges, 
preferences, and abilities to employ different approaches to solve problems and make 
decisions regarding different actors, especially business entities. The government 
established the Ministry of Environment and Forestry to implement its commitment 
regarding environmental protection. In addition, the Ministry of Finance began to make 
separate calculations for national income based on different industries, with oil and gas as 
well as general mining considered as different sectors. This could imply the importance of 
the extractive industry as the main source of national income. Even though tax has 
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become the dominant source of state income over the past 15 years, a significant 
percentage has originated from tax and royalties payment made mainly by mining 
companies. The Ministry of Transportation, which has authority in managing 
transportation within national land, water, and air, has also attempted to collect income by 
charging all water transportation through various terms such as permission to sail and 
transferring goods service; despite the name, this does not involve any government 
services. 
An important change in the relationship between the government and mining 
companies is the shift from the Kuasa Pertambangan (Mining Authorisation Holder) 
system for domestic-based mining companies and the CoW system for foreign and 
multinational mining companies to a license-based system in which all companies are 
treated equally regardless of their origin. The main difference between these two systems 
is that the government has gained a stronger position in the latter. In a contractual system, 
both the government and the company are at the same level, which means any changes 
related to business operations should be negotiated and agreed by both parties. 
Meanwhile, in the later system, the government provides companies with licenses to 
operate within the given area and they are also obliged to comply with every change in 
national and subnational regulations without prior negotiation. In the former system, 
domestic companies received special treatment as they did not have to pay royalties to the 
government as an additional tax obligation, while foreign companies were obliged to pay 
both tax and royalties. 
The second change relates to the authoritative party that can issue mining licenses. 
According to the former regulation, the national government has monopoly authority to 
conduct negotiations and sign contracts with foreign and multinational companies as well 
as to provide Mining Authorisation Holder status for domestic companies. There is no 
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control mechanism towards the national government in issuing the CoW and Mining 
Authorisation Holder system. Following the Law of Decentralisation, which came into 
effect in 2000, subnational governments, especially in regencies, also have the same 
authority. By law, the national government has had to share its authority in managing the 
mining sector so that the local governments are able to collect revenue from mining 
operations within their areas to fund local development projects. The contract or license is 
only a license for exploration and mining operations in the working area. However, local 
people own the land so the company needs to negotiate directly, primarily by consulting 
and cooperating with local authorities, with the landowner to buy the land and determine 
compensation (Septiari, 2014). Sometimes, if not most of the time, the landowner asks for 
significant compensation and the local elites also ask for a share from the landowner, 
from the company, or from both parties. 
This practice is very common in many regions in Indonesia and the national 
government often does not know and is unable to trace and control such practices. The 
negative impacts of decentralisation are evident in the many suspicions and findings of 
local elite corruption as well as contract and national law violations. The national 
government has established the KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/ Corruption 
Eradication Commission) to investigate and reduce the amount of corruption, while the 
MEMR has issued a clean and clear project to evaluate the system of mining licensing in 
subnational governments. The Ministry of Domestic Affairs has also evaluated several 
local policies and regulations which are not in line with national plans and violate 
national laws. 
On the other hand, the problem arising from the authority transfer was fake, 
problematic, and overlapping mining licenses given by the municipal government to 
unknown and unreliable companies. The MEMR, especially the Directorate of Mineral 
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and Coal, issued a “clean and clear” certification project for all existing mining contracts 
and licenses issued by local governments. During the process, new licenses or auctions 
for new working areas were halted. Due to this policy, domestic companies were also 
unable to expand their exploration project to find new mineral sources in other areas to 
maintain their production level. 
The third change relates to the use of forestry areas for mining. Based on Law No. 
11 Year 1967, mines could be created in all areas under GoI jurisdiction. However, with 
the increasing concern regarding environmental degradation and international recognition 
of the importance of Indonesian forestry areas, the GoI established the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry. The Ministry issued the Law on Environment, which prohibits 
any mines in forests which are categorised as protected areas managed by the GoI. 
However, the GoI could award special mining licenses to any mining companies for 
special reasons, such as for fulfilling domestic needs. Unfortunately, getting these 
licenses is not easy as the companies and their operation plans in the areas require 
approval by different ministries, which make it a long and difficult process. Thus, even 
though they have already targeted the locations as their new resource reserves, some 
companies have difficulties completing projects in such areas. 
A further challenge for mining industry institutions arises from small-scale and 
unauthorised mining by individuals or groups. Some of their activities are conducted in a 
mining area operated by a legal mining license holder. The responsibility to manage and 
control such activities belongs to subnational governments. This is a more realistic 
approach as the local governments are geographically closer and should have more 
knowledge about these activities and those involved in them, unlike the national 
government which does not have adequate information or the capabilities to manage 
them. Nonetheless, there is also a possibility that local elites with connections to 
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governmental offices are the ones who are responsible for these activities, potentially 
meaning the local government is unable to manage them. 
Both practices from unclean and unclear mining licenses as well as illegal mining 
are often related to the illegal mineral trade. This activity has significantly reduced both 
subnational and national income from the mining industry. In order to limit illegal 
activities, the national government has renovated and relaunched several ports that are 
specifically used to transport mining products from mining areas. Moreover, the national 
and subnational governments cooperate with law enforcement agencies such as the 
national and district attorneys, the KPK, the police, and Indonesia’s Armed Forces to 
conduct periodic inspections of mining areas which are suspected to have illegal mining 
operations. This operation could minimise illegal activities although they cannot be fully 
stopped due to the limited manpower and capital of the related authoritative bodies. 
The agendas, system changes, problems, and challenges have already been 
discussed in this section. It has provided an important basic understanding about the 
context in which an actor acts and builds a mutual relationship with others. It is important 
to note that the government does not consist of single or unified agencies and various 
levels of government agencies are involved in managing the industry. On the other hand, 
the business entities also consist of different type of companies. The next discussion will 
focus on the analysis of actors’ characteristics, perceptions, and tendencies as well  as 
their capabilities to act and to cooperate with the other agencies within the same 
organisation (as “government” or as “business entities”) in order to establish and develop 
a mining industry institution. 
Based on the above discussion about important events in the institutional 
arrangement of the mining sector, we could make classifications of actors whose actions 
and decisions may affect the direction and implementation of both regulations and 
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procedures. The actors are mainly divided into government and business entities. 
However, the government consists of bureaucratic actors represented by different 
ministries and related governmental bodies, as well as different levels: national and 
subnational (which consists of provincial and municipal government). On the other hand, 
mining business entities do not consist of similar scales and types of business. From the 
study, there are at least two categories: the origin and scale of operations. The origin 
category contains domestic and foreign mining companies, while from scale factor 
includes small-scale (usually local companies), medium scale (usually national, both 
state-owned and private companies), and large-scale (usually foreign, especially MNCs). 
Different companies could have different and similar perceptions and strategies in their 
interactions with the government. Moreover, both actors (government and business 
entities) could have unified actions as a group or individual approaches in their 
interactions with other parties. 
In addition, it is also worth considering society as another party in the mining 
industry institution even though it does not have a direct influence in determining the 
rules of the game. Society is not only often excluded from the discussion of government 
and companies’ relations, but its role is also considered as static. However, societies in 
different regions could have different perceptions, expectations, and strategies in 
interacting with both the government and companies. Moreover, they also have different 
scopes of action (as individuals, as a group or via representation from local elites) and 
different levels of interaction depending on their role and engagement with the other 
parties in the industry. 
The first learning process of the GoI was its willingness, following the actual 
decentralisation policy, to share some of its authority to manage the mining industry. 
Before the reformation era in 1999, the national government controlled all political, 
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economic, and social sectors without giving any of its authority to others, especially the 
subnational government. President Soeharto was the centre of the government’s policies 
and the sole decision maker for all sectors. His word was effectively the law and was 
followed by all provinces and ministries, as well as the House of Representatives. The 
authoritarian model of governance was covered by regular general elections every five 
years to choose the already-decided winning party and the House of Representative’s 
power structure as well as the already-decided and elected President. The government had 
only one voice and move in the already-decided and dictated goals, direction, plans, and 
projects; differing opinions were not permitted and could lead to a political, legal, or 
military approach. Opposing parties could be fired from their public positions, become a 
political criminal, or be banished without trace. 
The government still needs to improve its performance, especially to deal with  
and to synergise more governmental agencies that use their authorities to benefit from 
mining activities. Since the reformation, the ministries have gained more authority to 
determine their goals, plans, and projects. They can interpret the national law and plan 
from their own perspective and with their own priorities in mind. However, their ability in 
conducting their tasks is not equal. There are some ministries which are more advanced 
than others in terms of catching up with and adjusting their systems to the global demand 
for more transparent and accountable governance practices. Many policies are 
overlapping and create confusion and resistance from companies. One important solution 
from the government is the establishment of a one-door policy to issue mining licenses 
and national requirements to enter and prolong mining activities in the country. The 
MEMR shares some of its authority in assessing and issuing mining licenses with the 
BKPM (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal/ Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating 
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Board). It also collaborates with the Board by placing some of its staff to handle the tasks 
and smoothen the transition period. 
Not all ministries are relevant in this study. The MEMR is the one which has the 
most tasks and interactions with mining companies. Previously, it was involved in the 
negotiation process until mining contracts were issued, they also manage and control 
mining operations in Indonesia. In 1990, government established the Ministry of State- 
owned Enterprises to oversee the management of national companies at an administrative 
level. Due to growing concerns about environmental damage and protection, the mining 
companies also need to meet environmental requirements from the Ministry of Forestry 
and Environment before starting their mining operation. Finally, the Ministry of Finance 
is responsible for managing companies’ financial reports and payment of their financial 
obligation as stated in the contract or mining license. In fact, Indonesia has a Coordinator 
Ministry of Economic Affairs to gather and lead all ministries related to the business 
sector. 
The House of Representatives main task is related to discussing and issuing 
national laws. However, sometimes they use their rights to ask the government about its 
plans and projects, including the mining sector. Furthermore, the government is also 
obliged to consult the House before deciding on mining areas, signing contracts and 
issuing mining licenses. However, as the Members of Parliament were chosen not based 
on their knowledge, education or job background, as well as expertise, it is not easy for 
them to ensure that the GoI’s actions and policies are inline or at least not against the 
Constitution and national laws. In reality, there were ten years (from 1999 to 2009) during 
which mining sector governance could be considered as against the 1967 Mining Law, 
with Parliament issuing a new mining law in 2009 (interview with a Member of 
Parliament, February 2017). 
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Despite these problems, all ministries and the House have one common agreement 
regarding governance of natural resources. The government needs to be involved in 
managing and running the business in order to maximise government profits from 
companies’ existence and operations and to minimise the negative effects from those 
activities. It also has a common perception that mining companies are effectively a cash 
machine. That is why it attempts to charge them by using many and overlapping 
ministerial regulations or policies. It also attempts to renegotiate contracts when the 
international market price of mining products increases and closes its eyes when the 
companies are producing a negative business environment. Moreover, the government 
also ignores the fact that most big companies make a valuable contribution in developing 
the regions where they operate. There is no reward system for their good mining practice 
or their compliance with the regulations. 
Another development in the governance practice is the government’s use of its 
authority without public control in order to become a more transparent and accountable 
government. The GoI committed to a more transparent and accountable governance 
practice by establishing the KPK in 2002. The Committee has succeeded in investigating 
and bringing corrupt elites to justice even though corruption is still a huge problem in the 
country. It also supported the decentralisation process by collaborating with several 
ministries to watch and investigate local government activities in managing their regions 
in various sectors. The clean and clear policy is one mining industry-related example of 
MEMR and KPK collaboration. The programme is expected to increase local government 
awareness regarding the good governance code of conduct. This step is particularly 
important in order to attract more foreign investors to the mining industry, which has 
already suffered since reformation due to political instability and frequently changing 
regimes, especially at the subnational level. 
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Since 1999, the national government has decided to decentralise the political 
system by sharing some of its authority with subnational governments. Nonetheless, some 
local governments are more advanced as they have different ability levels and access to 
the information and data needed to establish a relevant mining policy. They also have 
different understandings regarding the mining sector, for example the region’s mining 
potency, the mining companies’ operation, or small-scale or people-led mining practices. 
The Governor or Regent has the authority to decide policies for all sectors, including the 
mining industry, because the subnational government only has limited capital (money, 
skilled employees, and knowledge) to complete these important tasks. The elites are not 
directly controlled by the national government and do not have to consult with relevant 
bodies at the provincial level in practicing this authority. In fact, most elites act as “little 
kings” who make local policies or regulations that contravene national interests and 
projects. Moreover, many mining producing regions have established a Distamben (Dinas 
Pertambangan dan Energi/ Energy and Mining Body) without clearly define this body’s 
role, authority, and tasks in managing the mining sector. This agency is not directly 
related to the MEMR, which also means there is no control over whether the director is 
appointed by the Governor or the Regent and whether employees fully understand their 
roles. In addition, it also does not have the authority, means, and ability to actively 
interact, collect data, and watch companies’ operations in its region. This condition has 
created ineffective and passive local mining governance. 
There have been changes in the government’s perception of the national economic 
security, concern, and agenda which emphasise domestic actors’ ability to produce 
mining products. Public opinion values the national ability to fulfil domestic demand for 
mining products highly. This view is mainly influenced by national awareness and self- 
esteem as a resource-rich country. However, the actual condition of the national mining 
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industry tells a different story. Mines are usually located in forests and difficult-to-reach 
areas. Furthermore, national companies usually have limited capital and therefore they 
cannot afford failure during the exploration phase and uncommercial mineral findings. As 
national companies they are domestic market-oriented, which could reduce the economic 
incentive to develop and expand their projects. Government and public expectations are 
also higher and could become a burden in managing their revenue and profit. They should 
pay particular attention to sustainable CSR projects in order to avoid criticism and losing 
favour from local people and the government. Moreover, the dynamic of mineral product 
prices in the global market as well as the changing global mining industry competition are 
further challenges for their business plans and operations. 
On the other hand, foreign and multinational mining companies usually have 
sufficient capital and the necessary experience to manage business risk and facing 
challenges both inside and outside the company. They place more emphasis on economic 
goals (profit) and a business approach in their business plans and development projects, 
while establishing and maintaining good relationships with local people and governments. 
By doing so, they are able to focus more on increasing product quality and quantity while 
maintaining low and manageable production costs to secure profit. Some of them also use 
independent institutions to handle tax-related matters, while some others establish a 
special section in their organisation, mostly consisting of Indonesian professionals. In 
addition, they also have superior equipment and the requisite technical ability to explore 
and produce minerals as well as a greater commitment to the host country’s regulations 
and requirements to prolong and secure their operations. They have more experience, 
ability, and flexibility to meet international standards of business management and mining 
operations. 
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The mining industry in Indonesia did not develop as quickly as in other resource- 
rich countries due to the government’s dependency on hydrocarbons, especially oil, as 
they are easier to explore, need less time from exploration to production, have cheaper 
production costs, and command higher prices in the international market. In the initial 
stage of the industry, coal, tin, and copper mining in Indonesia were mainly run by big 
foreign companies such as Adaro and Freeport. Adaro, which originated as a Spanish 
national mining company, focused its operation only in Indonesia and especially in the 
southern part of Kalimantan Island. On the other hand, PT Freeport Indonesia was a 
subsidiary of a multinational mining company which originated in the US, Freeport 
McMoran Inc. It signed CCoW and CoW agreements with the government from the late 
1960s until the early 1980s. It became one of the largest mining companies and has 
continued to operate in Indonesia despite the ups and downs in the international prices of 
mining products and the rapidly changing national and local regime and policies in the 
last ten years. 
The second stage was the entrance of NMCs in the industry. There are three 
NMCs, of which the GoI has a 65% share. Antam Tbk (Aneka Tambang, Tbk) produced 
various mineral products, especially ore and nickel, while the other two NMCs are PTBA 
(Perusahaan Tambang Bukit Asam/ Bukit Asam Mining Company), which produces coal, 
and PT Timah, which produces tin. Both of them were established to take over Dutch- 
based coal and tin mining companies which had operated in the East Indies since the 
1890s. As the GoI has 65% ownership of the companies, their management is overseen by 
the Ministry of National Enterprises while their operations are supervised by the MEMR. 
National companies have to pay royalties and tax to the government, like any 
other company, while also providing several social services for local citizens in their 
operation areas. Their CSR activities mean that both society and local governments will 
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always expect demand more services without appreciating the difficult situation faced by 
the companies. The lack of knowledge and information regarding the business conditions 
mean local governments have not been flexible or able to adjust their approach towards 
business entities. Thus, their main (if not the only) perception and attitude towards 
business has been as their cash machine and not as their partner in develop and strengthen 
the local economy and society. 
The third stage was the emergence and development of private and local mining 
companies. Some local mining companies were established by local governments to 
obtain bigger profits rather than merely waiting for tax and royalties payments by the 
foreign companies to the central government. However, developing the business is 
another story. The lack of capital, management strategy, and technological know-how to 
establish an effective mining operation are the three biggest problems these companies 
face. Unfortunately, they are also used by local elites as political tools to gain support and 
direct public opinion, especially during elections. Despite this, they still manage to mine 
and produce some mining products, which are predominantly traded in the domestic 
market. On the other hand, local service companies are also well developed as most the 
bigger companies regularly use them as subcontractors. Meanwhile, the larger foreign 
companies pay more attention to managing all operation activities, dealing with their 
financial and legal obligations to the government, and managing CSR projects. 
The fourth stage is management of traditional miners, especially illegal and 
problematic ones. Such operations have been around forever, especially gold mining. One 
important characteristic of their operations is the use of traditional and simple methods of 
mining. However, nowadays, these mining operations are often managed by small groups 
or local companies who manage a number of traditional miners, including the distribution 
of people working in several mining areas, the collection of the products, and the resultant 
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trading activities. They operate as middlemen between miners and bigger companies that 
will buy their products. Unfortunately, many of these activities are illegal and not under 
government supervision. Several problems have arisen from such activities. On a national 
scale, such groups and companies often take part in illegal exports of mining products, 
which prevents the government from receiving the maximum profit from mining trade. 
Furthermore, there is no protection given towards the miners involved in the activities. 
Traditional mining methods are risky because there are no safety measurements. Thus, the 
miners’ health and life are at risk and they do not have health insurance or other 
protection as well as leverage like legal workers in legal mining companies. Subnational 
governments, especially at the municipal level, have the biggest authority in managing 
such activities under Mining Law No. 11 Year 1967 and also under Mining Law No. 4 
Year 2009. However, only in the last 15 years has the local government been able to 
make a greater commitment and reduce such activities by cooperating with law 
enforcement bodies such as the Indonesian Army and the police. 
On the other hand, the agenda for mining operations is also expanding. The first 
issue is the rising awareness of and commitment to environmental protection and good 
mining practices following the after-mining reclamation obligatory fund. Many mining 
areas are already mature and no longer have sufficient mineral reserves. Thus, some 
companies have closed down their operations due to the rising cost of producing and 
continuing their operation. However, mining companies’ operations affect the lives of 
people in the surrounding area. A sudden closing down of a company could cause social 
and economic problems if the local government does not prepare beforehand to diversify 
people’s source of income and stop their dependency on income from the mining 
industry. Another important agenda is the rising awareness and commitment to manpower 
protection as mining operations have a high level of risk. Last but not least is CSR as a 
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form of compensation for any activities which are damaging to the people around mining 
areas. Furthermore, CSR could also be viewed as an important bridge in building and 
securing a good relationship between companies and local citizens. 
Society has different views and opinions regarding the existence and operations of 
foreign companies. Firstly, as a foreign body, the company is considered as an intruder 
and a threat to national sovereignty. Secondly, such companies are job providers which 
function as a source of income for citizens near the operation fields, factories, 
warehouses, and offices. Thirdly, by conducting CSR projects, the company becomes a 
partner in improving the living environment and funding small businesses as well as local 
economic, social, and cultural projects. Despite the advantages for both local elites and 
society, these operations also have disadvantages as they destroy the ecosystem and 
surrounding environment and also pose a threat to the morals and traditions of the local 
people as foreign workers have their own way of living, which is often against local 
culture. 
The first two points have a different direction of interaction compared to the third 
point. The interaction between companies and society in the first two points is mostly one 
directional. This means that the government and the businesses determine how and in 
what way they interact with local people. Meanwhile, there are two methods of 
interaction in the third point, which means that the society also starts to actively voice its 
concerns and demands to the companies or the government. 
Society strategies in approaching government and business entities involve 
cooperating, direct negotiation in various agendas, and the use of violence or threats 
individually or in a group. The former mining workers’ movement to take over mining 
sites in several regions immediately following the country’s independence is an important 
example of the scale and ability of society to voice its concerns and opinions. Society 
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roles in the mining industry include landowners, workers, and the supporting system 
(providing accommodation and food as well as other services to the workers), as well as 
intruders (in terms of illegal mining). The people, usually individually, are the landlords 
of mining areas and their main concern is receiving sufficient compensation for the land. 
As a group, they act as an environment in which the workers and company live. This 
means that the company should establish and maintain a good relationship with them. 
The main agendas which concern this societal group is environmental protection, 
job opportunities, CSR, and compensation. There are several examples of such problems. 
The most well-known problem is the conflict between Papua citizens and Freeport and  
the government, which have been accused of negligence regarding the citizens’ role and 
existence (Haluk, 2014). Despite large-scale mining and income collected by companies 
as well as tax and royalties paid to the government, Papua society is still less-developed 
in terms of education, access to cheaper daily essentials and fuel, interconnectivity with 
other regions, and the variety of occupation compared to Java or Sumatra. Moreover, the 
region had to deal with a separation movement which threatened the integration between 
different native groups in the region. This condition led to an ineffective lobby, strategy 
and scale of action in dealing with the national government and Freeport. 
National and subnational government relations involve control and sharing 
authority. The Constitution generally positioned the national government authority (rights 
and obligation) to translate national interests, manage and distribute public properties, and 
represent the Indonesian citizens in interacting with international actors. However, the 
1999 Decentralisation Act shared the authority with the subnational government. This 
was anticipated as the previous law was issued according to the contemporary national 
situation, when the priority was consolidating political elites and parties to establish a 
political system that was recognised by and legitimate in front of citizens and the 
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international community. However, the Act did not clearly define a control and 
coordination line between national, provincial, and municipal government despite the fact 
that there was an indirect interaction and control line between the national government 
and municipal authorities. 
The number and quality of mining licenses issued from 1999 to 2014 was 
uncontrollable by the national government. On the other hand, when there was a change 
of regime from the former Regent to the new one, the new elites could also allocate 
licenses for the same working areas to other companies as long as the result was more 
profitable than the existing scenario. An example of dirty practice regarding this matter is 
the mining licenses given to dummy or fictitious companies owned, established, or related 
to the elites or important persons in order to fund their campaigns prior to their 
appointment as the new Regent Thus, the first step taken by the GoI was by taking back 
the authority to issuing mining licenses from the municipal government and giving it to 
the provincial government (Sudaryana, 2016). This action was taken based on an 
amendment of the Act with Government Regulation No. 4 Year 2014. The new system is 
expected to be able to effectively reduce corruption as there is direct control from central 
to provincial government and there is direct communication and interaction from 
municipal to provincial government. 
There are several important agendas which have received attention from national 
and subnational governments. One of them relates to the environmental degradation 
caused by mining activities. The Mining Law highlights companies’ obligation to fund 
reclamation projects in order to rehabilitate the environment once a mining operation 
ends. However, this obligation is in the form of a reclamation fund which is paid to the 
national government, so the management of the reclamation project is conducted by the 
subnational government under supervision of the national authority. Consequently, 
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national and subnational governments need to work hand in hand to conduct and 
accelerate these projects. 
The national government also issued a controversial policy which becomes a 
problem for national company, especially Antam. Despite the fact that Antam’s income 
primarily originated from ore exports to China and Japan, the government issued a ban on 
ore exports in 2014 (interview with Antam, 2016). On one hand, the government made 
the regulation in order to increase the value of the country’s mining production, thus 
enabling the domestic mining industry to develop its activities to gain more experience 
and ability, as well as profit from smelter and half-product and end-product trade in the 
international market. On the other hand, prior to the implementation of the regulation, the 
RRC had bought more ore from Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries to cover 
their stockpile. Subsequently, the price of ore decreased significantly and Antam Tbk – as 
the biggest ore exporter to the RRC market before 2013 – lost its position in the market 
and was replaced by the newly emerging mining industry in Asia. The company faced a 
difficult situation as it needed to find another source of income during 2014 and 2015. 
Fortunately, its gold production margin was enough to cover the ore business. However, 
gold was not its main production and was predicted to stop in 2018 due to the decreasing 
gold reserves in the company’s working areas. It has also been unable to identify more 
sources due to the government’s policy to halt the issuing of licenses for new working 
areas until the conclusion of the ‘clean and clear’ project, which intends to solve the 
overlapping licenses issued by some municipal governments. 
The recent companies’ and government’s concern is the long and difficult 
renegotiation of contracts and licensing arrangements. In addition, the government has no 
award system or other forms of incentives for compliance with financial and other 
obligations to the national and subnational governments. It could be argued that this 
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implies the government does not considers companies as partners in national and 
subnational economic development plans and projects. Moreover, the national 
government, especially the MEMR, is often unresponsive to the companies’ difficult 
situation, especially regarding the slow global economic growth and the significant 
decrease in mining product prices in the international market. For example, there is a time 
where they tried to contact the MEMR by sending a letter and did not get any response 
despite sending a second letter (interview with an FMC, 2016). The national government 
not only provides financial incentives (such as tax allowance), but also demands a bigger 
share from the operations through renegotiation of contracts. 
The foreign companies which operate in Indonesia could be categorised based on 
their capital, technical ability and area coverage into small, medium, and large companies. 
The difference is mainly the transparency and accountability of their operations and their 
commitment to comply with their obligations and the government requirements specified 
in their contracts or mining licenses. However, the international mining market, especially 
in Asia, is changing with the success mining in Vietnam and Cambodia, combined with 
the loose regulations and demand for foreign investors in these countries; they are a 
strong competitor to replace Indonesia’s position as a world leading producer of tin and 
coal. This international challenge is also worsened by the government’s policy to ban 
exports of raw mineral. Indonesia has already lost its position as the biggest ore provider 
for China. Recently, China’s business entities began a new strategy to secure their need 
for ore from Indonesia by entering the country as mining companies so that they could 
obtain the ore they needed without breaking the ore export ban. 
National mining companies have developed rapidly during the past ten years. 
They have been able to enjoy greater independence in managing their activities and also 
to acquire capital from the public, even though they are only allowed to get 35% of public 
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investment and they are still 65% government owned. Although the amount of public 
investment is still very limited, the government demands that these companies establish a 
vertically integrated mining industry, which means they should do all activities from 
surveying, land digging, exploring, transporting, as well as processing the raw minerals to 
become half or fully processed products as these products have greater value in the 
international market. The smelter facilities have been in place since 1990 but with a small 
capacity. Before 1998, they also could enjoy various facilities in their operations such as 
easy processing and licensing to obtain land for mining sites and many administrative 
requirements before starting their mining operations, as well as subsidised fuel and 
electricity. They have had to maintain low production costs without those facilities since 
2000. This process has matured those companies and encouraged creativity to find 
various ways to stay alive and keep going forward in their activities as state-owned 
enterprises which are expected to keep the national dignity to mine and produce minerals 
from their own land. This ability is considered as crucial by the government and society. 
Both the GoI and the public are determined to take part in any business activities within 
their land. Despite the country’s inability to obtain more capital and better technology and 
equipment, as well as to give bigger salaries to the workers in comparison to foreign 
companies, Indonesia should have its own companies in natural resource-related 
industries. 
Another problem in the business and state relations relates to the operations of 
local companies, people, and illegal mining. The government does not have clear 
regulations to manage, watch, and control local companies. Most of them cannot perform 
well or even continue due the lack of capital, skilled manpower and good information and 
access to potential projects. On the other hand, larger companies have attempted and 
committed to comply with the changing government regulations, even though by law they 
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are only obliged to comply with those regulations issued before signing the contract. 
However, smaller companies have sometimes attempted bad corporate governance by 
collaborating with corrupt local elites; they have also failed to comply with their 
obligations and made fake reports to the related ministries. 
When the local authorities took charge of managing mining activities within their 
regions, they established a special office to handle mining-related affairs. The office is 
known as the Dinas Pertambangan Daerah (Local Mining Office). However, the support 
and level of authority given by subnational governments to this office are different based 
on their different management abilities, financial resources, and understanding of the 
mining industry. There is also a problem with regards to their ability to access, collect, as 
well as to process mining-related data from mineral potency and reserves (proven and 
unproven) to mining companies’ existence and operation within their region. The local 
authorities often demonstrate unprofessionalism and favouritism in awarding licenses and 
ignorance of organised business operations by issuing overlapping licenses in the same 
working areas or by lobbying individual elites, leading to corruption and collusion. 
Sometimes, they manipulate the system by establishing dummy companies which are 
related to them. They appear as new and real companies which will receive mining 
licenses before selling these licenses to foreign companies at a higher price. 
Furthermore, sometimes some of these authorities also acted as local kings who 
have the ability to mobilise people to initiate conflict with companies or to protect 
companies (usually as local bodyguards) from societal violence. Such practices are often 
uncontrollable by legitimate authorities as they have public sentiment and could stir up 
favourable public opinion. However, the 1998 national reformation and decentralisation 
project has prevented many of these issues. Moreover, the local elites also attempts to 
collect money from companies through various means such as using local regulations and 
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sending official demand letters to the company’s office regardless of the national interest, 
as well as the financial requirements in the company’s mining contract and licensing. In 
addition, it is able to ask companies to fund various social and local projects directly or  
by using local regulations. 
Companies have to build and maintain good relationships with local authorities, 
especially related to community development projects, licensing and funding various 
local events and compliance with various local regulations. However, some of them act as 
the “mafia” in doing business by initiating conflict with local people, cooperating with 
corrupt elites, and becoming involved in local politics. In order to carry out its operation 
in Kalimantan, the FMCs hire about 70% of local workers to establish a good relationship 
and to avoid resistance and conflict with local people in the surrounding mining sites. 
They only use foreign workers for specific positions. This is also because foreign workers 
are not familiar with local customs and traditions and they tend to continue their way of 
life, for instance drinking and prostitution which are against local norms and beliefs. 
Large-scale FMCs face slight difficulties due to the high service costs charged by 
local and national service companies. In hiring contract workers for example, the local 
company could propose a higher salary for its workers than the national wage standard or 
when small or medium scale mining companies use its services. Large companies, such as 
Adaro, subcontract their exploration and production activities while prioritising matters 
regarding financial and tax affairs relating to the government and customers as well as 
CSR projects themselves. Local workers constitute 99% of branch offices near mining 
sites. This strategy helps to maintain a close relationship and to ensure the company is 
reachable by the society. Acceptance and support from society and local authorities could 
determine a company’s security and ability to continue its operations (A Foreign Mining 
Company, 2016). At the same time, small-scale illegal mining by individuals or a group 
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of people sometimes happen. However, with clearer mining governance, the problem 
could be handled quietly. Thus, mining companies have closer and more intense 
communication regarding technical matters with provincial and regency authorities and 
local people. Their relationship and communication with central government mainly 
exists before starting operations because of the administrative requirements. The central 
government’s main concern during the mining contract period is financial affairs, tax 
compliance and various obligations as stated in the contract. In addition, if mining 
production increases in the international market, the government will propose a contract 
renegotiation. Lastly, various requirements about land reclamation and obligations must 
be fulfilled before the contract ends. 
Company to company relationships are not as intense as the companies’ 
interactions and relationship with the government. They use business associations to act 
as a mediator in dealing with the government regarding common issues and concerns, 
even though their voice often goes unheard and the government is unresponsive (or slow 
in responding) to business opinions and demands. On the other hand, companies deal 
directly with other companies, for instance mining, hydrocarbon or plantation companies, 
regarding matters such as overlapping working areas. They consider business to business 
negotiations and approaches to solve this problem as easier to handle than dealing with 
national and subnational governments. 
Interactions among companies are mainly related to subcontractor operations. 
Some large and medium-size companies do not directly take part in the operations. They 
are more focused on overall business management while actual mining operations are 
conducted by service companies. The main companies handle important matters such as 
administrative, political and financial affairs, as well as CSR and community 
development projects related to the society. This trend encourages domestic service 
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companies to grow in terms of skill, knowledge, and mechanical abilities and also provide 
more jobs to local people. These organisations are predominantly owned and managed by 
domestic private sectors. Moreover, the mining companies are obliged by the Law to use 
national and local products unless they are not available domestically. This policy is 
aimed to develop the national assembly and manufacture industry because raw materials 
and machine parts can be provided and assembled in Indonesia. A company only needs to 
import technological equipment which is not produced in Indonesia. 
The society and companies’ interactions are mainly conducted through local 
governments. Nonetheless, the increasing number of educated people has also increased 
the number and expanded the scope of collective actions. There are various types and 
levels of social association which interact with and voice their interests and needs to the 
government. An example of an active association is related to environmental protection 
and such associations mainly focus on raising awareness among companies and the 
government regarding the importance of minimising the damage caused by mining 
activities; examples include infertile land, which makes farming more difficult, and health 
problems suffered by people surrounding mining areas. 
Another example is traditional society associations, especially in West Papua 
where they have been active for several years to ask Freeport and the national government 
to recognise their existence as the landlords of Freeport’s mining areas (Haluk, 2014). A 
representative from the association claimed that, despite active operations in the region 
for more than fifty years, both the company and the GoI had not attempted to involve 
local people in the management and supervision of the operations and has not distributed 
the income collected evenly. Even though the region is well known for having large 
amounts of mineral deposits, the society and the region itself have not developed well. 
The society has lower education levels compared with Java or Sumatra, and public goods 
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such as food and fuel are limited and very expensive. Moreover, security problems caused 
by conflict between the Army and the pro-separation movement or conflict between 
different kin are commonplace. This is mainly due to the unbalanced development 
programme conducted in different regions in Indonesia. 
On the other hand, local people could also take part as small-scale mining in 
various areas, including within working areas, under the legal licensing and contract. 
Such mining activities are also regulated by the 2009 Mining Law (Darmono, 2009; 
Salim HS, 2013). Individuals or groups of miners should get mining licenses (usually 
from local authorities) before starting these activities (Prayitno, 2017). However, they do 
not operate based on mining security standards or good mining operations practice. There 
have already been many cases of neglected mining holes, usually from illegal mining 
practices, in various mining sites which are often unknown by the authorities. One 
example of collaboration between national companies and the government to deal with 
this problem is Ombilin, West Sumatra. PTBA was appointed as a buyer for small-scale 
coal mining surrounding its working area (interview with Governor of West Sumatra, 
2017). This arrangement not only encouraged the company to legalise its operations with 
the local government, but also provided legal trade partners. Unfortunately, it also caused 
problems for PTBA as the company had an oversupply while the market price for coal 
was decreasing. 
Another society role in the mining industry is as landowners of mining sites. 
Companies need to negotiate to buy the land on an individual basis. The mining contract 
or license they have already signed with or received from the MEMR is only a license to 
mine; realisation of their plans and actually starting their operations is a different matter 
entirely. They should deal with subnational governments from provincial to local 
governments and village chiefs to the actual landowners in order to obtain land 
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certificates. There is no standard price to buy the land so the price is fully dependent upon 
the local authorities and landowners (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016). This condition 
is a burden, especially for small and medium-size foreign companies which are taking the 
first steps of their mining operations in Indonesia. Moreover, illegal mining is often 
related to illegal trade, which causes financial losses for the state. 
In conclusion, there is an urgent need to synergise the opinions, understandings, 
and attitudes of national and subnational governments as well as the landowners within 
listed mining working areas in order to simplify and make it easier for foreign investors to 
enter the industry. Even though the main concern for both the government and society is 
to profit financially from such companies, they should also consider the economic 
interests and calculations of these businesses. Thus, all parties could attract each other to 
build a stronger and longer relationship in realising national development projects, plans, 
and goals. 
5.4. Process and Mechanism of Change 
 
The development process of business practice is from FMC domination to NMC 
and private domestic company involvement in the mining sector. Following 
independence, some mining concessions were granted to foreign mining companies and 
mining operations which were on hold until the government determined their status under 
the newly independent government regime. Those concessions were issued by the former 
colonial government and, due to public opinion, they were considered as a threat to 
national sovereignty. The public asked the GoI to nationalise the companies use local 
companies to take charge of their operations. Thus, the first step regarding the mining 
industry taken by the GoI was nationalising the mining sector and establishing three 
national mining bodies to handle mining operations. These three bodies become three 
national mining companies in the 1970s. 
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The institutional development process in the interactions between governmental 
bodies is mainly the change from an authority monopoly to a shared authority without 
control, and finally to an authority sharing system with control. This is expected to 
produce which can create harmonious and efficient (not overlapping) policies and actions 
between the agencies. In fact, the interaction between the different levels of government 
could also be viewed as a mentor-mentee relationship in which the national government 
has responsibility to educate and train the subnational government to govern and deal 
with many issues. The concern in this relationship is the limited transparency and 
accountability of the latter. Thus, intense supervision and evaluation as well as training is 
necessary. 
The contractual system has been changed to issuing licenses in an attempt to put 
the government above the companies and symbolise the government as the owner of the 
land. Moreover, companies are now subject to various national and regional regulations 
before and during their permitted or contract period. The central government does not 
have a unify regulation regarding company organisation and operation. Thus, companies 
are sometimes subject to similar tax components from different ministries and are obliged 
to pay both bills. The government has also issued the clean and clear policy, which is an 
attempt to list and organise working areas by providing a clean and clear certificate. 
Getting this certificate means that the working area is free from overlapping licensing and 
use from other business entities and operations. 
There are three institutional development processes which happen side by side in 
the government and business relationship. The first process is the change from simple 
requirements with more freedom in operating to more complicated requirements and 
regulations with less operational freedom in operating. In the earlier era, mining 
companies only needed to deal with the MEMR and the Ministry of Finance during their 
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contract period. The MEMR was a leading authority in all matters regarding contract 
negotiations or license issuance as well as technical matters and held the authority to 
control companies’ activities. It also assessed their operation plans and projects as well as 
production, import, and export. Companies had obligation to share their operation data 
and submit annual reviews to the MEMR. The Ministry could then evaluate their business 
performance and compliance with their obligations to various law and government 
regulations. The Ministry of Finance was responsible for handling all taxation and any 
financial matters regarding payment for their financial obligations to the national 
government. It could then calculate and share the money to subnational governments as 
stated in the Decentralisation Law. 
However, several ministries have begun to take part in managing their activities 
since 2000, such as the Ministry of Environment and Forestry in 2008. This involvement 
focused on the administrative and financial requirements needed before getting a license 
to mine protected forests. The process is complicated, takes a long time and has with  
strict clauses. Moreover, getting a license to use a protected area is expensive. Another 
ministry closely related to mining companies’ activities is the Ministry of Transportation. 
It has issued shipping and loading service fee without actually providing this service. The 
actual meaning of the regulation is to charge every ship that uses waters under  
Indonesia’s jurisdiction. Thus, the name and actual meaning of the regulation are very 
different. However, in order to secure their operations, the companies, especially large 
ones, have chosen to comply with the regulation and paid the taxation. These decisions 
are also made to avoid any delays in distribution, which could lead to credibility issues as 
they will be unable to meet the deadlines agreed with buyers and customers. This could 
ultimately lead to profit losses. 
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The second type of development is the change from a contractual system to a 
mining licensing system (only the right to mine). According to mining the CoW and the 
CCoW, the companies have several obligations, mostly related to tax and royalty, such as 
obeying national and subnational regulations related to their operations on Indonesia soil. 
Nevertheless, the national regulations have changed on a regular basis since the beginning 
of the Reformation Era in 1998. Furthermore, the provincial and municipal government 
have also established some local regulations which are often not inline or may even 
contravene national law. Unfortunately, the companies are not in a position to ignore 
them as they have to protect and maintain their assets and operations to avoid significant 
losses due to their inability to fulfil commitments with international buyers. 
An important development in the government and companies’ approach in their 
relationship relates to their obligation towards society in their surrounding area. In the 
earlier era, the government’s concern regarding companies’ activities was entirely related 
to their financial obligation (tax and royalties) to the state. However, due to the growing 
international concern about more diverse issue such as environmental and social 
protection within economic activities, both actors have realised the importance of 
establishing and maintaining a close relationship with society. CSR programmes are 
directed towards achieving these goals. On one hand, both the national and subnational 
government have the advantage of developing social and economic conditions around 
mining area. On the other hand, the companies also have advantages such as securing 
their asset and operations from local resistance to operations in the area and preventing 
the possibility of violence and boycotts of public space, which could obstruct their 
activities and workers. The GoI made aregulation that limits the use of foreign workers 
and imports of materials by issuing the obligation to use local people and local content 
and production unless there is a specific need for skilled workers or rare materials which 
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are domestically unavailable. By doing so, the entrance of foreign companies in the area 
is expected to open more job opportunities for local people, both as workers and as 
providers of facilities for the workers and the companies’ activities. However, there is  
still problem could emerge when the company discriminate between local and foreign 
workers (Erman, 2005). There are various conflicts between local citizen and mining 
companies due to various reasons: mainly disagreement over price of the land/mines, the 
destruction of environment surrounding mines, and disrespecting toward traditional 
society sacred land, and ignoring people’s voice and participation, usually by giving only 
brief information regarding negative impacts that could emerge from mining operations in 
their land (see for example Sangaji, 2002; Maimunah, 2012; and Haluk, 2014). In 
addition, the government could also be in conflict with mining companies (see for 
example Jati, 2018). 
The third development process is the change from the central government’s sole 
authority in managing the mining industry and interacting with business entities to a 
shared system of responsibility between the national, provincial, and municipal 
governments. The decision of PTBA to stop its operations in Ombilin, West Sumatra, 
without many issues is one of the success stories of the local government’s attempt to 
shift local dependency on the mining industry to more diverse jobs and sources of 
income. The local government developed the tourism sector to replace mining; however, 
the process took ten years. This demonstrates that it was not an easy job and it should be 
done step by step to not cause any social and economic problems to the people, the 
government, or the company itself. Moreover, it needs the local government’s 
commitment and perseverance to lead the process. Thus, the national government’s 
supervision and support is important to help subnational governments through this 
process as they have different capabilities. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
 
Indonesia’s mining institutions have experienced several changes in agenda, 
influential actors, and the nature of the bargaining relationship among the related parties. 
However, the constant factors in the rules of the game are the owner of land, the state, and 
the main dominant affairs the government is concerned with: financial-related affairs or 
the money collected or expected from mining operations. According to the Western 
perspective, the mining contract is sacred, unchanging, and respected. However, in 
Indonesia, such an agreement in the contract and the reality could be very different as the 
contract is only a license. There is no guarantee from the government that companies will 
actually conduct their operations based on their economic calculations and business plans. 
There are too many social and political factors that should be dealt with both before 
operations start and once they have started. Furthermore, the dynamic of the international 
market could also affect government expectations and lead to a renegotiation of the 
contract, which often does not take the company’s interests into account. The 
renegotiation often ends in a stalemate because the government does not want to lower its 
expectations. On the other hand, the government only does so in order to obtain larger 
profits for its public obligations. This dilemmatic relationship could be overcome by 
strategic communication and consultation with the central authorities. Close and intense 
communication and consultation with central government, especially the MEMR, is 
needed in order to smoothen the negotiation process with landlords and provincial and 
local governments. 
Historical institutionalism is very useful in capturing the government and business 
relationship within the mining institution as a whole. We can analyse actors’ perceptions, 
preferences, and attitudes not as a whole but as dynamics, therefore avoiding the trap of 
believing that the actors will always act rationally. We could also capture the uneven 
183  
ability to act and react as well as uneven information the actors have and have access to. 
Those differences lead to a dynamic relationship as they have more access and ability to 
achieve their goals and establish a better plan. Furthermore, the actors not only act by 
themselves, but also manage a joint operation with other actors in achieving their goals. 
Thus, their strategy and pattern of interaction is highly dynamic as they are more exposed 
to bigger challenges and face different problems. However, the concept of the resource 
curse and a bargaining political relationship, as well as Luong and Wienthal’s ownership 
structure and Sarbu’s Ownership and Control frameworks, only focus partially on the 
government perspective and its development process; they neglect the companies as other 
actors in the national industry as well as the interaction between government and business 
entities in an attempt to examine society’s position in the relationship. On the other hand, 
economy approach on state and business relations are emphasising too much on business 
factors such as taxation, capital, management, and technology as economic factor. 
The development of the mining industry’s institution, as analysed from the state 
and business relations perspective, has three stages. The first stage was the general 
government’s policy towards mining companies where the rules of the game in the 
interactions were regulated by the contract signed by both parties. The central 
government, especially the MEMR, under the President’s direction, was the dominant 
authority in managing the mining industry. The government’s main concern during this 
period was to collect income from companies’ tax and royalties, provide jobs to the local 
citizens, and encourage domestic involvement in the mining industry, especially as 
service providers in the operations of FMCs. 
The second stage is the establishment of integrated but specialised national mining 
companies (NMCs). The government nationalised Dutch-based mining companies which 
produced coal, tin, and other strategic minerals, placing them under the management of 
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three main NMCs (PTBA, PT Timah, and Antam). The GoI owned 100% of those 
companies before 1985. As the international market of their products increased, the GoI 
decided to sell 35% of its shares so the companies could obtain more capital from the 
public, expand their operations, and increase their product output. The government also 
encouraged them to establish a vertically integrated operation, meaning they were 
expected to conduct exploration as well as processing the minerals domestically before 
exporting them. During this stage, FMCs were still enjoying many freedoms in their 
operations. However, a new approach in the managing mining industry was approaching 
and was marked by a series of contract renegotiation proposals sent by the government as 
the 2009 Mining Law came into effect. 
The third stage is a more complicated agenda in government and mining 
companies’ interactions. The Law of Decentralisation Year 1999 marked the beginning of 
the subnational government’s involvement in dealing with business. Furthermore, various 
ministries also issued several regulations which affected mining operations, for example 
the prohibition against mining in protected forest areas which was regulated by the 
Ministry of Forestry and Environment. The obligation to pay for transporting mining 
products through land and sea, which was managed by the Ministry of Transportation, is 
another example of the involvement of ministries other than the MEMR in managing 
companies’ related activities. Another example is the regulation of mining product 
exports issued by the Ministry of Trade. In the earlier era (before 1999), the main 
regulators were the Ministry of Energy and Mining, which managed mining companies’ 
operations, and the Ministry of Finance, which managing companies’ financial 
obligations to the state. Other agendas also emerged such as manpower protection as part 
of companies’ obligation besides hiring local citizens in the operations, as well as the 
companies’ obligations in terms of reclamation after-mine projects as part of 
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environmental protection in mining areas; this is because mines are generally known to 
cause environmental degradation as land is dug in order to explore and extract minerals. 
By looking at the government’s learning process in managing the mining industry, 
the openness of mining institutions could also be analysed. An important stage in the 
process is sharing authority vertically from central government to subnational 
government, as well as horizontally by involving more governmental bodies in managing 
companies’ activities. Thus, a better, more accountable and transparent mining 
management system is to be expected as the involvement of more actors also indicates 
more information sharing between agencies and public knowledge regarding the way in 
which the government practices its authority. However, it also implies there has been no 
change in the ownership structure of the Indonesia mining industry as previously implied 
by Luong and Wienthal (2010) The land and water under Indonesia jurisdiction is owned 
by the citizens and managed by the government. There is no transfer of ownership as the 
companies are considered as government contractors which require permission to operate 
in the region. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE HYDROCARBON AND MINING INDUSTRIES 
IN INDONESIA 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The mining and hydrocarbon industries were initially regulated by the Indische 
Mijnwet released by the Dutch Colonial Government in 1899 (Darmono, 2009). During 
this initial stage, the colonial government encouraged the private sector to explore the 
potency of developing oil and gas as well as other mining industries in the Dutch East 
Indies (Indonesia). The government invested in the project, while the private sector 
conducted the actual surveys and explorations in the field. Their relationship was bound 
by a contract signed by both parties. Afterwards, international mining societies were 
attracted to take part in exploring potential oil and mining areas in Indonesia, which 
encouraged the government to release an amendment of the Mijnwet. This was known as 
5A contract, which generally aimed to protect the Dutch based private sector’s interests in 
the region while preventing the foreign companies from entering the industry. During this 
period of time, the Indonesian people and elites were forced to be mere spectators without 
the authority to become involved either as the actual owners of the land or as the 
beneficiaries from the operation. 
This historical background heavily influenced the political and economic will as 
well as the trajectory of the choices taken by both the government and society in 
managing both industries after the country’s independence in 1945. The enforced 
nationalisation of the mining areas and oilfields highlighted the importance of having new 
regulations and management strategies to maximise profits from mining operations in the 
country (Darmono, 2009). Initially, the society and some elites were determined to take 
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over and monopolise the sector by only allowing Indonesian people or companies to 
begin operations. However, the reality forced the GoI to choose an alternative strategy in 
order to obtain funding for national development projects. 
The reality is that no Indonesian people or companies were capable of fully taking 
over the operation. They did not have the necessary capital, managerial knowledge, and 
technical capabilities to actually manage the industry independently. These circumstances 
formed the general background behind the release of Law No. 37 Year 1960, which 
regulated both the hydrocarbon and mining industries as one sector, and Law No. 1 Year 
1967, which regulated private and foreign investment (Darmono, 2009). 
There are two separate paths taken by governmental agencies in governing the two 
sectors of the extractive industries. This difference emerges as the government has 
different perceptions, expectations, and approaches in the hydrocarbon and mining 
industries. The hydrocarbon industry has historically been a very important sector for the 
Indonesian economy. Oil and gas revenue was the biggest source of government income 
to finance national development projects before taxation took over this role and position 
(Henderi, 2017; Sudaryana, 2016; Tampubolon, 2015). On the other hand, the mining 
industry was not considered as important until the late 1980s when coal prices started 
rising (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016). Beforehand, mining activities in Indonesia 
were conducted mainly by three state-owned mining companies (Antam, PTBA, and PT 
Timah) which took over the nationalised foreign companies; the society that conducted 
small-scale gold mining; and an FMC (Freeport) which operated in the largest mining 
area in West Papua. Those three business actors had been active since the beginning of 
the country’s mining industry (Sudaryana, 2016). Initially, the government loosely 
managed the mining operations without much expectation or control. However, since 
1990, the mining industry has become popular and attracted more domestic and foreign 
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investment. The business has developed rapidly and the government has consequently 
taken mining governance more seriously (Warnika, 2017). 
Chart 6.1. A Comparison of Government Revenue from the Hydrocarbon and 
Mining Industries 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2017 
 
The governmental agencies involved in managing the industry and interacting 
with the companies are not a single entity (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016). 
Furthermore, they do not act unitarily or harmoniously with one another (Sudaryana, 
2016 and Tampubolon, 2015). It is important to note that each agency brings its own 
agendas, priorities, and interests in its interactions with other agencies as well as with the 
business entities (Sidemen, 2015). The different agencies also have different authorities, 
information, and access to information, as well as capabilities in conducting their tasks 
and achieving their goals. They also have limitations and needs to collaborate with other 
agencies in order to have a bigger impact. On the other hand, the business entities also 
consist of different types of companies and business associations: fully and partially state- 
owned companies, domestic private companies, and foreign companies (Sidemen, 2015). 
There are also main companies, which focus on overall and managerial operations, and 
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service companies, which provide services in conducting actual mining operations in the 
field. All types of companies give different levels of pressure and have a different nature 
as well as frequency and intensity of interaction with the government. Based on this basic 
understanding of the need to acknowledge the diversity of actors involved in the 
interaction and shaping the industries’ institution, I analyse the similarities and 
differences of the actors and rules of the game between the hydrocarbon and mining 
industries. 
6.2. The Rule Element 
 
The government established a state-owned company to handle oil and gas mining 
operation as well as to act as the government’s representative in all related matters from 
conducting negotiations, signing contracts, and supervising operations during the period 
of contract (Sidemen, 2015; Tampubolon, 2015; Warnika, 2017). Pertamina, the national 
oil company, took the lead in handling all technical and administrative matters regarding 
both business operations of the contractors and its own operations. At the initial phase, 
during 1970 to 1976, Pertamina was also given authority to collect rent from the 
companies (Bartlett III et al., 1972). This authority was given as the Director of 
Pertamina, Ibnu Sutowo, initiated a new form contract which was a mixed form of 
concessionary contracts under the 1899 Mijnwet and the CoW under Law No. 44 Year 
1960. Thus, Pertamina had two roles as an oil and gas company and as supervisor of 
foreign oil companies (FOCs). 
The contract was known as a PSC, which was adjusted several times from the first 
contract in 1967 to 1998 (Machmud, 2000). The main guideline of the contract is that the 
contractors (the companies) have obligation to share a certain percent of their oil and gas 
production to fulfil domestic need. All financial obligations (taxes, royalties, and 
bonuses) are determined in the contract and paid directly to the government; the 
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companies are supposed to be free from other financial charges which are not stated in the 
contract. Moreover, even though the companies should bear all the risks of the mining 
operations, they could claim cost recovery once the commercial production has finished. 
This contract has established the main rules of the game by specifying the roles, rights, 
and obligations of both the government and companies. There is no change in the form of 
the contract as of the end of the research in July 2017. However, several institutional 
elements of rule and practice do change. 
During Pertamina’s regime as the lead actor in managing the industry, they 
established a Badan Pembinaan dan Pengusahaan Kontraktor Asing (BPPKA/ the 
Managerial Body of Foreign Contractor) in 1980 (Sihotang, 2015). The agency operated 
under Pertamina and closely interacted in handling day to day management of the 
contractors’ affairs related to their operation. Meanwhile, Pertamina also conducted its 
own mining activities in its own oilfields as an oil company. Consequently, Pertamina 
was also an actor and therefore the organisation needed to supervise itself (Sihotang, 
2015; Warnika 2017). This situation became a concern for foreign companies which 
considered it as unfair and awkward (IPA, 2016). 
Moreover, the government regulates the industry from upstream to downstream 
activity as oil is the main energy source for in housing and industry. During the earlier 
era, Pertamina was authorised to represent the government in all activities so the company 
monopolised all distribution activities towards all regions nationwide (Tampubolon, 
2015). No foreign companies were allowed to take part in this activity. On the other hand, 
the majority of oil production was dominated by foreign companies, with Pertamina 
contributing just 10% of total oil production in the 1990s and early 2000s (Tampubolon, 
2015). This condition became a serious concern among elites and the public as they 
expected that, as a representative of the resource owners, Pertamina would have a bigger 
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contribution equal to its age in the industry. Alongside the suspicions about Pertamina’s 
mismanagement of state capital, this triggered the issuance of the new Oil and Gas Law 
Year 2001 which restructured Pertamina as a simple hydrocarbon company with mining 
operations as the core activity (Warnika, 2017). The authority to manage and govern the 
industry was returned to the MEMR, which later on established BP Migas to take over 
Pertamina’s (BPPKA) task in managing the contractors’ operations (Sihotang, 2015). 
This agency has direct responsibility to the President. From 2001 to 2013, a minimal 
number of new exploration contracts were signed by BP Migas and FOCs and therefore, 
in contrast with the contract signed by Pertamina and FOCs, there has been no change in 
the form of contract signed between both actors. 
BP Migas has been replaced by a temporary body named SKK Migas which is 
controlled by the MEMR. Unfortunately, the government has not released a new Law to 
legalise this agency. Thus, SKK Migas has remained a temporary body and does not have 
a definite authority to decide any important issues (Sihotang, 2015). Instead, it simply 
represents the government (the MEMR) in negotiating contracts and conducting any day 
to day administrative affairs related to the various regulations released by different 
ministries. Its main function is delivering new government regulations and policies to the 
companies and discussing the business interests with the government in order to find the 
most beneficial strategies to accommodate government interests based on the actual 
business scenario at the time of releasing new policies (SKK Migas, 2013; SKK Migas, 
2014; SKK Migas, 2015; SKK Migas, 2016). However the organisation’s 
disadvantageous position in front of national law is that the body serves an important role 
in bridging government and business interests in their interaction in order to maximise 
profit for both actors from the contract. It is an important intermediary actor in waiving 
bureaucracy limited actions in dealing with dynamic hydrocarbon business and market 
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situations and ensuring the acceptance and adjustment needed in following recent 
policies, which are more complicated than previous regulations (IPA, 2016). 
The MEMR took over the leading position in the hydrocarbon industry from 
Pertamina since 2001. However, the agency is predominantly a side actor which has no 
understanding or abilities to directly manage the hydrocarbon industry. As the learning 
process progress, the Ministry is able to take a more active role as the regulator. However, 
its bureaucratic nature limits their willingness and ability to fully understand and directly 
and frequently interact with the businesses. One of its handicaps is the limited budget in 
conducting an active supervision role regarding actual mining operations and various 
adjustments needed by the business entities to accommodate their own needs and 
government demands (Sihotang, 2015). Moreover, the various educational backgrounds 
and lack of specialisation among the Ministry’s staff has also limited its ability to fully 
understand the actual operations, challenges, and situations in the field. This means it is 
difficult to make breakthroughs in the management strategies and style in order to attract 
more reliable and bigger investors, as well as in giving more straightforward and 
appropriate incentives for new survey and exploration projects to overcome the mature 
oilfields and expensive operational costs. The lack of both projects in the last 20 years has 
caused Indonesia’s oil production to fall significantly and the domestic oil need could not 
be fulfilled without exporting oil from outside the country (SKK Migas, 2016). The 
MEMR and SKK Migas have attempted to ease the hydrocarbon regulations in Indonesia, 
especially regarding the bureaucratic requirements to invest in the country. Since 2015, 
the related ministries agreed to cut the bureaucratic line into a single system (known as 
central one door policy) with BKPM (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal/ Investment 
Coordinating Board) as the first door for foreign investment (BKPM Pers Release, 2016). 
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On the other hand, the MEMR has been responsible for mining industry 
governance since the very beginning. It is responsible for negotiating, signing contract 
(issuing mining licenses), and supervising the mining operations. It handles both technical 
and administrative tasks of governing the mining companies’ operations. However, it also 
has to face similar challenges regarding the limited capital and resources needed to play a 
more active role in supervising all mining working areas (Sudaryana, 2016). 
The mining rules of the game involved a CoW between the MEMR and the 
companies as well as national laws and policies related to the industry. Law No. 37 Year 
1960 guided the industry until 2009. The MEMR was a leading actor throughout this 
period. The mining contract gave more freedom towards the companies in their  
operations in the mining areas; however, they had to adjust to changes in government 
regulations, including those regarding financial obligations. The mining contract only 
determined that the government and companies had a 60:40 share arrangement and there 
was no domestic obligation to provide the domestic demand for certain mining products 
(A Foreign Mining Company, 2016). This was mainly influenced by the fact that the 
mining industry covers a large variety of mining products. 
Mining institutions have been heavily influenced by the release of the 
Decentralisation Law Year 1999, which placed the local governments as governmental 
agencies with the authority to sign mining contracts (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016; 
Antam, 2016; Sudaryana, 2016). Initially, such authority was monopolised by the 
MEMR. This arrangement became a problem afterwards as many local elites misused this 
authority for their personal benefit (Sudaryana, 2016). An important development in the 
mining governance is the transition from contractual-based system to a license-based 
system. The MEMR leads all negotiations, agreements, and adjustments needed in 
transferring all mining contracts to mining licenses (Sudaryana, 2016). State-owned, 
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private, and FMCs are subject to this policy. This type of arrangement means that the 
mining companies are given a license to do mining operations and that the government 
has the upper hand, whereas the contractual system recognises the government and 
companies as actors with an equal position before law. 
An important step in the reformation era was the establishment of the KPK 
(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/ Commission for Eradicating Corruption). This agency’s 
existence and progressive move has introduced various bureaucratic reforms in several 
ministries. The government’s accountability and transparency in hydrocarbon governance 
has also positively increased as impersonal relations and clearer procedures and protocols 
have been enforced to replace the more personal-based relations and negotiations between 
the government and companies (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016; A Foreign Oil 
Company, 2016; IPA, 2016; Prayitno, 2017). 
The subnational government has been another leading actor in the mining 
institution since 1999 (Warnika, 2017). These bodies consist of provincial and local 
governments which have been given authority to establish their own regional bureaucratic 
agencies and systems (Prayitno, 2017). They are supervised and consulted by the Ministry 
of Domestic Affairs and report directly to the President. However, before 1999, they did 
not have any authority nor information and managerial ability to handle political, 
economic, and social matters in their respective regions (Prayitno, 2017). All important 
decisions and policies were dictated by the President and national government, meaning 
that the subnational elites had no other choice than to follow the lead and decisions even 
though they were not suitable for handling most regional affairs. The regional 
development was therefore asymmetrical, which led to various problems and jealousy, 
especially in the resource-rich regions. Java and Sumatra, the two most advanced regions 
in the country, had hydrocarbon and mining areas which had been exhaustively explored 
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and exploited. On the other hand, the eastern regions had different experiences; some 
areas in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua had partially good regional economic growth, 
particularly in the main oil, gas, and mining working areas, while other areas were still 
poorly developed. Meanwhile, Maluku, Timor Timur, and Nusa Tenggara experienced 
much slower economic growth. The variety of regional conditions has created differences 
in governance capacity and style in managing their resources, not to mention their 
interactions with business entities (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016; Hijrah, 2017; 
Sudaryana, 2016). 
The government established three state-owned mining companies (PTBA, PT 
Timah, and Antam) which handled different mining products (Darmono, 2009). They ran 
the business after the government succeeded in taking over the working areas from 
foreign companies in the 1960s. However, they did not have the same governance 
authority and burden as Pertamina. Instead, they focus on running and developing the 
companies without the public service obligation as a burden as the mining products are 
mainly exported. They mainly export raw products instead of half or fully produced 
products, which have significantly higher economic value in the international market. 
Unfortunately, mining can also be done illegally by an individual or a group. Such 
activities usually happen in known mining working areas (contracted by mining 
companies) and are conducted without any safety measurements (Prayitno, 2017; 
Sudaryana, 2016). The area is legally contracted by the company which holds the rights to 
mining operations; thus, such activities are a violation of the contract and the company’s 
property rights. Illegal mining also creates economic problems nationally as it leads to a 
surplus in the domestic market and cheaper prices for certain mining products, which also 
means big losses for the producers. Illegal trade, especially illegal export of products, 
causes major losses in terms of national and regional revenue (Henderi, 2017; Hijrah, 
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2017). In order to handle these matters, the subnational government cooperates with law 
enforcement agencies – KPK, Army, and Police – to prevent illegal mining and at the 
same time protect both mining companies’ property rights and the Indonesian citizens 
involved in such activities (Prayitno, 2017). 
Pertamina and the NMCs are owned by the government. However, they have 
different tasks and receive different treatment from the government. Pertamina has a 
public service obligation, which means it has to meet domestic demand for hydrocarbon 
products and therefore the company’s products are mainly delivered for domestic 
purposes (Antam, 2016; Tampubolon, 2015). On the other hand, the NMCs are essentially 
treated in the same way as foreign companies, except they are given various limitations in 
conducting their business (Antam, 2016). They are 70% government owned, and are only 
able to collect 30% of their capital from public and foreign investment. They are also 
allowed to export most their products so the trading mainly happens in the Asian market 
and many of their trading partners are also Asian-based companies, especially China. 
In addition, through Pertamina, the government monopolised all distribution of 
fuel products before 2001. After 2001, the government established BPH Migas (Badan 
Pelaksana Hilir Minyak dan Gas Bumi/ Implementing Body for Downstream Business of 
Oil and Gas) as the government agency which handles the distribution of hydrocarbon 
products, mainly fuel (Sidemen, 2015; Warnika, 2017). However, there is no such agency 
for mining products. All companies are allowed to handle the distribution and trading on 
their own (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016; Antam, 2016). Some FOCs – Petronas and 
Shell – have been able to obtain permission to distribute and sell fuel domestically only in 
the past five years. Thus, there are separate protocols for upstream and downstream 
business operations in the hydrocarbon industry (Tampubolon, 2015; Warnika, 2017). On 
the other hand, mining companies have the freedom to trade and sell all mining products 
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both domestically and abroad. There were no restrictions until the government banned the 
export of raw minerals and instructed that they must be processed to half or fully 
processed products before being sold abroad (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016; Antam, 
2016). Both domestic and foreign mining companies are subject to this restriction. 
In conclusion, the element of rule in resource governance of hydrocarbon and 
mining industries has similarities and differences. They are handled differently mainly 
because of the different nature of the business and domestic needs with regards to 
hydrocarbon and mining products. First and foremost is that the general agreement about 
the ownership of hydrocarbon and mineral resources is constant and agreed by both 
actors. The government represents Indonesian citizens as the owners and direct claimants 
of the land and everything beneath and above it. Meanwhile, as contractors companies are 
given authority by the government to conduct business operations within certain working 
areas and within a certain period of time as stated in the contract. This means that the 
government has the right to collect tax, royalties, and any payments generated from such 
operations within its territory on behalf of the people (Henderi, 2017; Warnika, 2017). At 
the same time, companies get rights to collect any profit and benefit from their operations 
as long as the rules issued by the government are followed. Nevertheless, the government 
initially used one regulation as a guideline to govern both industries. Both industries are 
also handled by the MEMR as the leading actor and representative of the government 
even though the Ministry’s main role is different. The MEMR handles all tasks as 
regulator, supervisor, and administrator in the mining industry (Sudaryana, 2016). On the 
other hand, for the hydrocarbon industry the MEMR mostly acts as a regulator and 
partially (in collaboration with SKK Migas) as an initial negotiator, supervisor, and 
administrator (Sidemen, 2015; Sihotang, 2015). 
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As the understanding about the operational and economic value of both sectors 
has developed, the governance strategies for both sectors as well as the nature of 
relationship between governmental and business actors have developed in different 
trajectories. The regulations, protocols and guidelines of hydrocarbon and mining 
industries governance are separated and even government revenue from both sectors is 
calculated separately. The PSC is the main contractual model employed in the 
hydrocarbon industry, while the mining license the most recent model in the mining 
sector. 
The GoI is exposed to studies and analysis from various foreign and international 
organisations (Tampubolon, 2015; Sidemen, 2015; Warnika, 2017). This openness has led 
to some foreign recommendations regarding the government’s attempts to establish better 
regulations and governance to manage and attract more investment in both industries. The 
GoI adopted some of the recommendations that could be absorbed into Indonesia’s 
bureaucratic culture. However, the process takes time and energy as the reformation also 
takes place in all sectors at the same time but with different pace. Thus, harmonisation of 
policy among governmental agencies is still an unsolved task as of 2017 (Sihotang,  
2015). 
6.3. The Procedure Element 
 
The ministries involved in managing both industries are essentially the same (A 
Foreign Mining Company, 2015; A Foreign Oil Company, 2016; Sidemen, 2015; 
Sihotang, 2015; Sudaryana, 2016). The MEMR takes the lead from the negotiation to 
contract signing, as well as managing and supervising the mining operations. Meanwhile, 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is responsible for collecting taxes, royalties and other 
financial obligations subjected to business entities by the contracts or licenses and 
national law. On the other hand, the Ministry of Transportation regulates the use of land, 
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water, or air transportation across Indonesia’s territories and the Ministry of Forestry and 
Environment manages the mining in forest areas, as well as assessing the impact of 
mining operations in and surrounding working areas. Meanwhile, the management of 
workers and human resources in the industries is handled by the Ministry of Manpower. 
Another important body is the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, established in 2003 
to manage the companies in terms of organisation and management. NOCs and NMCs are 
also managed by this Ministry so they have additional rules to follow. This Ministry’s 
main focus is to oversee the management and administrative part of running the state- 
owned enterprises. 
However, these ministries act individually and often issue inharmonious policies, 
especially if the business activities involve certain payments that could be collected 
according to their respective authorities (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016; A Foreign 
Oil Company, 2016). For example, shipping which uses rivers to transport mining 
products, mining equipment, as well as exporting machines and materials from abroad 
needs government permission involving administrative requirements and certain service 
charges. The same protocols are also needed for mining in protected forest areas and 
onshore locations involving one or more regional authorities. 
Such protocols often prolonged the main activities of the companies, which are 
surveying, exploration, mining and exploitation, refining, and producing the end mining 
products, such as fuel, oil and gas, coal, tin, and other mining products. This bureaucratic 
approach towards business is necessary for the government not only to make sure that all 
business operations are appropriate and not violating the national regulations, but also to 
protect the national and public interest and security from unsafe and unsecure business 
practices (Warnika, 2017). Understanding and obeying such requirements is also 
necessary for by the companies to determine their strategies, calculate the production 
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costs and assess the profitability of the operations (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016). 
Without such rules of the game, both the government and the companies would be unable 
to maximise their gains from their ownership and contractual rights over the working 
areas as there are no exact protocols as a standard to determine, decide, and calculate their 
actions towards other actors and establish as well as develop their relationship. 
Another issue regarding government action is control and supervision. The 
structural characteristic of governmental agencies means that each ministry has its own 
role and works within a system and directs the government in achieving a set of goals. 
However, another nature of the structural relations between different agencies involves 
cooperation and coordination as well as competition and overlapping action. Governing 
the hydrocarbon and mining industries involves a number of agencies. This linkage of 
actors could lead to overlaps in translating and executing their authority, as well as 
issuing regulations and policies (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016). In the hydrocarbon 
industry, for instance, the Ministry of Transportation has the authority to regulate any use 
of water, air, or land transportation. Meanwhile, the transportation of mining equipment 
and products across Indonesian boundaries, in or out of the country, is also within the 
authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consequently, the regulation of similar 
business activities comes from multiple ministries. The related ministries for mining 
operations are expected to communicate in issuing relevant policies which concern those 
activities. The President has established several Coordinating Ministries to facilitate such 
forums. Both industries are generally managed by a Coordinating Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, with the MEMR as the lead in mining operations affairs and the MoF as the lead 
in financial affairs related to the industries. However, the coordination between ministries 
is difficult as all agencies, including the Coordinating Ministry, have the same structure 
(Henderi, 2017). This means that they cannot force each other to act harmoniously and 
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communicate or coordinate with each other in dealing with companies. These 
circumstances have created difficulties in both sectors. 
The government has made a turnaround from enjoying the oil revenue as the 
state’s main source of income. Since 2000, taxation replaced the domination of the 
industry in the country’s financial structure (Henderi, 2017). This decision was triggered 
by the significant decreasing of national oil production and reserves and the immature gas 
production and mining industry management. At the same time, political and bureaucratic 
reformation was widely conducted in many ministries. The process happened more 
rapidly in all departments of the MoF. Thus, the Ministry has established the Directorate 
General of Tax to collect money from economic activities in the country. As expected, 
hydrocarbon operations were the first place to look at as the contractors have extensive 
business activities. However, the cost recovery system stated in the contract made it 
difficult for the government to collect more money as the companies calculated it as an 
operational cost in order to reduce their financial obligations towards the government. 
The MoF is still working to find a better approach in handling this matter, especially to 
track and prevent misbehaviour in the recovered cost calculations (Henderi, 2017). 
However, the differences originate from the existence of SKK Migas and the 
different role and position of Pertamina in the hydrocarbon Industry, while the MEMR 
directly governs the mining operation and the three NMCs are fully business oriented 
since they were established with less politicisation and political involvement in running 
and managing the companies (Sidemen, 2015; Sudaryana, 2016; Tampubolon, 2015). The 
relationship between Pertamina and the NMCs and other actors is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
SKK Migas does not facilitate coordination among governmental agencies. 
Rather, it is an intermediary actor between government and companies to discuss 
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important matters concerning both parties (Sihotang, 2015). Furthermore, this agency 
does not have the authority to introduce regulations and issue policies regarding the oil 
and gas industries. Thus, it has to deal with this lack of authority in its interactions with 
other ministries. The MoF and the MEMR are the bodies that regularly communicate with 
this agency as they supervise companies’ operations. It also collects the most up to date 
information about government policies and regulations relating to mining and business 
operations. Thus, it regularly communicates with various related ministries and agencies 
despite the fact that, unlike other government agencies, it cannot issue policies,. It also 
provides recommendation for the government based on meetings with companies and 
other related parties related to certain issues. I attended a meeting about the 
implementation of a government regulation relating to the obligation to use Rupiahs in oil 
and gas trading, especially in tax and royalty payments as well as in the payment for the 
government’s share from oil and gas production and in domestic selling and buying 
activities. Following these meetings, SKK Migas gave a report and recommendation to 
the President, the MEMR, and the Bank of Indonesia about the implementation of the 
policy. 
In contrast, the mining industry governance does not have a body with the 
characteristics of SKK Migas. This sector only has different ministries, national, and 
subnational governments which issue policies on an individual basis without any further 
consideration of the mining business situation. Thus, the issued policies and the current 
business development are often mismatched and put the companies in a difficult situation. 
This is mainly caused by inadequate information collected and gathered by the 
governmental agencies from the mining field and the market to assess the situation before 
issuing a policy. This situation is actually not unavoidable and could be addressed with a 
proper approach, proven by the success of SKK Migas’ programme of establishing a 
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digital system to collect data and information directly from the companies (SKK Migas, 
2016). In fact, the MEMR could also process such information based on the various 
reports it receives from the companies. Unfortunately, not all mining companies have a 
positive attitude towards their government obligations regarding their financial as well as 
administrative requirements they need to fulfil after obtaining the contract or during their 
operation period (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016; Sudaryana, 2016). This is also one 
of the difficulties faced by the government in doing its job properly. 
Furthermore, as other ministries has the same level of authority in the 
governmental structure, the MEMR does not have the authority to force other ministries 
to issue policies related to mining operations in line with their priorities and choices of 
action (Sudaryana, 2016). Actually, there is a Coordinative Ministry of Economic Affairs 
that has such authority; however, the harmonisation of ministries’ policies to regulate the 
extractive industries is still in the early stages and remains an occasional occurrence. This 
lack of synergy also exists in national and subnational policies towards companies and 
mining operations in the working areas. Overlapping policies are especially evident in 
companies’ and financial obligations and profit sharing. Subnational governments, and 
also the local people, expect to receive the money first, despite the statement in the 
regulation that all payments are made to the MoF which has the authority and task of 
distributing these payments to the respective regions (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016; 
Hijrah, 2017). Afterwards, the provincial level of government is obligated to share the 
money with the municipal government to fund development projects benefiting the whole 
society. This misinformation is still found by the companies while dealing with 
subnational governments, proving that there is a lack of knowledge and information and a 
lack of socialisation from the national government to the regional authority. 
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Another level of government involved in both sectors is the subnational 
government, which consists of two main levels: provincial and municipal. Following 
independence in 1945, local governments took the dominant position in handling the 
industry. They cooperated with groups of local citizens to take over oilfields in  some 
parts of Java and Sumatra (Darmono, 2009). However, their role later diminished as the 
central government centralised all governance of political and economic sectors. For the 
hydrocarbon industry, the centralisation of governance was complete, including collecting 
tax and royalties from business operations and distributing the income to the regions. The 
local governments were unaware of exactly how much money originated from their 
resources and did not get to calculate how much money they were supposed to receive 
from mining operations in their respective areas (Hijrah, 2017). There was no 
transparency and accountability in the national and subnational government relations 
before the decentralisation policy is issued. 
This condition changed after the general political reformation started in 1998. The 
subnational governments got a 15% share of the profit from total revenue of oil and gas 
operation in their regions with a certain percentage of profit breaking down into 
provincial, municipal, as well as cross-province and cross-municipality areas (Hijrah, 
2017). Subnational governments which host oil and gas working areas receive profit 
information and have been able to calculate the local revenue. Furthermore, they have the 
authority to make their own local development plans and projects, including the 
budgetary plan to be submitted to the central government (Prayitno, 2017). They have 
been able to learn and develop the local political and economic capacity by directly 
practicing it in the field. However, there is no step by step process, transition phase, 
training, or clear assistance system from the national government. The result is an 
asymmetry in local elites’ ability to transform their potency into capacity; some of them 
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perform well in establishing better development in their regions, while some others are 
not able to do so. 
On the other hand, the municipal government had some authority in governing 
mining industry after the 1999 Decentralisation Law came into effect (Hijrah, 2017; 
Sudaryana, 2016). Unlike other subnational levels, the municipal government was 
initially allowed to sign mining contracts with companies. Meanwhile, national and 
provincial governments did not have control over the decisions taken by municipal elites. 
This became a significant problem in the governance of the industry as there were many 
overlapping working areas for more than one company in the same or different sectors. 
The lack of organised information about working areas from different sectors caused this 
problem together with the lack of willingness and ability to collect and organise industrial 
information at the subnational level (Sudaryana, 2016). The authority held by subnational 
governments was not supported by the capacity to govern the business operation in their 
respective regions. Nevertheless, some of them were able to manage the relations with 
companies properly. This is the main problem in the governing interdependence between 
state and business identified by Weiss and Hobson (2003) as the autonomy held by the 
state is not supported by the capacity to execute it. 
Led by the MEMR, the central government handled the problems with mining 
contracts and licenses as well as overlapping working areas by issuing a “clean and clear” 
policy (MEMR, 2016 and Sudaryana, 2016). It evaluated all licenses and contracts issued 
by local government, assess them, and gave clean and clear certificates to the proper ones. 
Meanwhile, problematic licenses and contracts have been terminated. Recently, the 
authority was taken back by the government and has been transferred to provincial 
governments in order to ensure direct control. 
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The desire to develop local governments’ capacity, especially regarding financial 
matter, has led to regular meetings with the MEMR and some training by related 
ministries (Hijrah, 2017). However, it takes a long time to achieve an ideal outcome as 
there is variation in the speed and ability to learn from local bureaucrats and elites as well 
as the political system’s capacity to reform and handle more complicated matters. As of 
2017, most local governments are still more focused on securing local revenue and 
getting funding for their development projects rather than creating better development 
projects and more productive relations with companies operating within their regions 
(Hijrah, 2017). Public and private collaboration projects are still very limited and are 
mostly initiated by the companies themselves. 
In conclusion, the policy network between ministries and between national bodies 
is still in an early stage. Specific organisations need to learn to do their own task while 
occasionally working together with the other agencies. The idea of collaborating and 
having joint projects across ministries has always existed. However, the difficulties and 
problems have arisen from the implementation and therefore the result of such 
cooperation is still far from ideal. However, the capacity to reform their organisations as 
well as identifying their potency and transforming it into organisational capacity is 
improving. The next step in the learning process is to learn to work together  
harmoniously with other governmental bodies by sharing, storing, and processing 
information in order to solve problems faster and more accurately. 
The national and subnational governments are able to work together within an 
institutional arrangement after opening up the limited order of the centralised political 
system with a sharing authority system (Prayitno, 2017; Sudaryana, 2016). There is a 
linkage between their actions and reactions as well as protocols and procedures to sustain 
and enforce this relationship. Their willingness and ability to share authority is the 
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doorstep condition for an open political economic order. Indonesia is passing this 
doorstep and working on binding the governmental agencies into “a governance linkage”. 
This linkage begins with mutual evaluation and supervision. The national government 
assesses and fixes the problems caused by subnational elites’ decisions and actions 
meanwhile, the subnational government can propose solutions, give suggestions, and 
make complaints regarding the choices and policies made by national authoritative 
bodies. They are free to question the decisions and policies made by the higher 
authoritative bodies in issues and agendas of concern. This is a kind of control  
mechanism which ensures that the linkage works openly and properly. This two-step 
method is supported with an open access network of information which provides the 
knowledge necessary to assess and solve problems and deal with challenges. These three 
factors are the essence of transforming state potency into capacity, which is one kind of 
transformative attitude in developing the industry. 
However, subnational governments have different levels of managerial authority 
in the two sectors. They are able to negotiate directly with mining companies and sign 
contracts or issue mining licenses (Sudaryana, 2016); however, they do not have such 
authority in the hydrocarbon industry as this authority falls to the government, 
represented by the MEMR and SKK Migas (Sihotang, 2015). There is no share of 
authority in the hydrocarbon industry. Nevertheless, the subnational governments have 
had the right to get a share of the profits from mining operations since 1999 (Hijrah, 
2017). They are not authorised to collect the money directly from companies as the 
payment is made directly to the MoF. The MEMR and the MoF have held events to 
socialise and train the subnational governments to calculate and estimate the amount of 
money they receive from the profit sharing system and determine how to distribute the 
money according to the Law. The distribution of the profit is especially important as it 
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involves the provincial, municipal, and local levels of government. The percentage gained 
by each level is fixed according to the Law. 
5.1. Process and Mechanism of Change 
 
This approach of analysing government actions in Indonesia in terms of its 
interactions with business entities provides a more complete understanding of the way in 
which the government has moved from a limited social order into an open social order 
while governing its interdependence with companies in developing the hydrocarbon and 
mining industries. Most importantly, this approach acknowledges the learning process of 
the Indonesian government and avoids identifying and labelling Indonesia as a resource- 
rich country that tends to have rentier collector attitude, is trapped in the “Dutch Disease”, 
and has had difficulties recovering from a dependency on a single source of revenue. 
There are different paths which lead to different institutional outcomes from studying 
both sectors. Nevertheless, we could consider this as an element of the variation of 
choices the government has made in dealing with distinctly different industries. Oil and 
gas is highly valued economically and strategically as the main source of energy for the 
country’s industrialisation, while the mining sector is considered as an important part of 
the industry which contributes to state revenue. 
Determining and agreeing the rules of the game is crucial in a long-term 
relationship among actors. Those rules involve a number of protocols, procedures, and 
financial affairs which are known, understood, and agreed by all parties involved. This 
means that all actors have access towards information about mining operations in order to 
issue appropriate protocols for achieving both parties’ goals. It also means that there is a 
system to collect, process, and share this information among the related agencies. The 
MEMR has the leading role in this system for both sectors as this Ministry is responsible 
for issuing general regulations and policy about mining operations, such as determining 
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and opening bids for working areas, signing oil and gas contracts, and providing mining 
licenses (Sidemen, 2015; Sudaryana, 2016). 
From this point, the hydrocarbon and mining sectors have a different path because 
the first sector has SKK Migas as the supervisor and intermediary actor for the 
government and companies in discussions regarding important matters. SKK Migas 
intensively communicates and cooperates with various governmental bodies such as the 
National Bank, the MoF, and other ministries regarding their recent policies, procedures, 
and concerns (Sihotang, 2015). Meanwhile, this agency also communicates and gathers 
oil and gas companies to ascertain their opinions, complains, commitments, and any 
adjustments needed to follow those recent policies. This agency helps the government to 
react faster and to accommodate business situations both in the field and in the market 
(SKK Migas, 2016). Unfortunately, it is legally a temporary body and does not have a 
clear position in the government structure. It does not have the necessary power and 
authority to make any decisions for both actors. An example is the policy to use Rupiahs 
in all transactions, especially in selling oil and gas within the country (SKK Migas’ 
Meeting with the Contractors, 2015). This policy resulted in extensive discussions 
between SKK Migas, Pertamina, and some large hydrocarbon companies in order to 
determine the most plausible way to accommodate both government and business 
interests. There are steps in the implementation of this policy based on the 
recommendations from this meeting. Both the government and companies understood 
each other and committed to follow the rules and adjust their expectations. This series of 
meetings in which the best strategies to accommodate each other are discussed and 
determined took a long time. Fortunately, the result is satisfying for both parties and the 
policy has been implemented steadily and smoothly. 
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In contrast, the government has used a more bureaucratic approach in governing 
the mining sector (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016). This involves less interaction and 
no discussion with the companies, leading to a lack of understanding between both actors 
and a lack of accommodation towards mining business dynamics both in the field and in 
the market. The government has issued some controversial policies that make it difficult 
for businesses to operate in the country. One of them is the requirement to process raw 
minerals before selling them abroad. This policy became controversial because there was 
no system to discuss it beforehand or to discuss the steps in implementing it in a way that 
would not heavily burden business entities and cause various losses. This policy became a 
significant problem for companies as they already had business agreements and 
commitments with foreign buyers with specific deadlines. Violations of these 
commitments cost them a huge amount of money, not to mention their credibility in 
international market. 
The government reacted slowly to companies’ complaints and suggestions in 
implementing recent policies (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016). Most of the time, the 
government did not react to business concerns at all. They let the companies figure out 
the recommendations and negotiate them individually with the related body. There is 
more personal interaction and vague protocols in this sector in comparison to the 
hydrocarbon industry. This means that the mining sector less attractive, unpredictable, 
and costly for potential foreign companies which initially wanted to enter the industry and 
it also means that the government has lost potential revenue from the industry. 
The decentralisation policy in 1999 has created opportunities for subnational 
governments to take part in managing mining operations in their jurisdiction. However, 
they are given more authority in dealing with mining companies than in hydrocarbon 
governance. The most significant difference is their ability to negotiate and sign contracts 
211  
with mining companies, while the authority to sign a PSC is centralised in SKK Migas 
(Sihotang, 2015; Sudaryana, 2016). The MEMR handles the negotiation prior to the 
signing of a PSC and afterwards SKK Migas manages the companies’ day to day 
operations. Thus, SKK Migas has more frequent interaction to discuss more technical and 
wider issues with the companies, while after the negotiation the MEMR mostly has 
indirect interaction through various reports submitted by the companies through SKK 
Migas. SKK Migas and the MEMR have a special relationship in which SKK Migas has 
the authority to manage its organisation although structurally it is subordinate to the 
MEMR (Sidemen, 2015; Sihotang, 2015). Furthermore, the MEMR needs to consult with 
SKK Migas before issuing policies which directly influence day to day operations in the 
oilfields, while SKK Migas holds discussions with companies about their positions and 
recommendations regarding issues of concern. 
This kind of interaction does not exist in mining governance structure. The 
MEMR works alone from negotiation to signing the contract or issuing a mining license. 
Subsequently, it collects annual report from mining companies while not actively being 
involved (neither knowing nor understanding) and updated regarding the situation faced 
by the companies in the field (Sudaryana, 2016). It does not have a structure that has the 
ability and budget to complete technical tasks while interacting with the companies to 
submit recommendations before issuing a policy or regulation. There is a serious 
disconnect between what companies need from the government and what the government 
actually does. 
There is a recent example to illustrate this problem. 2013 and 2014 were difficult 
years for mining companies since the international market prices for mining commodities 
decreased significantly (A Foreign Mining Company 2016; Antam, 2016). The companies 
needed to rearrange their operations in the field to avoid bigger profit losses and 
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inefficient production costs. During this time, the government issued an export ban policy 
for raw minerals, especially ore. This policy became a big hit for many companies, 
especially the NMC Antam Tbk, which relied heavily on exporting ore to China as its 
main destination. However, due to complaints and resistance from some mining 
companies, especially the most profitable ones, various adjustments were made by the 
MEMR. First, there were negotiations with the intention of convincing the companies to 
follow the new regulations with some exceptions for the companies until they agreed to 
do so. This management practice drew complains from NMCs and other mining 
companies. However, it is not easy to fix this problem as the MEMR, particularly the 
Directorate General of Coal and Mining, has the limitations mentioned previously. They 
did not have enough money and manpower to actually survey the conditions in the fields, 
there was no system or staff allocated to update the information about international 
market for mining commodities, and there was also no system to gather the opinions of 
mining contractors and business entities before actually releasing a policy. 
However, the government approaches the mining industry differently. The 
companies do not have to submit the work and budget plan and PoD to be approved by 
the MEMR upon their operation (Sudaryana, 2016). Thus, the only source of information 
that a mining company shares with the government is the annual report. Moreover, the 
financial system, particularly taxation, and companies’ obligations towards the 
government are different in both sectors. The tax obligation for the hydrocarbon 
companies is accounted as part of the production costs, which could be recovered through 
a cost recovery system (Hijrah, 2017). On the other hand, the tax obligation for mining 
companies is not part of the contract and therefore has to be paid by the companies. The 
hydrocarbon companies also have to fulfil a DMO (Domestic Market Obligation), which 
213  
is an obligation to provide 25% from their total production to the domestic market, while 
the mining companies do not have such obligations (Tampubolon, 2015). 
Another difference related to the involvement of subnational governments in the 
governance. Subnational governments do not have direct involvement in any phase of 
hydrocarbon mining operations. They do not have the authority to negotiate, sign, and 
terminate a contract. They also do not have the authority or the ability to supervise the 
mining operations as there is limited access to information regarding these matters. They 
do have authority to accept and cooperate with the hydrocarbon companies and support 
them to do their job smoothly, as well as make sure that their existence in the area is 
advantageous for the local population (A Foreign Oil Company, 2016). They actively 
initiate various community development programmes and ask for funding from 
companies to realise the projects; however, sometimes they also reject proposals or 
demand more from the companies which could hinder their operations. 
A recent example is the Tangguh Project established by BP in Papua (A Foreign 
Oil Company, 2016). The company made a series of deals with the local government and 
society representatives while preparing to start the project. Both the local government and 
society sounded their concerns and demands to the company, which were assessed and 
dealt with by the company itself without any support from the national government. There 
are no standards for the way in which the subnational government should deal with these 
companies. This problem emerges for all new oil and gas projects in working areas run by 
new companies. Pertamina handled such matters until 2001 and ensured that FOCs could 
start operating as soon as possible once the contract was signed (Sidemen, 2015; 
Sihotang, 2015; and Tampubolon, 2015). Any administrative requirements needed by 
FOCs were also completed in consultation and cooperation with Pertamina. This is one of 
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the reasons why a BPPKA was established as it enabled Pertamina to function both as a 
company and as a manager and supervisor of oil and gas contractors. 
The NOC and the NMCs have been treated differently by the government (Antam, 
2016). While Pertamina was frequently given investment by the state and had authority to 
manage revenue from other contractors until 1976, the latter was established and only 
received government investment in the beginning and had to learn how to run and 
develop the company to survive and be profitable. However, as state-owned companies, 
they were obliged to share most of their profits with the government, and even Pertamina 
had a PSO to fulfil domestic demand on fuel. 
Unlike state-owned companies, foreign companies managed by Pertamina enjoyed 
privileges of a smooth entrance to their working areas and the ability to start operations in 
a timely fashion (Tampubolon, 2015). Various requirements and regulations from various 
governmental agencies were fulfilled and obeyed by the companies in conjunction with 
Pertamina. However, such privileges have never been enjoyed by mining companies. 
Once they have been awarded a contract, they have to deal with all governmental 
agencies and subnational governments by themselves. The privileges highlighted above 
stopped when BPPKA was taken out of Pertamina and became BP Migas in 2003. Since 
then, FOCs have also had to deal directly with local governments. 
During the earlier era, the government mostly considered companies as cash 
machines with financial benefit as the most important factor (Warnika, 2017)., the 
government’s agenda and concerns became more varied after the 1998 economic crisis 
and political reformation (Sudaryana, 2016). The government expected to develop strong 
mining industries not only to produce and sell raw minerals to the international market, 
but also to be able to produce half or fully processed products which have higher 
economic value in the market. Therefore, it encouraged all companies, including state- 
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owned, private, and foreign ones, to build smelters in Indonesia. In addition, the export of 
raw minerals was banned. The government has also forced the implementation of this 
policy through a punishment mechanism for any company that failed to obey this rule. 
The government threatened these companies by terminating export permissions and not 
giving them chance to prolong a contract which was due to end in three years. 
Contrastingly, the government’s recent policy in the hydrocarbon sector focuses 
on encouraging more exploration projects in non-conventional areas, such as onshore 
(Sihotang, 2015). However, there are a small number of non-conventional projects 
compared to conventional ones. This is because the costs and risks are higher in such 
areas and the expected profit once they are capable of producing oil and gas is still low 
compared to the capital required and the cost of oil production in other oil-rich countries. 
Few big companies have remained or want to enter this industry, so oil production has 
remained low and gas production is not increasing significantly even though Indonesia 
has significant gas potential (Sihotang, 2015). 
Another difference between both sectors is the government’s supervision of the 
mining operations. SKK Migas plays an important role in supervising the hydrocarbon 
business operations (Sihotang, 2015). The organisation generally understands and  
updated important information related to both businesses and the market. It represents the 
government in dealing with and supervising the companies’ day to day operations. Unlike 
SKK Migas, the MEMR cannot perform supervision or actively update information and 
recent developments regarding the mining operations and markets. This is due to its 
bureaucratic nature, limited budget, and the lack of expert staff to handle the supervision. 
SKK Migas inherited BPPKA under the Pertamina tradition, where there was a 
close relationship with the contractors while conducting operations in the organisation’s 
own working areas (SKK Migas, 2013). Pertamina’s conflict of interest, as both 
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controller and player in the industry, was a concern for both the foreign companies and 
the GoI. Thus, along with the political reformation wave starting with President 
Soeharto’s resignation in 1998, the new Oil and Gas Law legalised the separation of those 
tasks. The GoI reacquired the controller function from Pertamina and adopted the BPPKA 
structure to establish BP Migas as a special governmental agency. Pertamina is now 
mandated to focus all its effort to secure and fulfil domestic needs for oil and gas 
products. Furthermore, the GoI has also removed Pertamina’s sole authority in the 
national distribution of fuel, gas, and other products and established BPH Migas as a 
special government agency with this authority. 
BP Migas not only inherited the working system of BPPKA and its connections 
with hydrocarbon companies. The agency got more authority in negotiating with the 
companies, evaluating and agreeing on the PoD. As part of the government, the agency 
enjoyed the ability and authority to interact and cooperate with other bodies and agencies, 
including the subnational governments. However, its existence became subject to 
complaints from some academic associations which led to the abolishment of BP Migas 
in 2012 (Sihotang, 2015; SKK Migas, 2013). As a way to ease the uncertainty in the 
national management of the hydrocarbon industry, the GoI established a temporary body 
called SKK Migas. It had the same task in bridging the GoI and companies’ interests 
regarding the changing political and economic situation affecting the industry. 
Unfortunately, the agency has not inherited its predecessor’s authority in making 
decisions (Sihotang, 2015). It negotiates until reaching agreement with the companies 
regarding issues concerning both the GoI and businesses. However, all the decisions are 
under authority of the MEMR. Thus, SKK Migas gives its proposals and 
recommendations about the relevant issues and these proposals are then legalised and 
enacted by the MEMR (Sidemen, 2015). Nevertheless, once a decision is made, the 
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implementation of the decision is returns to SKK Migas in the field with the cooperation 
of the companies that agreed to it. This agency might not have the authority, but it is 
indeed the centre of hydrocarbon governance which is keeping it alive, ensuring it is 
credible, and working more effectively than governances in other industrial sectors. 
A recent and important breakthrough made by SKK Migas despite its limited 
authority is the online system connecting the agency and the companies (SKK Migas, 
2016). This system has been in place since 2014 and ensures the openness of the data and 
more importantly updates the current situation in all working areas through an 
information technology system. After succeeding in maintaining this system, SKK Migas 
established and managed a similar system in 2015. The system connects companies’ data 
with the relevant ministries, particularly the MoF and the Ministry of Environment. Such 
movement is particularly important in supporting the government’s desire to control and 
evaluate the amount of cost recovery (as stated in the contract) companies can gain,  
which has the potential to reduce government profit. Thus, the GoI and especially the 
MoF have focused on making sure that the amount of money claimed by the companies  
as part of cost recovery is correct and reasonable. 
Another challenge relates to the dilemma of the negative effect of mining on the 
environment and positive impact in terms of the boost for local economic development. 
Most of the time the company, or collaboration between the company and the 
government, builds road, ports, education and healthcare facilities as well as providing 
information technology, electricity, and water as supporting systems for the mining 
operation base (A Foreign Oil Company, 2016). The mining base and factory also creates 
various employment opportunities for the people in the area. Unfortunately, if local 
governments cannot manage these opportunities wisely, the short-term advantage turns 
into a heavy reliance on one sector. This problem is admitted and widely addressed by 
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local governments in resource-rich regions and they have made efforts to diversify local 
people’s sources of income by promoting other sectors. 
One success story is West Sumatra, which was known as a coal producing 
province and hosted one of the oldest mining working areas in Sumatra (Prayitno, 2017). 
Sawahlunto, a municipal in the region, succeeded in transforming the city from a former 
mining area into a tourist destination. The process was not short and smooth or without 
social conflict. It took more than ten years to transform the city after the coal reserves 
began running out and PTBA ended its active operations in the area. As one of NMCs, 
cooperate with provincial and municipal elites along the process so the people in the area 
are not suffered during the transformation. Pangkalan Brandan and some other cities in 
Sumatra and Java that also ever hosted oilfields are also succeeded to develop their local 
industry and diversify people’s source of income along with the end mining operations in 
the areas. 
President Soeharto established a special Ministry to assist the local private sector 
to grow and take part in the extractive industry when Pertamina fell into crisis in 1973 
with the hope to strengthen the national position in the hydrocarbon industry (Sidemen, 
2015). Unfortunately, it was not an easy task as this Ministry did not have the requisite 
capital, knowledge, and technology. The goal was not achieved until the Ministry 
completed its working period, nevertheless some private domestic companies did emerge 
afterwards. Two major private oil companies succeeded in producing oil, multiple 
regional companies attempted to take part in downstream oil and gas projects, while some 
smaller companies could not continue their upstream operations due to the lack of capital 
and some others continued their work as subcontractors providing services for the bigger 
companies. 
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The connectivity among actors and the working system in the mining governance 
is markedly different compared to the hydrocarbon sector (A Foreign Mining Company, 
2016 and Antam, 2016). The main reason behind this difference is the non-existence of 
intermediary actors between government and business. Both actors work individually and 
mostly have no connection with each other. 
The local government also interacts with the companies because the working areas 
are within their jurisdiction (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016 and A Foreign Oil 
Company, 2016). However, the agenda is mostly limited to CSR projects initiated by 
companies or proposed by local elites or organisations. In addition, their main concern is 
getting their share of the profit collected by the government from both sectors. 
Sometimes, there are misunderstandings when the local government is unaware that the 
company makes payments to the central government so that it can be distributed to all 
resource producing provinces and municipals. The company is unable or not allowed to 
pay directly to the local government. Such issues are usually solved by clear 
communication between the national authority, the subnational government, and the 
related company. 
I have attempted to study the process of institutional development in two 
extractive industries in Indonesia, rather than exploring economic performance and 
following the assumption of either the resource curse’s weak institution or the ownership 
structure. In order to do so, I have focused on the relationship between government and 
companies and also their individual development throughout the interaction process. The 
shift in the governance direction of the hydrocarbon industry is primarily a result of 
Pertamina’s 30 years of work as the manager of oil and gas contractors. Although 
Pertamina did indeed represent the government in doing governing the industry, its core 
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existence as a business entity influenced its choice of action, approach, and governing 
 
style.  
 
Regardless of the public criticism of Pertamina’s work during this time1, the 
 
company provides an example of how important an existence of a body which could 
intermediate government and companies long-term interaction to balance their interests 
and solve problems through cooperation. The company set a standard and example for 
other sectors to create a cooperative governing style by assessing companies’ interest and 
adjusting to their conditions while achieving the national goal and protecting the national 
interest. The system is not yet ideal, but it has developed in a good direction towards a 
partnership. There are various problems that need to be solved, but the government’s 
attempts to involve the companies in discussing the implementation of national policies 
have been highly appreciated by business entities (IPA, 2016). On the other hand, Antam, 
PTBA, and PT Timah (the NMCs) are treated like other mining companies (Antam, 
2016). They do not have the authority to sign contracts or oversee the mining contractors 
with the exception of PTBA, which had authority for signing coal mining contracts for 
approximately two years. However, the company did not establish a system to manage 
and oversee the mining contractors. The NMCs were only responsible for conducting 
their mining operations and exporting to the overseas market, while the MEMR handled 
all matters related to mining industry governance. Unlike Pertamina, with its PSO to fulfil 
the domestic market need for oil products, the NMCs do not have such obligations. 
Therefore, the nature of state-owned, foreign, and domestic private companies in 
both sectors was very different until 2001. Pertamina represented the government from 
negotiation to managing and overseeing the oil and gas contractors. Since then, Pertamina 
has been treated the same as other contractors with the exception of the privilege of 
1 
Refer to criticisms of Pertamina’s monopoly in the industry, which has been explained in Chapter III 
221  
getting the first offer to take over an oilfield left by its previous contractor. Besides this 
and being “the insider” (or part of society) in the industry, there are no other advantages. 
As the first player the industry ever had Pertamina has facilities nationwide, including 
refineries, pipelines, distribution lines and fuel stations. It also has these facilities in the 
rural areas. Thus, it is not easy for a new player, especially a foreign company, to enter 
the downstream oil and gas business. Pertamina and foreign companies often compete to 
get potential oilfields, especially existing locations where the contract has come to an end. 
The nature of the business in both sectors is also different. Oil and gas compete to explore 
and produce similar products with different qualities, quantities, and techniques. Thus, the 
cooperation among the main companies is more intense and varied. On the other hand, the 
mining industry consists of different types of mineral and produces and sells different 
products. In comparison to the oil and gas sector the competition is not as intense, while 
the cooperation is also limited to the joint venture scheme and the use of subcontractors in 
mining operations. The hydrocarbon and mining industries involve the cooperation of 
various companies which have various specialisations and provide different types of 
service. The contractors sign PSCs with the government and obtain rights to mine in 
specific working areas. Meanwhile, as the real job of exploring and exploiting the 
hydrocarbons and minerals could be conducted by different companies assigned by the 
main office, the government encourages domestic private sectors to take 
part in supporting working area contractors. 
 
A slightly different type of cooperation exists between hydrocarbon contractors 
that operate in the same working areas with various schemes, such as JOAs (Joint 
Operating Agreements), Technical Assistance Contracts (TACs), Enhanced Oil Recovery 
(EOR) or joint venture schemes (Tampubolon, 2015). In addition to those schemes, SKK 
Migas also facilitates another type of cooperation with the purpose of reducing operation 
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costs (SKK Migas, 2015). The companies working close to each other are encouraged by 
SKK Migas to rent the same equipment or use existing refinery facilities, for example the 
government’s existing pipelines and refineries. This cooperation has taken place several 
times and has successfully reduced the cost in difficult situations where the market price 
of oil has plummeted. On the other hand, it is difficult to find another form of cooperation 
among mining companies other than using service subcontractors. It is also not common 
to have a joint venture in the mining sector. The most recent example of such cooperation 
is the joint venture between Antam and Freeport relating to smelter operations for anode 
slime. 
In addition to cooperation among companies, there are also some problems which 
have arisen in their relations. The problems mostly come from overlapping working areas, 
usually with plantation areas. SKK Migas usually helps the relevant parties, the 
companies and the local government, to agree on a joint land use agreement to solve such 
problems (SKK Migas 2015). However, the mining companies negotiate by themselves, 
without assistance from the MEMR, or involve the local government only if it is 
necessary in solving similar problems (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016). The role of 
SKK Migas in assisting the companies in dispute situation becomes more prudent and is a 
leverage enjoyed only by hydrocarbon companies. 
In conclusion, the cooperation among companies exists in a slightly different form 
in the two industries. The difference is primarily the different governance styles and the 
different nature of the operation. Pertamina and SKK Migas play an important role in the 
different governance styles of both industries. Their existence and actions make it 
possible for the companies to conduct joint operations, joint ventures, and ensure cost 
efficiency by sharing expensive equipment. On the other hand, a joint venture, which 
means join investment and capital, is the only form of cooperation that can be found 
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among mining companies. Nevertheless, there is a similarity in both industries in terms of 
the companies’ need to use service companies to do part of the operations instead of 
completing all activities by themselves. 
The business association of hydrocarbon companies is also different in 
comparison to the association of mining companies. The former has an active role in 
reading and evaluating new policies related to the industry in order to give official 
recommendations representing the business’ interests and position (IPA, 2016). One such 
association is the Indonesia Petroleum Association (IPA), which holds an annual event 
attended by all companies and related governmental agencies, including the MEMR, the 
Ministry of Environment, and SKK Migas, as well as some service and consultation 
companies and media which gather to discuss recent developments in the industry. At 
scheduled days after this special gathering for all relevant entities, the event is opened to 
the public. The participants provide data through brochures and public presentations that 
bring government, companies and society closer to understand what existing projects 
there are, how the companies operate and how the ministries govern the industry. 
These events are also conducted on a smaller scale by the association of coal 
companies (A Foreign Mining Company, 2016). However, the specialisation of the events 
attracts smaller participants and guests. The event is not as widely known as the IPA 
annual convention. This condition affects the limited public understanding about how 
mining operations are conducted and how the industry is managed. 
Government and companies are two dominant actors shaping the hydrocarbon and 
mining industries in Indonesia. However, both of them live in the society. Thus, 
acknowledging society as an actor and recognising the role it plays in the industry is also 
crucial. I posited that society views see companies in both industries as similar entities 
which pose both opportunities and threats to people’s lives and the environment. There is 
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no argument about the contribution of mining operations in terms of creating more jobs 
and developing the economic prospects of local citizens. However, the resistance comes 
from the concerns of both local governments and the people that such activities endanger 
the environment, the quality of farming produce and sea life. The root of the problems is 
that society has historically been neglected by both governments and companies. People 
have only had a voice and the ability to fight for their rights since the 1998 political 
reformation. Thus, this new wave of access to information and the opportunity to voice 
their concerns towards the government and companies has been used extensively. 
The most recent example was about Tangguh Project and Freeport operation in 
Papua, which initiated complaints from the locals and traditional society (A Foreign Oil 
Company, 2016). They asked for more transparency regarding the companies’ operations 
and economic contribution towards society as compensation for damaging their 
environment and neglecting them for more than 20 years. The citizens were smart and 
well informed because such complaints were also directed towards national and local 
governments. They asked the elites to involve the society more often before making 
agreements with the companies. They claimed that they are the actual and direct owners 
of the land, meaning their rights should be acknowledged and fulfilled by both dominant 
actors. This case was widely covered in the national media and became high profile. Both 
the government and companies have recently had to deal with the rising societal 
awareness of their lives and environment. The younger generation is more educated, so 
they also have more capacity to access up to date information and act accordingly. 
The national government has attempted several projects in response to this recent 
social development (Hijrah, 2017; Sudaryana, 2016). It conducted more socialisation so 
that the people could understand how mining operations are actually conducted. It also 
trained the subnational government to calculate the government’s share and profit from 
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mining operations and understand how the companies actually pay their financial 
obligations. This activity could be seen as an attempt to be more transparent and 
accountable in sharing the mining profit to the region, which was a concern for resource- 
rich regions when the national government monopolised all the revenue and decided the 
amount to share for all regions without asking the opinion of the subnational 
governments. The national government neglected the fact that, despite the advantages of 
such operations in their area, the government and people in resource-rich regions also 
deal directly with the companies’ personnel and are affected the most by the mining 
operations. However, these attempts at transparency are not sufficient. The national 
government has limited budget and manpower to be able to provide assistance in all 
regions, especially in more rural areas; thus, the subnational government is responsible 
for this task of hearing and responding to people’s complaints. 
From the learning process, we can also conclude that previous and recent 
regulation considered society as little more than a user of oil and gas. As a matter of fact, 
at the beginning of the industry, it was a group of people who decided to rehabilitate the 
already-destroyed oil refinery facilities in Sumatra and Java. They also pressured the 
government to take over the facilities from FOCs, as well as pushing (and accelerate) the 
government’s decision to establish national oil companies. The interaction between 
society and companies has mainly been conducted through local government. 
Nonetheless, the increasing number of educated people has also increased the amount and 
expanded the scope of collective action. There are various types and levels of social 
association which interact with and voice their interests and needs to the government. 
Another societal role in mining industry is as a landowner of mining sites. Each company 
needs to negotiate to buy the land on an individual basis. The mining contract or license 
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that has already been signed with the MEMR is only a license to mine, while realisation 
of the company’s plans and starting their operation is a different matter entirely. 
In conclusion, the government and companies do pay attention and attempt to hold 
and support development projects in the region through various programmes, mainly 
through CSR to fund local events and programmes as well as the economic empowerment 
project to help local people grow their businesses, which are usually small-scale 
businesses (Antam, 2016; A Foreign Oil Company, 2016; A Foreign Mining Company, 
2016; Tampubolon, 2015). From the government and company perspective, this 
programme could also be viewing society as the object in the industry. The people 
themselves have attempted to change their passive position by sounding their concerns to 
both dominant actors. Such action is still limited but has begun to arise recently. 
Nevertheless, it is always worth mentioning that the current active position of the GoI in 
managing and governing the extractive industries was historically initiated by a people’s 
movement immediately after the country’s independence. They took over the oilfields and 
demanded that the government take over the management, allowing the group to operate 
the business. 
Despite the fact that the government then neglected society’s wishes in managing 
and governing the mining operations and businesses, there was a high level of awareness 
and people did make themselves heard, even in negative ways (such as stealing 
equipment, treating the companies and operations’ staff badly, or demanding large 
amounts of money to compensate the use of their land as mining areas or oil and gas 
fields) (A Foreign Oil Company, 2016). On the other hand, they have supported the 
mining operations in their own way by providing food and other daily needs or local 
shelter for the workers. They also take advantage of the operations though employment 
227  
and the use of public facilities built by the companies in the areas, usually the roads, ports 
and other forms of transportation, as well as education and health facilities. 
6.4. Theoretical Reflection 
 
There are certain principles that have never changed in government and business 
relations in Indonesia’s hydrocarbon and mining industry. They are the ownership 
structure and the government’s desire to govern (directing and controlling) those 
industries which are often seen as vital for the national economy. The government and 
business relations cover diverse issues and involve both local economic development 
projects and the direct influence of the industry on the local citizens. Subnational 
governments mainly take the lead in directly hosting the companies as they operate within 
their areas. Their interaction is mostly personal and deals with specific issues related to 
unique situations in the region. Meanwhile, the national government provides the general 
guidelines for company operations and overall business practices within Indonesian 
boundaries. It interacts with the companies by using more impersonal relations and a 
bureaucratic approach involving regulations and policies. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that the existence of SKK Migas in the hydrocarbon industry plays a significant role 
in differentiating the nature of national government relations with hydrocarbon companies 
from its relations with mining companies. 
The recent concept proposed by Luong and Weinthal (2010) was named the 
“Ownership Structure”. At a glance, they attempt to move beyond the resource curse’s 
assumption. Unfortunately, in the process, they made the same judgment of simplifying 
the government’s act to governing the hydrocarbon industry as mostly driven by its claim 
as owner of the land and the elites’ desire to stay in power. Their concept could be 
replicated in an authoritative political system or LAO. However, it could not be used to 
understand the governance of the industry in a more democratic society or a nation in 
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which democratisation is taking place. Such conditions could be classified as OAO or the 
transition towards OAO. LAO and OAO are two types of economic governance 
introduced by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) which have been explained in Chapter 
II. 
In addition, Luong and Weinthal also falsely classified Indonesia as moving from 
S1 structure towards S2 in its recent development (2010, p. 346-348). The research found 
that the ownership structure in the extractive industry is fixed in S1 and S2 as the 
government is representing the people as the owners of the land while controlling the 
hydrocarbon industry but weakly and vaguely controlling the mining industry. S1 and S2 
assume that the state holds the biggest equity share of the natural resources, while the first 
type means that the state controls the industry and the latter means that the industry is run 
without state control. On the other hand, P1 and P2 mean that the private sectors own 
most of the equity in the mining operations. Like the S1 and S2 classifications, P1 means 
that the private companies operate under state control, whereas P2 means that private 
sector operates without control. The fact is that the GoI intervenes and actively oversees 
operations of oil and gas contractors through various means, while the PSC as the main 
form of oil contract in Indonesia clearly states that the oil explored is owned by the 
government until there is a handover from the government to companies at the point of 
transfer. This means that the hydrocarbon sector should be classified as S1. 
The key concepts of governing interdependence proposed by Weiss (1998) and 
Weiss and Hobson (2003) are mutual dependence, institutionalised cooperation, the 
government’s proactive role in managing the cooperation, and institutional insulation. 
Interdependence means they need each other in order to achieve their goals. It also marks 
a mutual relation of adjusting with each other. The state takes a proactive role, using its 
autonomy to consult and to elicit consensus and cooperation from the private sector. 
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Weiss considered this to be a special kind of infrastructural power encompassing both the 
coordinated and the cooperative quality of that power. 
In the natural resource industry, interdependence is an obvious base for 
cooperation as it belongs to the people in a country’s jurisdiction. No matter how big and 
capable a hydrocarbon company is in terms of conducting mining operations, it cannot do 
anything without permission and support from the government. In addition, a common 
feature is that the government in a resource-rich country does not have the ability to 
monopolise all the mining operations one its own as this process requires a lot of capital, 
knowledge, high-end technology, and management. Therefore, the government needs to 
cooperate with hydrocarbon companies in order to gain profit from the natural resources  
it owns. 
A long-term cooperation needs a steady interaction and stable environment to 
achieve both parties’ goals and interests. Such relations need to be institutionalised with 
agreed and fixed rules of the game containing each party’s rights and obligations, as well 
as clear protocols and procedures which need to be followed. One of the most important 
things to maintain a well-organised cooperation is the system of knowledge and 
information sharing. Such a system supports the actors to understand each other’s job and 
interests although they have different preferences and choices of action. Governing 
interdependence is conducted when the rules of the game respect and accommodate both 
actors’ preferences and existence. 
The first stage is competitive bargaining relations, in which other actors are more 
dominant than the others and there is limited cooperation within organisations and 
between parties. This first phase mainly existed in the 1980s as the government 
implemented a programme to increase private domestic involvement in the hydrocarbon 
industry and at the same time the oil companies struggled due to the falling oil prices after 
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a significant windfall after the Oil Boom. If we take a closer look, this condition provided 
a better opportunity for private domestic companies to enter the industry as the cost of 
production was also lower than in previous period. However, oil operations are not only 
about the opportunities and they also involve significant capital and the ability to take 
losses from unsuccessful exploration and exploitation, which is not something the small 
companies were capable of. Therefore the large foreign (mostly multinational) companies 
continued to dominate the industry 
The second stage is cooperative bargaining relations, in which the actors develop  
a partnership within their category (among governmental bodies or among mining and 
hydrocarbon companies) to achieve greater goals which could not be achieved by acting 
individually. There is competition as well as cooperation between actors. Pertamina was 
appointed as the manager for oil contractors and oilfields nationwide, which meant that 
other companies could only enter and work in the field after signing a contract with 
Pertamina and subsequently getting approval for their PoD proposal and work and budget 
plan. Moreover, cooperation with Pertamina could only take place through several 
schemes, namely TAC, JOA, and EOR. The government established such policies to 
allow Pertamina to learn how to manage the operations and handle high-level 
technological equipment. 
During the earlier era, when public information was not as accessible as it is today 
and the government paid more attention to building a good image for the citizens, 
companies were only granted an exception in following the regulations by engaging in a 
good relationship, usually involving money as bribery, with political elites, namely 
Soeharto’s cronies. This practice was known as personal exchange in North’s view. 
However, on the surface, this practice was hidden from both the public and law 
enforcement agencies. From the 2000s onwards, with the establishment of the KPK, the 
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governance practice in both sectors has moved towards impersonal exchange involving a 
set of protocols and procedures in the interaction between the government and companies. 
The rules of the game are also impartially enforced towards all type of companies with 
few exceptions given to NOCs, NMCs, and the domestic private sectors. 
6.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter attempts to answer the second research question; why and how 
resource governances in hydrocarbon and mining sectors develop in different direction. 
The discussion analyse institutional elements that change in both sectors: the rule and 
procedure element. Furthermore, mechanism of institutional change is analysed based on 
North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) proposition about transition from limited to open 
access order. 
Based on discussion above, it is clear that institutional actor always develop 
themselves to gain more knowledge and understanding in order to do their task better. 
North (2009) named it as a learning process. Thus, we have both the changing 
institutional arrangement and also the dynamic of institutional actors. This perspective 
mans that static point of view need to be reconsidered in further studies about resource- 
rich countries. 
In addition, the research also studies the way in which the governance of two 
extractive industries in Indonesia have been shaped by government and companies’ 
relations. This point of view is generally introduced and conceptualised by Weiss (1998) 
and Weiss and Hobson (2003), who named it “governing interdependence”. This concept 
proposes another viewpoint regarding Strange (1994)’s proposition that, in the 
globalisation of business and economic activities, the government must also learn to deal 
with companies as business entities. She called this state and market relations with 
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economic diplomacy as the main activity. While economic diplomacy has been used to 
refer to all relations between economic and business actors in the world, governing 
interdependence specifically highlight the importance of state capacity framework to 
analyse the actual and intense interaction between the government and companies, with 
the government as the leading actor or the one which governs the industry. 
There are some principal differences between the governance behaviour of 
governing, imposing, and letting businesses have their own way. The government’s act to 
govern involves a wide spectrum of policies and codes of conduct surrounding business 
activities within its jurisdiction, while the act to impose involves a one way interaction 
between the policy maker and businesses. The letting type of action is a choice by elites 
not to intervene in business activities through politicisation. Businesses have more liberty 
in conducting their activities in this type. 
The imposing type means that businesses have many limited choices of action. 
They are obligated to follow all rules set by the government without needing to consider 
the situation and challenges involved in each specific activity. The governing type is the 
best situation to manage the interdependence between government and business as it 
involves good relations strengthened by adequate interaction, communication, and trust 
between the related parties. Both need to understand each other’s situation and interests, 
cooperating to achieve common goals. It is possible for the government in a state to not 
only conduct one type of approach over time and towards all sectors. This dynamic of 
choice and action should be fully considered and understood by a researcher before 
choosing an approach to analyse relations between governments and businesses. 
The government’s act to control the industry is a basic principal stated in article 
33 of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution. It is mandated to protect the country’s land and use 
the abundance of natural resources within its jurisdiction for public advantage and to 
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fulfil domestic needs for oil and gas as well as mining products. At the same time, the 
companies also act to protect their rights and control their liberty in business operations 
and management. The focus of their relations is balancing and accommodating both 
agendas and interests to achieve their economic goals. The government uses its authority 
to regulate, make decisions, and issue policies to govern the industry, while the 
companies use their comparative advantage in terms of knowledge and technological 
know-how in mining operations and business management. As the GoI opens up the 
governance by involving more governmental bodies and the subnational government, the 
more complex requirements and regulations will need to be followed, fulfilled, and 
obeyed by the companies. 
Analysing the relations between the government and companies in the 
hydrocarbon and mining industries in Indonesia by using governing interdependence as a 
framework, it is possible to generate several theses. The first important aspect is the 
existence of SKK Migas as an intermediary actor between government and business 
entities. 
By taking a closer look at the difference between SKK Migas’ and the MEMR’s 
priorities and strategies in governing the industry, we could see a second, vital difference 
between both industries. SKK Migas has built and managed a system ensuring direct 
sharing of knowledge and information between the company and the agency. Another 
important strategy is holding regular meetings to discuss the implementation of a 
concerning policy or issue with some of the companies as representatives of oil and gas 
contractors. This kind of meeting ensures that companies understand the government’s 
expectations and interests behind the policy, while at the same time voicing their concerns 
and positions regarding the government through the agency. I assume that this practice 
could be understood as the government’s willingness to recognise the companies as 
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partners in achieving its goals, protecting the public interest, and conducting its 
development and economic programmes. 
This valuable standpoint actually enables the academic community to avoid a 
biased judgment about resource-rich countries under the resource curse label. Moreover, 
supporters of the resource curse concept have mostly focused on the national economic 
performance and the financial structure of states in which extractive industries, especially 
the oil and gas sectors, play an important role in their economy. However, the concept 
neglects the fact that the government is not a unitary actor; rather, there are various 
agencies and many layers of government which influence the governance of the industry. 
It also disregards the fact that government’s actions in dealing with the companies and 
governing the industry are dynamic and progress as they gain further exposure to the 
international standards of business and governance practice, as well as the flow of 
information, technology, and opportunities to introduce better options and strategies in 
governing. Both government and companies have not remained in the same room and at 
the same time as they were in the beginning of their relations. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The chapters in this thesis present an analysis about institutional change in 
hydrocarbon and mining industries in Indonesia. At early stage of my research, I seek a 
framework for explaining the development of resource governance in Indonesia’s 
extractive industry. The starting point and conclusion generated from such studies are 
generally connecting the poor performance in such countries with their political and 
economic system, authoritarianism and nationalism. Moreover, previous studies also rely 
heavily on a static perspective regarding institutions in developing countries, which are 
also resource-rich. It implies that they do not actually attempted to understand and 
analyse what process and mechanism happen in the governance, especially related to the 
way in which institutional actors develop their capacities to act and interact with each 
other. 
The massive political economic development experienced by the actors is far too 
complicated to be captured and analysed via the static viewpoint provided by existing 
studies. This chapter also intends to provide an alternative viewpoint in studying resource 
governance in developing countries and demonstrates that the previous frameworks, 
namely resource curse and rentier state, might provide a good starting point for studying 
this topic. However, it is not sufficient to explain the resource governance trajectories. It 
is also not adequate to understand the way in which the learning experience and process 
of the developing countries to be more open institutionally. It is important to also 
emphasise that, despite the institutional dynamic in resource governance, the political and 
economic actors are also dynamic as they develop internally in order to adapt to changes 
and deal with problems and challenges derived from their previous decisions and actions. 
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This is because the actors that are taken into account in this research are organisations 
rather than the elites. Political and economic organisations are dynamic and developing 
themselves as they welcome new individuals and new managerial regimes. 
An intense and complex relationship between government and companies exists in 
the extractive industry. This is because, unlike other industries such as agriculture, 
Multinational Oil Enterprises (MOEs) have been the main actors in the international oil 
industry since the discovery of oil. They are known as the seven sisters and consist of 
Exxon, Mobil, BP, Shell, Chevron, Texaco, and Gulf (Victor, Hults, and Thurber, 2012, 
p. 273). The complexity in this relationship is caused by the high cost and high risk 
character of the exploration, production, and distribution process. There is uncertain 
precision in geographical information, unpredictable risk in the drilling process, and 
environmental damage in the exploration phase. While crude oil is found and explored, 
the refining phase to produce various petroleum products needs high technological and 
technical capabilities. The distribution phase also has to face the risk of leaking through 
cross border pipes as well as through oil tankers, which can reduce the amount of oil 
traded in the international market and damage the environment. 
Slightly different in comparison with the hydrocarbon sector, more actors take 
part in mining operations as they can be achieved both traditionally by individuals or 
groups of people and in a more modern manner by using more sophisticated methods and 
technology. This means that mining operations can be done by governments, companies, 
and society at the same time (Spiegel, 2011). This is a unique differentiation between the 
mining and oil industries as there is no individual or group of people without having an 
organised firm which conducts oil and gas exploration and production. Since 2000, there 
have been growing concerns about safe mining operations and good business practice; 
consequently, most governments have paid more attention to regulating the small scale 
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mining usually conducted by individuals and groups of people (Suryana, 2016). This type 
of mining operation produces various problems, especially regarding worker safety, 
environmental damage, and illegal trading of raw mineral (Spiegel, 2011; Resosudarmo, 
2005, p. 206-209). 
Using this path of research, I argue that at a certain point, the governance of 
hydrocarbon and mining sectors has developed into different trajectories. The shift could 
be explained by looking into the interaction between the change in institutional 
arrangement in both sectors and the way in which government and business relations have 
developed differently in both sectors. This important but neglected fact is interesting and 
valuable because previous researches have tended to make general assumptions that 
resource governance in the extractive industry has both static, uniform, and unified 
institutional arrangement as well as a simple form of government and business relations 
without considering the dynamic and development of actors and the fact that government 
is also an organisation of organisations that is either uniform or unified in their interests, 
perceptions, and strategies towards corporations. 
This research explores the institutional development of Indonesia’s extractive 
industries by looking at the relationship between government and companies in the 
hydrocarbon and mining sectors. This viewpoint has mostly been overlooked by previous 
researches on resource-rich countries. The resource curse is a dominant framework 
wherein such countries are labelled as having poor economic performance and weak 
institutions (see for example Karl, 1997). They look at the government with a static view, 
meaning they fail to acknowledge the changing and dynamic action of governments over 
different periods of time. Their tendency to focus more on the elites’ interest and action in 
managing the financial affairs of the extractive industries is misleading. They neglect the 
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complexity of government and companies relations. They also do not take the diversity of 
governmental agencies that take part in managing the industry into account. 
Therefore, I posit that both the governance of extractive industries and the actors 
involved in the institution are not static; rather, they have developed individually and 
institutionally. There are more choices available for the actors, and the scope of agenda 
and issues covered in their interactions are wider as well. Collecting rent from the 
companies is not the only activity of concern to both parties. Moreover, when there are 
more actors involved from both sectors, their interactions become more complicated. The 
more the actors are exposed to the international environment, the more familiar they will 
become with international standards for both the governance of the industry and the 
business operations. Therefore, treating the development of extractive industry 
institutions as a process can establish a valuable understanding of how a resource-rich 
country manages its industry. Meanwhile, the relationship between the government and 
companies, as the unit of explanation, provides a proper focus on the actors’ individual 
development through their interactions. This means that there are two processes as the 
main focus in this research: the institutional arrangement and the relationships among 
actors. 
This is where my thesis attempts to fill the gap from previous studies about 
resource-rich developing countries. There are two research questions in this thesis. The 
first one is why and how resource governances in hydrocarbon and mining industries in 
Indonesia develop the way they are. The second question is why and how governance for 
hydrocarbon industry is different from mining industry. 
Moving on from that perspective is not an easy task. Searching for an alternative 
framework to look into the resource governance in such countries bring me to the primary 
frameworks used in the analysis; they are Institutionalism and Institutional Change 
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developed by North (1991 and 2005), North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), Lowndes and 
Robert (2013), and Campbell (2004). Institutionalism provides the most suitable 
analytical framework to look at the development of the rules of the game as a process. In 
this framework, the institution is considered as dynamic and changing over time rather 
than something that is static and impossible to change. Meanwhile, the framework also 
underlines the importance of looking at the learning experience of the actors involved. 
This learning process is the main assumption used to examine both the development of 
the institutions and the development in actors’ relations. 
North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) proposed a comprehensive framework to 
analyse institutionalisation within society. Moreover, he emphasised several key themes 
crucial in understanding the initial steps for establishing, the development process of, and 
finally changes to the institutional structure and framework. The learning process that 
contains both aggregating information as well as accumulating knowledge about the 
environment as well as other actors’ preferences and actions is the basic concept. 
Furthermore, the incentive structure, including the pay-off structure as well as ownership 
and property rights protection, is also an important concept. This is generated from the 
basic human needs: survival and security, as well as achieving goals and wealth. The 
main factors evident in all the key themes are the interactions and relationships among 
actors. There is always a bigger advantage to being inside the institutional framework 
rather than outside the structure. 
Institutional change in the hydrocarbon and mining industries in Indonesia is 
analysed by using the phases of institutional openness proposed by North and Weingast 
(2009), the process and mechanism of change established by Campbell (2004) and 
Lowndes and Robert (2013), as well as other research articles related to the subject. North 
and Weingast (2009) stated that it is important to understand that institutional openness 
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could go forward as well as backward throughout time. It is not about progress but more 
about process. Meanwhile, Campbell (2004) explained the importance of considering the 
timeframe in the study of change as, in general, change could happen both incrementally 
and revolutionary. This means that change could be triggered by a sudden development 
influencing a social situation on a large scale or could happen slowly, meaning it is often 
impossible to track who the actual initiator was or when the change began. The first 
situation is often understood by historical institutionalists in terms of ‘path dependence’, 
which means current decisions made by actors are influenced by previous decisions taken 
by their predecessors and will affect further decisions in the future (North, 1990 and 
2005). On the other hand, Lowndes and Robert (2013) emphasised the importance of 
determining which element of institutions could experience change and how much time is 
needed by each element to change. Both North and Weingast (2009) and North (1990) 
posited that an actor (most importantly an elite or a group of elites) must have an 
incentive to change their current institutional arrangement and gather support from their 
group in order to pursue their goal. This framework considers actors’ actions as the most 
plausible mechanism for changing an institution. Furthermore, Campbell (2004) and 
Lowndes and Robert (2013) made an important contribution to the framework by 
recognising the importance of considering different elements of institutions that could 
have different mechanisms of change. Along with both propositions, I also use bargaining 
relations between government and business as my main unit of analysis in order to 
understand changes that have occurred in resource governance of Indonesia’s extractive 
industry. In addition, I highlight the development in the Indonesian government’s 
capacity to govern the extractive industry and to build, maintain, and strengthen its 
relationship with and ability to solve problems in its interaction with companies. 
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The development of government capacity is evident in the wider scope of issues 
managed and the more open opportunities for subnational government and other 
ministries to become involved in governing the hydrocarbon and mining industries. The 
government pays more attention to details involving wider agendas and issues which lead 
to set of requirements, permissions, and documents to be fulfilled before allowing the 
mining operations to start. This could be seen as a more complicated bureaucracy and 
administrative affairs system compared to the simpler requirements in the earlier era. It 
also involves more agencies authorised to handle various issues in comparison to fewer 
authoritative bodies issuing various policies and regulations to be followed. 
This point of view is still rarely used in international political economy literature. 
One common and dominant perspective used to analyse the governance in resource-rich 
countries is the “resource curse”. The supporters of this theory posited that being a 
resource-rich nation brings disadvantages for a country and its citizens, namely poor 
economic performance as well as political and social conflict over resource ownership 
and management authority. The financial systems in such countries have also received the 
most attention from political and economic scholars. Some of them blame weak 
institutions for unsuccessful resource management which has failed to distribute welfare 
and wealth evenly for the people. The researches used both concepts are inevitably 
trapped in perceiving the government’s actions through a biased and judgmental 
assumption. There are some labels attached to a resource-rich government, such as: 
having weak political and economic institutions and prioritising money and profit from 
the extractive business (rent-seeking behaviour), and using the money to get public 
recognition to maintain their position and authority. 
In my opinion, the labels come from the reluctant to analyse governance as a 
process. Tracing this process could prevent a government being judged before its 
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dynamic attitude, approach, and strategy towards the industry has been properly 
examined. Therefore, this research focuses on analysing the mechanism and process of 
institutional change in hydrocarbon and mining industries by using process tracing and 
comparative historical method developed by Lange (2013). This is an attempt of to move 
beyond resource curse domination in studying the governments of  resource-rich 
countries. 
This research provides analysis and comparison of government and companies’ 
relations in two Indonesia’s extractive industries, the hydrocarbon and mining. This 
country is resource-rich and has more than 60 years of experience in managing the 
industry. As a developing nation, it has a dynamic political, economic, and social system 
which has triggered a reformation towards better development in governance practice. In 
addition, there is also a distinct strategy to manage the extractive industries proven by 
various initiatives introduced by the government in its interactions with companies and its 
management of the industry. 
The institutional development in both sectors is analysed by using North, Wallis, 
and Weingast’s (2009) concept of society typologies and the steps to move forwards from 
limited access order (LAO) to more open access order (OAO). The process of moving 
from LAO towards OAO is long and not smooth, but it is believed to be better than LAO. 
North also mentioned a doorstep condition, which could also be seen as another term for a 
path dependence (commonly used by historical institutionalists) each society will pass by 
before reaching OAO. Moreover, this movement needs a credible commitment to keep 
moving forward and each actor should always be cautious as the road is not one way; the 
society could be moving backwards rather than forwards. One important point in this 
process is that OAO is not a final destination. It is not an ideal system in which all 
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problems can be solved smoothly and where all actors do their jobs well and collect profit 
from their ownership or works. 
Societal order needs to be maintained, protected, and enforced by a mechanism 
that requires actors’ commitment to follow and protect the rules while also punishing 
those who violate the agreement. Furthermore, in an institution there might be an outsider 
who is not among the recognised actors in the system and cannot claim the benefits from 
it. Alternatively, there might be a free-rider that enjoys the benefits even though they do 
not belong in the system. As an actor also develops themselves, there might also be 
changed in the preference, attachment, and commitment to comply with the agreement. 
Thus, it is also plausible and valuable to analyse the development of an institution from 
the perspective of actors’ relations, in which the self-development of the actors is also 
part of the explanation. 
It clearly presents in the discussion chapters from Chapter III to Chapter VI that 
the government has different approaches in governing the hydrocarbon and general 
mining industries. It uses a stricter and more regulated approach in the hydrocarbon 
sector, while a more freedom is given to mining companies. This difference is part of a 
historical path set and chosen at the beginning of industrial development. In addition, it is 
also caused by different governments’ perceptions, expectations towards the business, and 
the different governance structure in both sectors. After independence, the government 
issued the first Mining Law in 1960, which became the guidance in governing both 
industries. Afterwards, the government established state-owned companies in both sectors 
with different tasks. Pertamina is a merger of three national oil companies and its primary 
role is to collect rent from oil operations by attracting, negotiating, and signing contracts 
with foreign companies while at the same time managing and overseeing them (Darmono, 
2009). Moreover, it has a public service obligation to provide oil as the main energy 
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source for supporting national development programmes through industrialisation 
projects. On the other hand, there are three mining companies resulting from the 
management of small foreign companies which were nationalised. Their main task is 
managing mining operations and producing mineral products for overseas markets. 
The nature of the hydrocarbon and general mining businesses and companies in 
both sectors are also different. The hydrocarbon industry was a major source of income 
for the government until the 1990s, when taxation replaced its position (Henderi, 2017). 
Moreover, domestic demand for oil increased significantly as hydrocarbon fuels became 
the dominant energy source for housing and industry. Thus, the GoI paid special attention 
to this sector both upstream and downstream of business operations. 
On the other hand, even though mining products are also widely used in various 
industries, there are many types of mining products and most mining companies do not 
produce the end products which are actually used by the domestic costumer. Exports of 
raw minerals have become the dominant business in the sector, while the domestic 
market’s demand for mining products is not fulfilled (Sudaryana, 2016). This condition 
affects both the government’s approach in mining governance and public perceptions 
regarding the industry. 
The pattern and approach in the governance development from LAO to OAO has 
taken different paths. This difference originated from the government’s authority to 
manage the entrance of newcomers in the industry, especially those with a share of 
authority. Prior to 2001, the hydrocarbon business was governed by Pertamina, which  
was mandated by national law to represent both the government and the main players in 
the industry. All companies that wanted to operate in the oilfields needed to sign the 
contract and obtain approval for their Work and Budgetary Plan (including the Plan of 
Development). This power ultimately led the first Director of Pertamina, Ibnu Sutowo, to 
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cross his authority by investing outside the company’s core business and buying oil 
tankers which had administrative problems. This course of events in 1976 was known as 
the “Pertamina Crisis”. Afterwards, the government closely and strictly managed and 
oversaw the management of Pertamina, including restrictions on receiving capital other 
than state funding. From the 1980s to 2001, the company was more focused on governing 
the hydrocarbon industry and was failing its core duty as a company. As its performance 
was low, the public perceived that “the nation’s hydrocarbon industry was under 
domination of foreign companies” and that “the government was intentionally selling the 
nation’s resources to foreigners and putting the public interest aside”. 
The government did not pay much attention to governing the mining industry as 
the 1960 Law was unreplaceable for more than 40 years. There was no urgency from 
Parliament in releasing a new Mining Law which could cover a changing situation in both 
the industry and the country as a whole during this period of time. The industry itself was 
rising in the 1980s as many companies were attracted to invest and operate in Indonesia; 
moreover, commodity prices were rising while the oil price plummeted significantly. 
Actors are dynamic as they learn from their exposure to new information and 
knowledge. A government consists of independent and dynamic agencies, while business 
entities also consist of independent and dynamic agencies, from individuals to 
associations. Thus, their relations are also dynamic and changing as they are exposed to 
new information and knowledge to realise their actual and potential capacity, their 
limitations, as well as the range of strategies to act and establish relations with other 
actors. 
There are several questions which instigate deeper thought while comparing the 
governance of the hydrocarbon and mining industries in Indonesia. The thought process 
itself starts from many questions which emerged throughout the research process. The 
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first is related to the diversity of governance in the different sectors despite their identical 
classification as extractive industries which are conducted by the same government with 
the same political, economic, and social system and situation. Interestingly, this diversity 
is often ignored by previous researches which argue that governments apply a similar 
style in governing the industry, particularly natural resources or the extractive industries. 
This ignorance also takes another form by neglecting the fact that the government is not 
unitary actor in which all agencies act harmoniously and have similar level of capacities 
to process information, to make and implement policies. 
Secondly, the need to identify the actors’ learning and development processes. 
The actors themselves develop as they are exposed to new information and knowledge. 
Their exposure to a larger system and attachment to the international system with 
different standards of action also influences their governing style. However, they could be 
influenced differently as there is also a difference in the ability to access and process the 
information. 
Thirdly, the previous decision taken by elites in the past influences the way in 
which actors’ developing themselves and changing in institutional arrangement happens 
in the present and future. In this regard, looking interconnectivity between resource 
governance in both sectors and institutional arrangement in larger political and economic 
system is crucial for analysing mechanism and process of institutional change. 
The government and companies’ relations comprise actors’ intended actions 
towards other actors in order to get what they want from such interactions. This 
relationship could be seen as a process wherein the actors interact more than once and 
even exist in the same sphere with capacities and intentions to maintain and develop the 
relationship by establishing rules of the game which bind all relevant parties. 
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From discussion of the findings, there are two elements that changes in the 
institutional arrangements for both sectors. The rule element consist of contractual system 
for oil, gas, and mining; while the procedure element consist variety of government and 
companies administrative, financial, and legal affairs. 
The source of change in rule element for hydrocarbon industry in 1998 came from 
internal pressure, the end of Soeharto’s regime and the beginning of Reformation era, as 
well as external pressure, from the requirement for getting financial support from IMF 
and World Bank. The result is a slightly liberalized-look in new hydrocarbon 2001 
regulation by making a big change in the structure of its hydrocarbon industry 
governance. Pertamina is no longer positioned as both supervisor and competitor for other 
oil and gas companies. The NOC has only responsibility as a business entity and its 
function as supervisor is given to BP Migas and later to SKK Migas and MEMR. This is a 
crucial decision proven that government has capacity to deal with economic and political 
problems. It also proves that government has both adaptive and transformative capacities 
to compromise between external pressure and internal discourse, the long debate between 
pro liberalisation and nationalist faction. 
On the other hand, the rule element in mining industry changed in 2009. In 
contrast with hydrocarbon sector, the change came from rising nationalist sentiment 
regarding governance of mining. Public generally view elites as ‘selling the country land 
and resources to foreigner, while ignoring and sacrificing public interest’ for elites’ 
political and economic interest’. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the President for two 
periods of time (2004 to 2009 and 2009 to 2014) attempted to answer the accusation by 
pushing the House to release a new mining regulation. The 2009 mining law has more 
strict regulation for further mining operation in the country. Among highlighted rules are: 
government should stop releasing new mining contracts and renegotiate to change it into 
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a license-based contractual system, CSR become an obligation for the company, and the 
company should build smelter facilities and process raw minerals to be mineral products 
in the Indonesian soil. The later clause also existed in previous law, but it is never 
enforced seriously by the government. According to the law, government should make 
utmost attempt to renegotiate all existing contract and change it into license. In this way, 
the government is no longer positioning as contractual parties with obligation and 
responsibility towards the mining companies. Licensing system means that government 
gave permission for the companies to conduct mining operations in certain mines, but the 
license could be revoked single-handedly by the government in case there are problems 
emerged during their license period. Previous contractual system means that the 
government have to renegotiate and compromise with companies’ need and interest. This 
change is crucial marked the change from previously more liberalistic government’s 
approach toward mining companies toward a more nationalistic strategy. 
Furthermore, changes in procedure elements of institutional arrangement in both 
sectors’ governance consist of developing of actors’ capacity to act and interact within the 
structure. Big shifting role of actors happens in hydrocarbon industry. Pertamina was 
once a supervisor for oil and gas contractor. The NOC even had right to collect rent from 
foreign companies and invest it to other projects as it saw fit. After Pertamina Crisis in 
1976, the right was taken off and return to MoF. Although having difficulties to get 
capital for their operations and expansion project, the company has leverage of having 
distribution routes, facilities, and system to nationwide. Such leverage is advantageous 
after its public service obligation, to supply and distribute fuel to all regions in the 
country, was also cut off and government decided to give foreign companies’ opportunity 
in downstream operation. The new competitor’s access is not comparable to Pertamina. 
The NOC is still dominating domestic fuel market as primary supplier. 
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Meanwhile, after 2001 law of hydrocarbon industry is activated, its role as 
supervisor was taken back by BP Migas. This agency was responsible for handling all 
matters related to oil and gas contractors. Its main task was to improve national oil 
production that plummet since the beginning of Reformation Era. It had authority to 
decide and make policy to fulfil the task. The agency’ position and authority as MEMR is 
seen as an ideal structure for the sector. However, its vast authority without control 
mechanism from other agencies rose public suspicion and therefore the agency is replaced 
by SKK Migas. 
Unlike BP Migas, which task and authority dictated by the Law, SKK Migas was 
established only by Presidential Regulation. This new agency is having similar task, 
supervising oil and gas contractor, but without having authority to decide and make 
policy on their own. The agency is also positioned under MEMR supervision. This 
positioning became a challenge for conducting their task effectively. They could not 
directly call and discuss problems and matters happen in the industry with related 
ministries. All have to be proposed to MEMR and the ministry is the one that could do so. 
However, although it is not ideal, the agency’s existence is crucial to bridging 
government and companies’ opposite interest and approach related to business operations 
and related affairs. In this regard, implementation of government policies related to the 
industry could be done by the companies without much problem. The communication is 
done two ways with compromise to companies’ circumstances. 
BP Migas have their organizational structure and experience from initially 
established by Pertamina specially to conduct its task to supervise the contractors. Having 
access to all companies’ information and plans is proven to be beneficial to improve the 
agency’s capacity to govern the industry effectively. It is important to underline that the 
effectiveness does not mean without problems. The decreasing oil production is unsolved 
250  
problems as investment on explorative operation is high risk and high capital. There is no 
new oilfield found after all attempts made by both BP Migas and SKK Migas. National 
production is still heavily relied on mature oilfields with various strategies, to increase its 
production. It is not a surprise that Indonesia halted its membership in OPEC as of 2006 
due to the country being net oil importer since 2004. 
In contrast with the governance of hydrocarbon industry presented above, the 
learning process in the governance of mining sector is different. MEMR is the one that 
always be supervisor for mining contractors. However, unlike Pertamina and BP Migas, 
the agency never actually oversaw the mining operation as they have limited expertise 
and budget to conduct close inspection in the mines. Hence, their main strategy is to have 
a more bureaucratic approach and one way interaction with mining companies. The 
mining contractors, like the hydrocarbon companies, have administrative obligation to 
submit various documents to MEMR and seeking government approval before conducting 
any operations in the mines. However, such information and data is not properly preserve 
and analyse properly (based on my visit to its library and a discussion with its staff) to 
grasp the business operations and companies’ circumstances and make a better policy to 
support expansion of their operation. Companies have limited communication and 
interaction with MEMR and thus government could not response effectively to 
companies’ voice. The mining companies generally understand and attempt to fulfil their 
obligation to the government by themselves without having consultation with their direct 
supervisor, the MEMR. In this regard, companies’ capacity to process new policies and 
obligations from both national and subnational government is distinguishable. Big 
company with big capital is able to constantly check the newest regulation for their 
operation and financial obligation. They even have special section that is responsible to 
do that task and to discuss it with staffs in MEMR or other ministries. On the other hand, 
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many other companies could not afford to do so. There is a very loose government’s 
supervision and governance structure in mining sector. All ministries have their own 
strategy to deal with the companies. Thus, the institutional structure is somehow messy 
and complex with so many agencies involved without having coordination. Mining 
companies are in disadvantage position in such structure. Such circumstance also means 
that mining sector has many of loophole in which corruption and other negative elites’ 
behaviour are unsupervised and uncontrolled. 
Important change in procedure element of the sector happens when 
decentralization policy came into effect. MEMR should share some of its authority, to 
negotiate with and give contract to mining companies, with subnational government. This 
policy produce large amount of unreliable mining contracts signed by local governments. 
To deal with this problem, MEMR implement a clean and clear project to evaluate every 
contract made by subnational government and classify it between the one that is reliable 
and the one that is problematic and fictitious. The mines with clean and clear certificate 
are expected to free from problems and the companies are allowed to operate in the area. 
Meanwhile, the ones that are not certified means that there are problems related to the 
land, mostly overlapping rights to use the land. 
Above analysis shows that generally, GoI have transformation from limited to a 
more open access order. The bureaucratic system, especially the ministries related to 
economic activities, developed to be perpetual life organizations. It means that  
impersonal exchange, through a more standardize procedure based on regulations, is 
replacing personal exchange based on elites personal connection and leadership. The 
government adapts with changes, happen both in rule and procedure elements of 
institutional arrangement, without has to rely on top bureaucratic elites’ direction and 
leadership. Furthermore, it also means that learning processes of both individuals and the 
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organization affect the way in which further development happen in the resource 
governance. It also means that the way in which government deal with business entities is 
also developing along with its learning process and transformation. 
In conclusion, both learning process and adaptive mechanism of institutional 
actors to deal with changes happen in institutional arrangement of both sectors are indeed 
different and complex. Such complexity is better understood by using Institutionalism and 
institutional change framework. 
It would be valuable to continue the focus on institutional change of resource 
governance in developing countries. First of all, it is important to analyse the variety of 
government styles in managing different economic sectors by conducting case or 
comparative studies. By doing so, the research could provide a wider range of analysis 
and conclusions regarding the way in which a government governs its interdependence 
with business entities. Furthermore, by using a qualitative comparative method, the study 
could be expanded to compare the government and business relations of an industry in 
different countries with similar or different characteristics. By doing so, the framework 
would be able to cover a wider area and sectoral studies. 
In order to do so, there are two basic guidelines that I propose to be followed in 
further researches on resource governance in developing countries. The first one is that it 
is important to keep in mind that the both government and business entities are not 
unitary. Furthermore, they are not static as they always develop their capacities along 
with their learning process. It means that their exposure to larger  institutional 
arrangement in national, local, and global environments could change the way in which 
they perceive and process information as well as determine their choice of actions and 
decisions. 
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Secondly, it is important not to make too early judgement both the governance of 
an industry and the pattern of government and companies’ relations in the industry. 
Process tracing is a method that utilises an objective perception in accompanying a 
researcher to study the development process in politic, economic, and social realms. An 
early justification could cause a research to overlook the real set of events, such as 
changes in institutional arrangements and changes in the relationship patterns among 
actors. 
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